S.A. Subramania Padayachi vs S. Balachandran

Venkataraman, J.—This revision petition is filed by one Subramania Padayachi questioning the order of eviction passed against him by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Chidambaram, under Sub-S. 4 (a) of S. 3of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (Act XXV of 1955). The respondent to this petition Balachandran was admittedly the owner of the lands in question situated in Sokkankollai, when he leased them out to the present petitioner Subramania Padayachi in 1955. The landlord filed the petition for eviction of the present petitioner on the ground that the latter was in arrears of rent subsequent to 1957. Even in his petition for eviction, he referred to an agreement dated 26th December, 1958, entered into between him and the tenant Subramania Padayachi (the present petitioner) under which Subramania Padayachi was to become the owner of the lands in Sokkankollai of which till then he was a lessee, and in exchange Subramania Padayachi was to sell certain lands in Thiruvengadu village to Balachandran. But the case of Balachandran is that this arrangement did not materialise, because among other things, there was cloud on the title to the lands in Thiruvengadu and that the period of agreement had also expired on 30th May, 1959. On the ground therefore that Subramania Padayachi was still a tenant and was in arrears, he filed the petition for eviction. The eviction petition was resisted by Subramania Padayachi on the ground that the agreement dated 26th December, 1958, had put an end to the relationship of landlord and tenant and had altered his status into one of purchaser. He alleged that it was Balachandran who had committed default and contended that Balachandran had taken possession of the lands in Thiruvengadu.

Both sides let in some evidence. But the learned Revenue Divisional Officer felt that he was not the competent authority to decide the question whether the agreement had ceased to be operative or could be availed of by Subramania Padayachi, that the relationship of landlord and tenant still continued and that since admittedly there had been arrears of rent at least from 1958-59, Subramania Padayachi was liable to be evicted. He further found that there was no proof of payment of rent for 1957-58 either. On the quantum of rent for each year, however, he found that there was no proof beyond the admitted liability of 40 kalams for each of the two crops in the year and fixed the arrears only at that rate. The amount due was thus fixed at Rs. 2260 and he gave a month''s time from the date of the order (5th June, 1962) to pay the arrears.

It seems to me that the decision of the learned Revenue Divisional Officer is correct. Sri Balakrishnan learned Counsel for the petitioner, cited the decision of Ganapatia Pillai, J. in Annamalai Gounden v. Venkataswami Naidu (1959) 1 M.L.J. 301= 72 L.W. 265, In that case the tenancy came to an end on 18th November, 1954, and it was common ground of the erstwhile landlord and tenant that that relationship came to an end by means of an agreement of May, 1957, by which the erstwhile landlord was to sell the lands to the former tenant. Consideration was paid in part but when the balance of the sale price was tendered by the former tenant, the former landlord refused to receive it. The period of limitation for enforcing the contract by specific performance had not expired. It was in such a situation that Ganapatia Pillai, J. said that it was not open to the former landlord to treat the relationship of landlord and tenant as subsisting and to resort to the petition under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. The learned Judge referred to the right conferred by S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act on the former tenant to remain in possession and to resist an action in ejectment if filed in a civil Court. That decision however cannot apply to the case here, because in that case admittedly the relationship of landlord and tenant had come to an end and hence the initial jurisdiction of the Revenue Divisional Officer under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act had gone. But that is not the case here. According to Balachandran, the agreement did not fructify and the relationship of landlord and tenant continues.

The argument that merely by setting up such an agreement of sale, the former tenant can resist the application for eviction has only to be stated to be rejected, because in such a case a frivolous plea to that effect can be put forward by a former tenant by producing a forged document of sale in his favour. Even Sri Balakrishnan, learned Counsel for the petitioner, recognises this to some extent, but says that in this particular case, there is an agreement in writing and Balachandran has admitted the receipt of Rs. 1000 in his deposition. He urges that the Revenue Divisional Officer must under the Act have at least a limited jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the bona fides of a claim by the former tenant of the cessation of the tenancy. I am not persuaded that this is correct. In this respect there seems to be prima facie difference between the provisions of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (Act XXV of 1955) and the provisions of S. 7of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, and the corresponding Act of 1960. Under these latter Acts a bona fide denial of the title of the landlord would be sufficient to exclude the jurisdiction of the House Rent Controller and in such a case the landlord would be permitted to resort to the civil Court to get a decree for eviction. There is no such provision for bona fide denial of title by the former tenant under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. Indeed one provision is that a tenant, who wilfully denies the title of the landlord to the land, is liable to be evicted under the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (Vide S. 3 (2) (d) of that Act). Explanation (1) says that a denial of the landlord''s title under a bona fide mistake is not wilful within the meaning of this clause. This is different from a bona fide claim of title by a former tenant in himself. Even if his claim is bona fide, a denial of title of the landlord would seem to be wilful and intentional. Looking at the Act from this aspect, it seems to be that the scheme of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, is to confer benefits on the tenant only when he admits his relationship as tenant and pays up rent regularly. From this point of view, it seems to me, that the learned Revenue Divisional Officer cannot be said to be wrong in saying that he had no jurisdiction to decide the question raised. Assuming for the sake of argument that he had jurisdiction to decide the question, I would say prima facie that on the materials available the present petitioner is not entitled to relief. I rely on the evidence on his own side that the attempts to put the agreement through proved abortive. There is no reason to reject the evidence of Balachandran that the arrangement could not be put through because there was cloud on the title to the lands in Thiruvengadu.

Learned Counsel relies on the fact that the petitioner had paid Rs. 1000 to Balachandran. But that is neither here nor there for our purpose. The present petitioner may pursue his remedy in the civil Court for recovery of that amount or for enforcing the agreement of sale, if it is possible. The point is that it is he who must go to a civil Court.

The residuary complaint of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the learned Revenue Divisional Officer was wrong in finding that there were arrears even prior to 1959-60. For this purpose he relied on an averment in the agreement that if the transaction was not completed by May, 1959, Balachandran would be entitled to the produce of 40 kalams of paddy to be harvested in May, 1959. It seems to me that the provision refers to the particular crop which was then existing on the land at the time of the agreement and cannot be construed as throwing any light either way on the arrears. If this clause is to be construed as meaning that there were no arrears apart from the 40 kalams of paddy standing on the land, ready for harvest, it is inconsistent with the admission of the present petitioner that he was in arrears even for the year 1958--59 completely, for both the crops. That shows that the clause in question cannot be interpreted in the manner suggested. The point is that the petitioner did not produce any receipt, to show that he had paid rent for 1957--58. The decision of the learned Revenue Divisional Officer, therefore, appears to be correct on that point also. For the above reasons, I feel unable to admit this civil revision petition. It is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner is given time till 31st July 1962 to pay off the arrears.