High CourtsSingle Bench(2012) 07 P&H CK 0023

Sachin Kapoor and Others vs State of Punjab and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 17 July 2012

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rameshwar Singh Malik, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Miscellaneous M-No. 24502 of 2011 (O and M)

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Judgment

72 paragraphs · 1,603 words

Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.—Petitioners seek quashing of FIR No.85 dated 08.08.2006 under Sections 498A/406 IPC, registered at

Police Station E-Division Kotwali Amritsar, by way of instant petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C., invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court on the basis

of compromise (Annexure P-1), arrived at between the parties. Petitioner No.1, respondents No.2 and 3 are present and identified by their

respective counsel.

2.

Learned counsel for the private respondents No.2 and 3 as well as learned counsel for the petitioners are ad idem that the parties have amicably

settled the dispute. Petitioner No.1 and respondent No.3 filed a petition u/s 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for dissolution of marriage by a

decree of divorce by way of mutual consent. The learned court of competent jurisdiction, vide its judgement dated 17.02.2011 rendered in Hindu

Marriage Act Case No.8 of 2011, titled as ''Sachin Kapoor vs. Smt.Simmi @ Nidhi'', has accepted the petition and dissolved the marriage

between the parties by a decree of divorce by mutual consent.

3.

The parties accepted the terms of compromise arrived between them which have been so recorded by the learned trial Court while passing its

above said judgement dated 17.02.2012. It is appropriate to refer to the observations made by the learned trial Court in operative para No.5 of

the judgement dated 17.02.2012, which read as under:

In his statement petitioner No.1 Sachin has reiterated on oath all the averments contained in the petition filed u/s 13B of Hindu Marriage Act,

while, Simmi, petitioner No.2 has agreed with the statement of petitioner No.1 and admitted it correct that she has received two drafts of Rs.

2,50,000/-in her favour Rs. One lac in favour of minor. Rs. 12000/-in cash qua difference of gold ornaments. The parties to the petition have left

with no right against each other and both the parties undertake that in future they will not claim anything from any of the party. The son of the

parties shall remain in the custody of parents of petitioner No.2 having been adopted by them by way of registered Adoption Deed. Now there

shall be no claim against each other. The parties are living separately from each other since 20.04.2006 and there is no cohabitation between the

parties and they are separated from each other on account of incompatibility of temperament. There are no chances of reconciliation in future. The

parties have settled their claim inter se. Both the parties are in the prime of their youth. Keeping this relationship intact would not serve any purpose

than to unnecessarily prolong the agony of the parties. The statutory period of six months has already expired. Hence, the petition is allowed and

the marriage of the parties is ordered to be dissolved by decree of divorce by mutual consent from today. Parties to bear their own costs. Decree

sheet be drawn. File be consigned to the record room.

4.

Learned counsel for the parties also filed compromise deed dated 29.06.2011 (Annexure P-1). Original of Annexure P-1 has been shown by

the learned counsel for the parties, on which the photographs of petitioner No.1 as well as of respondents No.2 and 3, have also been affixed. On

the pointed question put to respondents No.2 and 3, they have stated in one voice that they have got no objection in case the impugned FIR is

quashed because they have entered into a compromise with the petitioners. They have also admitted the fact that pursuant to the compromise, the

parties filed a petition u/s 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act and the marriage between the parties already stood dissolved by way of decree of

divorce by mutual consent.

5.

Learned counsel for the petitioners as well as private respondents submit that since the parties have decided to bury the hatchet, no useful

purpose shall be served if the prosecution is allowed to continue. They further submit that in view of the compromise arrived at between the

parties, no chance of conviction is left and in this view of the matter, the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed.

6.

Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the record of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that it is just

and expedient to quash the impugned FIR, so as to prevent the abuse of process of law and also to secure the ends of justice. I say so because the

parties have arrived at a genuine compromise on the settled terms which are reflected from the operative part of the judgement dated 17.02.2012,

reproduced above. Further, petitioner No.1 and private respondents who are present in the Court have endorsed the factum of compromise

(Annexure P-1). The private respondents have got no objection if the impugned FIR is ordered to be quashed. Thus, the ends of justice would be

adequately met, in case the impugned FIR is ordered to be quashed.

7.

In the case of Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab, , the Apex Court emphasised and advised as under:

We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should

ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the

prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding

more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities

of the law.

8.

The view taken by this Court finds support from the recent judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in Shiji @ Pappu and others versus

Radhika and another, 2012 (1) RCR (criminal) 9 and also the larger Bench of this Court in Kulwinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and

another reported as 2007 (3) RCR (criminal) 1052. The observations made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in para 13 of the judgment in Shiji''s

case (supra), which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:

It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable u/s 320 IPC is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its

power unde Section 482 Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against

the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences

by the parties before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution u/s 482

Cr.P.C. on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an

offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in case where the offences are not compoundable u/s 320, the High Court may quash

the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High

Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the

power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the

nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in case where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear

view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to

enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power u/s 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for

securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court

may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing

with a petition u/s 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of

each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.

9.

Reverting back to the facts of the present case, this Court has satisfied itself that the parties have arrived at a genuine compromise without any

pressure. They have amicably decided to part ways. Further, the marriage between the parties already stood dissolved by a decree of divorce by

way of mutual consent, vide above said judgement dated 17.02.2012. passed by the learned court of competent jurisdiction.

10.

In this view of the matter, the instant one is a fit case for invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the

impugned FIR, so as to secure the ends of justice.

11.

In the totality of the facts and circumstances of the present case, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, the impugned FIR No.85 dated

08.08.2006 under Sections 498A/406 IPC, registered at Police Station E-Division Kotwali, Amritsar, including the subsequent proceedings

arising therefrom, is ordered to be quashed. Resultantly, the instant petition stands allowed.