Sachin Pandey vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others

Ashish Shroti, J

Petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 28/8/2025 passed by Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Gwalior, whereby, he has been removed from service and his service contract has been cancelled on account of filing of challan by Special Police Establishment (SPE), in relation to offence registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short "PC Act"). The petitioner has also challenged the Clause 6.9 (क) of Circular dated 24/6/2025 being violative of principles of natural justice. He has also prayed for a direction to the respondents to permit him to continue on his post.

The facts, in short, necessary for decision of this case are that the petitioner was appointed as Gram Rojgar Sahayak in the Gram Panchayat, Putti, Janpad Panchayat Dabra, District Gwalior. A criminal case being Crime No.244/2021 is registered against him by Superintendent of Police, SPE, Gwalior for offence punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(b) & 13(2) of PC Act. The SPE sought sanction for prosecution from the respondent/department on 6/9/2023 and the department, in turn, gave sanction vide memo dated 5/8/2024. Accordingly, after investigation, the SPE filed challan on 17/6/2025 and the trial is now pending in the Court of Special Judge (PC Act), Gwalior, which is subject matter of Special Case No.4 of 2025.

Invoking Clause 6.9(क) of Circular dated 24/6/2025, the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Gwalior passed the impugned order, thereby, removing the petitioner from the post of Gram Rojgar Sahayak and cancelling his service agreement with immediate effect. This has been done on account of filing of challan in relation to the aforesaid case against the petitioner.

Challenging the impugned action of the respondents, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner was working on the post of Gram Rojgar Sahayak and a challan for offence under Section 7, 13(1)(b) & 13(2) of PC Act has been presented against the petitioner and only on account of filing of challan, his services have been terminated without conducting enquiry and affording him opportunity of hearing. It is his submission that till date, there is no finding of guilt recorded against the petitioner in the criminal case and even the respondents have not conducted any enquiry holding him guilty of any misconduct, and therefore, his services could not have been terminated. The learned counsel further submitted that Clause 6.9(क) of Circular dated 24/6/2025 is illegal and arbitrary being violative of basic principles of natural justice. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of Apex Court in the case of K.C. Joshi Vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1985)3 SCC 153 and that of Delhi High Court in the case of Mangal Singh Vs. Chairman, National Research Development Corporation & Ors., reported in 2009 SCC Online Del 2345. He further submitted that even though the respondents have stated in their reply that a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 21/8/2025, however, no such notice is received by the petitioner and within seven days of issuance of such show cause notice, the impugned order has been passed.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submitted that in terms of Clause 6.9 of Circular dated 24/6/2025, petitioner's services are liable to be terminated as the challan has been filed against him for offences registered under the PC Act. It is his submission that no enquiry was required to be conducted when the SPE has already found him guilty in its investigation and the challan has been filed. Learned counsel further submitted that the even though there is no requirement, a show cause notice was served to the petitioner on 21/8/2025 and the impugned order has been passed only thereafter.

With regard to validity of Clause 6.9(क) of Circular dated 24/6/2025, learned counsel for the State submitted that the investigation has been done by Superintendent of Police. Further, the department has also considered in detail the acts alleged against the petitioner while granting sanction for prosecution, and therefore, since the respondents were satisfied about the guilt of petitioner, the impugned action is justified and does not warrant any interference. It is his submission that in cases of corruption and/or the offence involving moral turpitude, there can be no tolerance and sympathy shown in favour of the employee. It is his further submission that since the petitioner is only a contractual employee, he does not have any vested right to continue in service and looking to the nature of his job, no detailed enquiry was required to be conducted before dispensing with his services. Learned counsel therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.

Considered the arguments and perused the records.

It is not in dispute that the petitioner has been removed from the post of Gram Rojgar Sahayak and his service contract has been cancelled only because of registration of the criminal case for offence under the PC Act and filing of challan in the Special Court. Even though respondents have averred in their reply that a show cause notice was given to the petitioner on 21/8/2025, however, the petitioner has specifically denied this fact. From the notice, it is seen that one day time was given to the petitioner to present his case before the Authority. There is no document available on record to show that this show cause notice was served to the petitioner. Accordingly, it is to be held that the show cause notice was not served to the petitioner.

It is settled in law that even contractual employee is required to be given adequate opportunity of hearing before terminating his services. This has been so held by this Court in the case of K.C. Joshi (supra). The Court held as under:

"9.Mr Datta however, contended that the earlier order dated December 7, 1963 recites that the appointment could be terminated by either side by one month's notice and that was the power invoked in terminating the service of the appellant. The order dated December 7, 1963 was at the time when the appellant was appointed on probation. On successful completion of probation, the appellant became a member of the regular establishment. The contract of service, if any, has to be in tune with Articles 14 and 16 and such unilateral power of termination of service without giving reasons is so abhorrent that it smacks of discrimination and therefore, violative of Article 14. The High Court brushed aside this aspect by merely observing that "in order to dismiss one employee on the ground of unsuitability, the Government or the Corporation is not required to dismiss all". If it is suggested that you can dismiss anyone without a semblance of an enquiry or without whisper of the principles of natural justice, then such an approach overlooks the well-established principle that where State action affects livelihood or attaches stigma, the punitive action can be taken after holding an enquiry according to the principles of natural justice. In other words, an unbiased Judge, and an opportunity to controvert the allegation and to clear oneself are the minimum principles of natural justice which must inform such drastic power of dismissal affecting livelihood of an employee. If the observation of the High Court was with reference to the contention of the order being violative of Articles 14 and 16, it overlooks the fact that the Corporation attempted to sustain its action on the ground that the services of the appellant were no more required which will certainly impel the court to enquire whether the post had been abolished or whether retaining the juniors, the inconvenient person was thrown out under the garb of being surplus. Therefore, the approach of the High Court in this behalf is not appreciable."

The ratio of aforesaid case was of course in the case of member of regular establishment, however, the observations made would apply to a Gram Rojgar Sahayak also where he is appointed on contract basis.

The respondent no.3 has invoked Clause 6.9 of the Circular dated 24/6/2025 while passing the impugned order. Said clause empowers the authority to dispense with the service of Gram Rojgar Sahayak in case challan has been filed after obtaining sanction for prosecution in relation to offence of corruption or moral turpitude. As per the petitioner, such action could not be taken against him without complying with principles of natural justice. On the other hand, counsel for the State submitted that no opportunity is required to be given when the petitioner has been found guilty in investigation and challan has been filed.

Thus, the issue for consideration of this Court is as to whether Clause 6.9(क) of Circular dated 24/6/2025 is illegal being in violation of basic principle of natural justice?

Clause 6 of the Circular dated 24/6/2025 deals with discipline and control with regard to services of a Gram Rojgar Sahayak. Clause 6.1. to 6.5 deals with the manner in which the action is to be taken against a Gram Rojgar Sahayak in case of any departmental complaint/misconduct. Clause

6.6 thereof provides that upon proof of embezzlement of amount, acts of moral turpitude or gross indiscipline, the services of a Gram Rojgar Sahayak can be terminated. This clause also incorporates application of principles of natural justice inasmuch as service of Gram Rojgar Sahayak can be terminated only when act of embezzlement of amount, acts of moral turpitude or gross indiscipline is proved. To prove such act, the opportunity is required to be given. Clause 6.7 thereafter provides that in case of complaint/charge, the reasonable opportunity of hearing shall be given to the Gram Rojgar Sahayak. Thus, from reading Clause 6.1 to 6.7, it is seen that before taking departmental action against Gram Rojgar Sahayak on the ground of misconduct, the principles of natural justice needs to be complied with.

Clause 6.9 of the circular deals with the situation when a Gram Rojgar Sahayak is involved in a criminal case. It provides for termination of his service upon filling of challan in cases of corruption and involving moral turpitude. Clause 6.9, being relevant, is reproduced hereunder:-

"6.9 यदि किसी à¤-्राम रोजà¤-ार सहायक के विरुद्ध लोकायुक्त/ ईà¤"डब्ल्यू का ट्रैप प्रकरण à¤...थवा आपराधिक प्रकरण पंजीबद्ध हुआ हो तो उसके विरुद्ध उपरोक्त प्रावधानों के à¤...नुसार शासकीय कार्यों से विरत रà¤-े जाने का आदेश प्रसारित किया जाएà¤-ा। यदि à¤...नुबंध à¤...वधि समाप्त होने तक संबंधित à¤-्राम रोजà¤-ार सहायक सक्षम न्यायालय से दोषमुक्त नहीं होता है तो आà¤-ामी वर्ष हेतु संविदा नवीनीकरण नहीं किया जाएà¤-ा। इस प्रकार के प्रकरणों में निम्न आधार पर संविदा सेवा भी समाप्त की जाएà¤-ी:-"

(क) जब भ्रष्टाचार या à¤...न्य नैतिक à¤...पराध में आरोपित दण्डनीय à¤...पराध में सक्षम प्राधिकारी द्वारा à¤...भियोजन स्वीकृति के पश्चात उसके विरुद्ध चालान प्रस्तुत किया à¤-या हो।

[à¤-] उसके निरुद्ध किए जाने के दिनांक से यदि उसे या तो किसी दंडनीय आरोप पर या à¤...न्यथा, 48 घंटे से à¤...धिक की कालावधि के लिए à¤...भिरक्षा में निरुद्ध किया à¤-या हो।

Aforesaid Clause 6.9 can be bifurcated into following three categories:

(ii) if the Gram Rojgar Sahayak is not acquitted in criminal case till conclusion of his contract period, his contract shall not be renewed for the next year; and

(iii) in the following cases, the contract of service can be dispensed with:

(a) when in cases of corruption or moral turpitude, the challan has been filed against Gram Roj Sahayak after obtaining sanction from the competent authority; and

(b) if he is detained for 48 hours in case of any criminal offence.

Sub clause (क) of Clause 6.9 of the Circular dated 24/6/2025 thus provides for termination of service of a Gram Rojgar Sahayak merely on filing of challan in the criminal case involving corruption and/or moral turpitude.

It is the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is innocent till he is proved guilty. It is profitable to refer to following observations of Apex Court in this regard in the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2024)9 SCC 813:

"18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused; not a convict. The over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be."

Thus, at the stage of filing of challan, the accused in a criminal case cannot be said to be guilty of the offence alleged against him and, therefore, mere filing of challan in criminal case cannot be foundation for taking an action against him in service jurisprudence.

It is also settled in law that while continuance of a criminal trial, the employer can always simultaneously conduct an enquiry to judge the suitability of the employee to continue in service. However, for judging the suitability also, opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the employee as it is concerning his livelihood. At the cost of repetition, the Apex Court in the case of K.C. Joshi (supra) observed "an opportunity to controvert the allegation and to clear oneself are the minimum principles of natural justice which must inform such drastic power of dismissal affecting livelihood of an employee". As observed hereinbefore, even for a contractual employee, reasonable opportunity of hearing is required to be given before passing any stigmatic order against a contractual employee also.

The learned Govt. Advocate is perfectly justified in submitting that in cases of corruption and acts involving moral turpitude, there cannot be any leniency in favour of an employee. There should be zero tolerance in such cases. However, for holding an employee guilty of such act of moral turpitude and/or corruption, there has to be a finding of guilty recorded either in criminal case or in an enquiry to be conducted by employer. As observed above, mere filing of challan is not a finding of guilt against the accused. Therefore, before taking any action against an employee based upon his involvement in criminal case, the respondents are required to record a finding of guilt against the petitioner. Needless to mention, being a contractual employee, the petitioner cannot demand for a regular departmental enquiry as contemplated under Rule 14 of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966. The nature of enquiry would depend upon the discretion of employer and its satisfaction about guilt. However, action cannot and should not be taken without complying with even basic principles of natural justice.

Thus, denial of opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before terminating his services invoking Clause 6.9 of Circular dated 24/6/2025 is found to be in violation of principles of natural justice. This petition is accordingly allowed and disposed of with the following directions:

(i). Clause 6.9 (क) of Circular dated 24/6/2025 is therefore declared illegal to the extent it denies opportunity of hearing to the concerned Gram Rojgar Sahayak. The respondents are accordingly directed to incorporate the provision for affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to a Gram Rojgar Sahayak before taking action against him under Clause 6.9(क) of Circular dated 24/6/2025.

(ii). The aforesaid direction is however not applicable in cases of renewal of service contract of a Gram Rojgar Sahayak. In other words while renewing the service contract, the competent authority is at liberty to consider the facts and circumstances of the case and take a decision in the matter and in such cases of renewal of contract, the principles of natural justice would not be applicable. However, dispensing with principles of natural justice does not mean that the authority is absolved of its obligation to record reason for such non-renewal. Such a decision taken by the competent authority would also be open to judicial review by this Court.

(iii). The impugned order dated 28/8/2025 (Annexure P/1) is found to be unsustainable in law and is accordingly set aside. The respondent no.3 is directed to afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and to pass fresh order in the matter. Since, the petitioner is already out of service since 28/8/2025, his reinstatement in service shall remain in abeyance and is subject to fresh order that may be passed by respondent no.3.

The petition stands allowed and disposed of accordingly.