High CourtsSingle Bench

Sadhu Ram vs Rohtak Improvement Trust

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 19 March 1998 · Citation: (1998) 120 PLR 505

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sat Pal, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 39 Rule 1, Order 39 Rule 2
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision No''s. 3520 (O and M) and 3563 (O and M) of 1997
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 989 words

Sat Pal, J.—Civil Revision Nos. 3520 and 3563 of 1997 are being disposed of by this common judgment as the point raised in both the petitions is similar. For the purpose of this judgment, facts from C.R. No. 3520 of 1997 have been taken.

2.

In this case, the petitioners-plaintiffs filed suit for permanent injunction against Rohtak Improvement Trust (respondent-herein) with the prayer that the respondent-defendants be restrained from carving out plots on any part of the street site running from North to South on the eastern side of their factory building by way of conducting public auction. Along with the plaint, the plaintiffs-petitioners filed an application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC for interim injunction. The said application was dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Rohtak, vide order dated 10th April, 1997. The appeal filed by the petitioners against the said order, dated 10th April, 1997 was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Rohtak, vide order dated 21st August, 1997. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders passed by the courts below, the present petitions have been filed by the petitioners.

3.

Mr. Kapoor, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the disputed land which is 20 feet wide Gali on the eastern side of the petitioners'' property, had been used as a street since 1974. In this connection, he submitted that a letter dated 27th February, 1976 (copy of which is on record of the trial Court) was written by Shri S.P. Mittal, the then Deputy Commissioner and the rough site plan annexed with that letters shows that the disputed land was a street. He, therefore, contended that the respondents could not be permitted to put up any structure on the public pathway. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the Municipal Board, Manglaur Vs. Sri Mahadeoji Maharaj, , and a judgment of the Madras High Court in K.V.K. Janardhan v. State of Tamil Naidu 1995 (2) R.R.R. 580.

4.

Mr. Goyal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, submitted that the disputed land was acquired by the defendants under the Trust Development Scheme No. 19 vide Notification dated 28th June, 1974 which was duly approved by the State Government. He submitted that the said land was lying vacant for the last 25 years as per the report of the Local Commissioner. He submitted that as per the case of the plaintiffs, defendant-Trust had agreed to leave 12 feet wide land out of their land and the plaintiffs had agreed to leave 8 feet wide land both these lands combined together were converted into a street. He, however, submitted that as per the observations of the courts below, the plaintiffs have failed to produce any document in support of their said averment. He further submitted that the local Commissioner appointed by the learned trial Court, in his report, has stated that the disputed land was situated in Khasra No. 8086 but the land belonging to the plaintiffs is situated in Khasras No. 8084-8085. He, therefore, contended that both the Courts below have rightly dismissed the prayer of the plaintiffs for interim injunction.

5.

I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. From the order passed by the learned trial Court, I find that the said order is based on documentary evidence, viz. notification dated 28th June, 1974, in terms of which the land in dispute was acquired by the defendant-improvement Trust vide development Scheme No. 19 and the compensation as directed by this Court has already been deposited in the court of the learned Additional District Judge, Rohtak. It may be relevant to note here that objections were invited from general public in the year 1972 before acquiring the land in dispute but no objection was raised by the plaintiffs. Besides, from the order dated 21st August, 1997, passed by the learned lower appellate Court, I find that the Tehsildar was appointed by the learned trial Court as Local Commissioner and vide his report dated 24th May, 1997, it was observed by the Local Commissioner, that the disputed land was a part of Khasra No. 8086 whereas the land of the plaintiffs is situated in Khasras Nos. 8084-8085. Keeping in view the aforesaid documents on record, the learned trial Court and the learned lower appellate Court came to the prima facie conclusion that the plaintiffs were not entitled for interim injunction. Since the orders passed by the courts below are based on prima facie valid evidence, it cannot be said that the orders passed by the Courts below are arbitrary or perverse. The said orders passed by the Courts below, therefore, do not call for interference by this Court in its jurisdiction u/s 115 Cr. P.C.

6.

As regards the contention of the learned counsel of the plaintiffs-petitioners that in term of the rough site plan annexed with the alleged letter dated 27.2.1976 written by then Deputy Commissioner, the disputed land was shown as a street, I am of the opinion that this letter and the rough site plan are yet to be proved by the plaintiffs and at his stage, this letter cannot be relied upon in the present proceedings, particularly in view of the fact that the disputed land was acquired by the defendants under the Trust Development Scheme No. 19 vide notification dated 28.6.1974 which was duly approved by the State Government. Since, the fact as to whether the disputed land was being used as street is yet to be proved, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners-plaintiffs are of no assistance to them.

7.

In view of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in these petitions and accordingly, both the petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs.