High CourtsDivision Bench

Sagar Bai vs Junior/Assistant Engineer, Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board

Chhattisgarh High Court · Decided on 17 July 2023 · Citation: (2023) 07 CHH CK 0041

HON’BLE JUDGES
Goutam Bhaduri , J · Sanjay S. Agrawal, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
FA No. 197 Of 2015
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Judgment

51 paragraphs · 2,084 words

Heard.

1.

Instant appeal is against the judgement and decree dated 10th March, 2015 passed by the District Judge, Dhamtari in Civil Suit No. 01-B/2013 whereby the Court has passed a decree of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rs.Two Lakhs) in favour of the plaintiffs with an interest at the rate of 6% per annum.

2.

Briefly stated facts are that one Bhuneshwar Sahu who is husband of the appellant No.1 Sagar Bai and father of minor Digeshwar Sahu had went to his field to spread the fertilizers. During such act, he came in contact with a live wire of electric pole which was on the field and thereby he was electrocuted and died on 27/07/2009. It was pleaded that at the time of the incident Bhuneshwar Sahu was aged about 25 years and was in avocation of agriculture and was a mason and used to earn Rs.5000/-per month which would have been increased with the passage of time. It was stated that because of such sudden death, they were deprived of the family support including the income. As such compensation of Rs.12,00,000/- was claimed.

3.

The respondent/electricity department in its reply contended that because of the self invited activities the deceased Bhuneshwar Sahu came in contact with the live electric wire and died. It was stated that Bhuneshwar Sahu the deceased himself wanted to cross a wire and since he became unbalanced and caught hold of the wire, thereby came in contact with the wire, consequently the death was caused. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned District Judge framed the issues and held that because of the negligence of the respondent, the deceased Bhuneshwar Sahu died and after evaluating the facts, ordered for a compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- Hence, this appeal for enhancement of the compensation amount.

4.

Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the learned trial court has completely failed to appreciate the principle which governs grant of compensation in case of a death by like nature of negligence. He would further submit that the income of the deceased was not considered and only notional income of Rs.15,000/- was arrived at which is completely faulty. Apart from that, the other expenses which were incurred, a meager sum in lieu thereof to compensate was granted, therefore the amount of Rs.2,00,000/- requires to be enhanced.

5.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/electricity department would submit that the order of the learned District Judge is well merited inasmuch as there is no evidence as to the actual income of the deceased, therefore the notional income which was arrived at by the learned District Judge was justified in the facts of this case and no interference is required.

6.

We have heard the learned counsel for the contesting parties. Perused the evidence available on record.

7.

Admittedly, there is no appeal on the point of negligence. Even otherwise as held by the Supreme Court in the matter of M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumar and Others reported in 2002 AIR SCW 129 and this Court in Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Co. Ltd. & Another v. Smt. Bhagwati Bai (FA 198/2003) the principle of strict liability would be applicable.

8.

By referring the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of Shail Kumar (supra) and Union of India v Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and others (2008) 9 SCC 527, this Court in Smt. Bhagwati Bai (supra) held thus at paras 9 to 12 :

(9) Now the question arises for consideration as to whether defence raised by the electricity department that they were not liable for the act as no negligence was committed by them whether was available to them or not. Predominantly department has tried to raise defence to the 'torts' strict liability rule and exception for Act of god or safety measures. This issue was considered in the case of M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumar and others, 2002 AIR SCW 129 wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality is statutorily conferred on the Electricity Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it, the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. Therefore applying such principle, the defence so taken on the part of the management of the board that by reason of thunder storm the live wire fell down without there being any negligence was unavailable to the board. Even when safety measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertaking. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity and as such liability cast on such person is known, in law, as strict liability which is exactly in this case.

(10) Similarly Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (2008) 9 SCC 527 has laid down principle that exception to the doctrine of strict liability or no fault liability for hazardous activities cannot be applied to a Welfare State and there has been a corresponding shift from positivism to sociological jurisprudence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court at para 24 of this judgment has held as under:-

“24. The basis of the doctrine of strict liability is twofold; (i) The people who engage in particularly hazardous activities should bear the burden of the risk of damage that their activities generate, and (ii) it operates as a loss distribution mechanism, the person who does such hazardous activity (usually a corporation) being in the best position to spread the loss via insurance and higher prices for its products (vide Torts by Michael Jones, 4th Edn. p. 267).

(11) Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated that doctrine of strict liability shall be applicable to the public corporation or local bodies which may be of the social utility, undertaking not working for private profit.

(12) In the light of aforesaid principles I have examined the evidence adduced by both the parties closely. After careful examination of the evidence, I am of the opinion that the witnesses has substantially stated the fact that electricity line which was being run by the electricity department had broken and fallen to the ground wherein the deceased came in contact. The incidence is also on record that after the line had broken no warning was issued by the department of any danger to this effect that the live wire had broken down which may endanger the public life. It is not the case here that the deceased tried to enter in to a zone of danger knowing full well of the consequences. The fact that he was walking on the road and while such walk he came in contact with such live wire and eventually died because of the electrocution. Therefore the argument which is raised by the appellant that the deceased died not because of the negligence on part of electricity department cannot be sustained. As the deceased had died due to electrocution by electricity line which had fallen down was admittedly maintained by the electricity department. Therefore, they cannot escape the liability on this ground that no negligence was made by them. Therefore, after careful scrutiny of the evidence and finding of the trial court, I am of the opinion that the trial court while awarding the decree of Rs.1,22,500/- after evaluating the income of the deceased who was aged about 40 years has not committed any wrong and therefore the appeal has no merit and accordingly it fails and is hereby dismissed....

9.

Now turning to the quantum of compensation. The respective evidence of the plaintiff widow wife Sagar Bai is perused. No evidence is led on behalf of the respondent. Statement of the wife Sagar Bai would show that she states that at the time of the incident deceased, her husband was 25 years of age and he was doing his cultivation agriculture and also was doing the work of mason, thereby he used to earn Rs.5000/-per month which would have been increased with the passage of time to Rs.8000/- per month. In cross-examination of the witness suggestion was given to her that at the time of the incident her husband age was 24 years. The initial police enquiry also shows of the merg intimation that the deceased was aged about 25 years. The merg intimation and the preliminary papers Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 shows that deceased was of 24 years of age whereas the postmortem report (Ex.P/5) shows the age to be 30 years. The statement of the wife and the merg intimation which was made immediately after the incident would show the age of the deceased was 25 years and in the cross-examination too this fact was admitted by way of a suggestion by the defendant/respondent that the age of the deceased was 25 years. Therefore, it would be apt to accept the age of the deceased to 25 years.

10.

For purpose of calculation of the compensation, the learned District Judge has calculated the notional income to Rs.15,000/- per annum. Considering the fact that there was no evidence to rebut the statement of the wife that at the time of the death deceased used to earn Rs.5000/- per month by doing the work as a mason and taking into the fact payment of the mason which was paid and the inflation which was existing, the amount of Rs.5000/- per month which remains unrebutted appears to be reasonable. Further considering the age of the deceased, he was said to be of 25 years, applying the principles laid down in (2017) 16 SCC 680 in between National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and Others an addition of 40% of the established income would warrant as the deceased was below the age of 40 years and was self employed. Since there were four dependents i.e. the plaintiffs/appellants herein the wife minor children, mother and father, as per the principle laid down in Sarla Verma v. D.T.C. (2009) 6 SCC 121 deduction would be ¼th towards the personal expenses of the deceased. Taking into the age of the deceased, multiplier of 18 would be applicable. On the conventional head for loss of estate amount of Rs.18,150/- would be granted as per the law down in case of Pranay Sethi (supra), for loss of consortium Rs.48,400/- and for funeral expenses Rs.15,000/- would be granted. Thus, we calculate the compensation as under:-

S.No.

Head

Calculation

1.

Income of the deceased @ Rs.5000/- per month

Rs.5000 x 12 = Rs.60,000/-

p.a.

2.

40% of (1) above to be added as future prospects

Rs.24,000/-

S.No.1 + S.No.2

Rs.84,000/-

3.

One Fourth deduction as personal expenses of the deceased

Rs.21,000/-

(Rs.84000- Rs.21000)

Rs.63,000/-

4.

Compensation after multiplier of 18 is applied

Rs.63000 x 18 = Rs.11,34,000/-

5.

Loss of estate

Rs.18,150/-

6.

Consortium to wife

Rs.48,400/-

7.

Funeral expenses

Rs.15,000/-

Total compensation (S.No.4+5+6+7)

Rs.12,15,550/-

11.

In view of the above, the decree is modified to the above extent. The defendants/respondents are directed to pay an amount of Rs.12,15,550/- (Rupees Twelve Lakhs Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty to the plaintiffs/appellants No.1 to 4. Any amount paid during the pendency of this appeal or in the execution proceeding as per terms of the decree shall be deducted and rest of the amount shall carry interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of incident i.e. from 27/07/2009 till the date of realization.

12.

Considering the age of the claimants, we deem it proper that the distribution of the compensation amount would be to the extent of 65% to the appellants No.1 and 2, who are the wife & son of the deceased and rest of 35% of the amount would be distributed to the appellants No.3 and 4, who are the parents of the deceased.

13.

In the result, the appeal is allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).

14.

A decree be drawn accordingly.