Sailesh Chandra Dey vs Labour Court and Another

Bhat, C.J.—Petitioner is a former employee of M/s Moloy Biri Company Ltd. of which the Secretary is respondent No. 2 herein. Petitioner was working as an Accountant and for some reason or the other he tendered resignation which was accepted. However, the sums due to him by way of leave salary, out-station allowance, gratuity, bonus, unpaid salary and Provident Fund were allegedly not paid to him. He, therefore, filed an application before the respondent No. 1, the statutory authority, claiming the amount u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Dispute act, 1947 (for short, the Act.) The application was resisted by the second respondent who contended, inter alia, that the petitioner had ceased to be "workman" of the second respondent on the date of the application u/s 33C(2) and hence he is not entitled to invoke Section 33C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court accepted this contention and rejected the application. Hence, the present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Section 33C(2) reads as follows:-

"(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit shoud be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government".

It is clear that the claim can be made by a "workman".

The expression ''workman" has been defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. Leaving aside the exception, the definition runs thus:

"In this context, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-

"Workinan", means any person employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, including any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as consequence of, that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include****"

"Workman" as defined above takes in not only a person actually in employment, but takes in also dismissed, discharged or retrenched workers, though the inclusive definition is in relation to Industrial Disputes. The legislative policy to treat former workman as workman for a limited person is clearly discernible from the inclusive definition. The question is whether a former workman can be treated as "workman" for the purpose of Section 33C(2) of the Act.

The definition begins with the words:

"In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.-"

enever a definition is to be construed and its application is to be considered, the court has to consider whether there is any thing repugnant in the subject or context and if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context, the definition has to be applied in the subject or context. If, however, there is any repugnancy the court must further consider to what extent, if at all, the definition can be imported into the subject or context and if it cannot be so imported, to determine what other meaning can be ascribed to the particular expression in the context or subject.

Section 33C(2) contemplates a situation where any workman is entitled to receive any money or benefit which can be computed in terms of money and there is any question arising as to the amount of money due. In such a situation the workman is entitled to approach before the Labour Court u/s 33C(2). Neither on principle nor on precedent can it be said that the Legislature intended to use the expression ''workman'' in Section 33C(2) in its narrow sense as a workman in actual employment of the employer on the date of the application. Section 33C(2) has been enacted to ensure the workman an efficacious and speedy modality to collect the amount due to him from the employer. There is no reason why this efficacious remedy should be denied to a person who was an employee of the employer but has ceased to be under such employment on the date of the application. Such denial will frustrate the legislative purpose behind Section 33C(2) since an employer who owes such dues to his workman need only to terminate his service to prevent him from invoking Section 33C(2). To import the definition in Section 2(s) in all it''s vigour into Section 33C(2) will tend to spell out a clear repugnancy with the scheme of Section 33C(2) and the legislative intendment. To hold that the expression "Workman" occurring in Section 33C(2) could take in a former workman could subserve the legislative purpose. The only limitation is that his claim must be in respect of an existing right arising from his erstwhile relationship as an employee of the employer.

The Supreme Court in National Building Constructon v. Pritam Singh Gill 1972 Lab IC 857 on almost identical facts took the view the "workman" as used in Section 33C(2) includes all persons whose claim, requiring computation under this sub-section, is in respect of an existing right arising from his relationship as an industrial workman with his employer. Petitioner is entitled to invoke Section 33C(2).

We, therefore, find that the order of the Labour Court is wholly erroneous in law and, therefore, cannot stand. We set aside the order dated April ,24, 1986 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court in Misc. Case No. 10 of 1984 (Annexure-A to the petition) and remit the proceeding to the Labour Court for fresh disposal of the matter in accordance with law.

The Civil Rule is accordingly disposed of but without cost.

Rule disposed of accordingly.