AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
David Annoussamy, J.—This is a petition under S 482 of the Code of Code of Criminal Procedure to call for the records in C.C. No. 200
of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Special Judicial First Class Magistrate (Prohibition), Pollachi, and to quash the same.
The first information report against the accused was filed on 22.7.1982. After Investigation, a final report u/s 173 of the Code of Code of
Criminal Procedure was filed by the investigation Officer to the effect that offences u/s 4(1)(a) and Section 4(1)(g) read with Section 11 of the
Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act appeared to have been committed by the accused. Upon perusal of that report and the documents appended
therewith, the Magistrate framed charges accordingly on 12.10.1983. Thereafter the matter has been adjourned 101 times without any progress in
the matter. Aggrieved by such a course, the accused has filed this petition on 18.1988 praying to quash the proceedings.
The Petitioner''s case is that there is inordinate delay in the trial of the case which fact constituted an abuse of process of law and was violative
of the constitutional rights of the accused to speedy justice. He further added that he was a resident of Palani and that on each adjourned date he
was compelled to go to Pollachi in order to attend the Court only to learn that his case was adjourned again and again.
Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner placed before me in support of his contention two decisions viz. (1) the decision of this Court in
Kothanda Pillai v. State 1982 L.W. Cri. 112 and the (2) the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court In G. Balchand Verma v. The Stale of
A.P. 1986 1 Cri 175. In the second decision, there is also a reference to two other decisions of the Supreme Court, Viz, Hussainara Khatoon and
Others Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, and Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar AIR 1932 S.C. 1167: 1982 2 M.L.J. (Cri.).In both the
cases, the Supreme Court held that speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in the guarantee of life and personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 of
the Constitution and that the accused, who is entitled to such a right, was entitled to approach the Courts for the enforcement of the same.
Learned Counsel appearing for the Public Prosecutor stated that the case could not be processed through on account of the non-availability of
the doctor, who was a witness in this case and who was not traceable as he was suspended. But we do not find in the docket sheet of the
Magistrate that such a reason was given to him when the case was taken up. It is also not known when the doctor was suspended and from when
he was not traceable.
The fact of being charged with an offence creates certainly a stigma against a person and will cause to him certain handicaps. The status of the
accused person as a free and full-fledged citizen is curtailed. Further the fact of having to attend the court hundred times for no purpose constitutes
undoubtedly an inroad into his personal liberty, when such appearances are not necessary for the process of justice. In this case, it is not shown
why the case has been adjourned so many times without ascertaining the number and the availability of the witnesses. I have no hesitation to come
to the conclusion that the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is right in contending that in the circumstances of the case the petition should be
quashed for violation of the fundamental right of the Petitioner for speedy justice.
In the result, the petition is allowed and the proceedings in C.C. No. 22 of 1983 on the file of the Court of the Special Judicial First Class
Magistrate (Prohibition), Pollachi, are quashed.