Saji Varghese vs State Of Kerala And Ors

The petitioner was the Secretary of the District Tourism Promotion Council, Kannur.

One Balakrishnan filed a complaint against the petitioner and two other persons in the Court of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge,

Thalassery alleging that they committed the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Special Court

obtained a quick verification report from the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau (VACB). As per Anneuxre-C order, the Special Court found that

the facts alleged in the complaint disclosed commission of cognizable offences. Therefore, the complaint was forwarded to the Dy.S.P, VACB,

Kannur for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code'). Pursuant to Anneuxre-C order,

Anneuxre-D FIR was registered against the petitioner and two other persons under Section 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act and under Section 120B of IPC. This petition under Section 482 of the Code is filed by the petitioner for quashing Annexure-C order

and Annexure-D FIR.

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Public Prosecutor.

It is not necessary here to narrate the allegations contained in the complaint filed against the petitioner or in Anneuxre-D FIR. Suffice it to state that

the allegation against the petitioner is that he caused huge financial loss to the Government and gained pecuniary benefits to the accused persons in the

execution of the works relating to Palakkayamthattu Tourism Project.

When the case came up for hearing before this Court on 14.1.2021, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the VACB has completed the

investigation of the case and the competent authority has granted sanction to prosecute the petitioner. Learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that

there are sufficient materials collected by the investigating officer to prove that the petitioner has committed the offences alleged against him.

Ordinarily, the power under Section 482 of the Code should not be used to quash an FIR because that amounts to interfering with the statutory

power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence in accordance with the provisions of the Code. If the allegations made in the FIR prima facie

disclose a cognizable offence, interference with the investigation is not proper and it can be done only in the rarest of rare cases where the court is

satisfied that the prosecution is malicious and vexatious (See Teeja Devi v. State of Rajasthan : (2014) 15 SCC 221). It is a settled legal proposition

that while considering the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings the court should not ""kill a stillborn child"", and appropriate prosecution should

not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some

substance. When a prosecution at the initial stage is to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is whether the uncontroverted allegations as

made, prima facie, establish the offence. At this stage neither can the court embark upon an inquiry, whether the allegations in the complaint are likely

to be established by evidence nor should the court judge the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein (See Vinod

Raghuvanshi v. Ajay Arora : (2013) 10 SCC 581).

If the position of law is as mentioned above with regard to quashing of FIR at the initial stage, it would almost be totally impermissible to quash it at

a stage when the investigating agency has collected evidence against the accused and completed the investigation of the case and when it is about to

file charge sheet against the accused in the court.

Faced with the above situation, the learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that a direction may be given to the investigating officer to file the final

report without any delay. When this Court put a query to the learned Public Prosecutor with regard to the time within which the final report could be

filed in the competent court, after getting instructions in the matter, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the investigating officer would be able

to file the final report within a period of two months.

In the above circumstances, I find that it is only proper to give a direction to the investigating officer to file final report in the jurisdictional court

within a period of two months.

Consequently, the investigating officer is directed to file final report in the case before the court concerned within a period of two months from

today. The petitioner is granted liberty to take appropriate steps to challenge the final report after it is filed in the court concerned, if so advised. The

Crl.M.C is disposed of as above.

All pending interlocutory applications are closed.