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Judgment
V. Kanagaraj, J.—The above appeal suit is directed against the fair and decretal order dated 19.5.1984 made in L.A.O.P.No. 65 of 1978
by the Court of I Additional Subordinate Judge, Salem in the reference made u/s 18 of Act I of 1894 for enhanced compensation by the Revenue
Divisional Officer, Salem in Award No. 4 of 1977, dated 3.12.1977, thereby fixing the value of the lands acquired at Re. 1 per sq.ft. with a
solatium of 15% and with interest at 4% p.a. from 4.2.1959 till the date of payment of compensation.
Aggrieved, the claimant No. 2 in the petition before the lower court has come forward to prefer the above appeal suit on grounds, such as (1)
that the lower court itself has observed that ''though the 4(1) Notification was made in the year 1959, the Award was passed only on 3.12.1977
and no reason is given by the respondent why such a long delay is caused to pass the Award''; (2) that the valuation fixed by the lower court at Re.
1 per sq.ft. is arbitrary, unguided and unreasonable since neither the guidelines-value nor the Urban Land Tax value has been considered; (3) that
Section 6 notification was not given within three years from the date of Section 4(1) notification and in the instant case, Section 4(1) notification
was issued on 4.2.1959 and Section 6 notification was published on 18.1.1969, as such the Award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer is
irregular; (4) that the land acquisition case is to be reopened and compensation is to be fixed in accordance with Amendment Act 68 of 1984; (5)
that the lower court has not fixed any amount for recurring compensation., which is agreed by the Government in 1942, which is payable annually;
(6) that the lower court has failed to give due importance to Ex.A-3 Urban Land Tax Notification, wherein the price of the land in the area was
fixed at Rs. 6 per sq.ft. on 1.7.1971 and since there was inordinate delay in passing the Award, Section 4(1) notification being issued in the year
1959 and Section 6(1) notification being published on 18.1.1969 and Award being passed on 3.12.1977, the court below ought to have adopted
the Urban Land Tax value and (7) that the fixation of the value of the land at Re. 1 per sq.ft. by the lower court, relying on Exs.A-1 and A-2 is
arbitrary, since Ex.A-1 relates to 7.9.1949 and Ex.A-2 relates to 12.12.1961 with the gap of 12 years. With the above grounds offered in the
memorandum of grounds of appeal, the claimant No. 2/appellant would pray for fixation of the value of the land at Rs. 6 per sq.ft. with all other
benefits.
During arguments, Sri. M. Kandaswamy, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant would give the history of the area with which the land
is concerned and the proceeding contending that the area was acquired as early as in the year 1944 under the Defence of India Rules, 1939; that
the possession of the entire area was taken over on 2.12.1944 for the formation of the military bypass road i.e., the present Salem Ammapet
Road; that in the year 1959, the Highways Department took possession of the land from the defence personnel on 4.2.1959, in which year Section
4(1) notification was issued and the possession continued to be with the Highways Department; that the declaration was made on 18.1.1969 i.e.,
exactly ten years after Section 4(1) notification; that the Award passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Salem on 3.12.1977; that the lower
court passed the order on 19.6.1984 and the Highways Department deposited the compensation amount on 29.9.1987.
The learned Counsel for the appellant would further contended that Act 64 of 1984 came to force on 24.9.1984; that the amendment bill got
introduced on 30.4.1984 and that Award had been passed in this matter on 3.12.1977; that the market value had to be fixed on the date of
Section 4(1) notification; that the Land Acquisition Officer fixing the market value of the land at Rs. 0.20 ps. per sq.ft. valued the land of the
appellant at Rs. 7,605 and by adding 15% solatium and interest has ultimately arrived at Rs. 16,883.10ps being the total amount of compensation
to be paid to the appellant herein. It is only objecting to the said offer, the appellant herein along with 3 others made a reference in L.A.O.P.No.
65 of 1978, wherein the appellant testified himself in the box as PW.1 and would depose to the effect that under Ex.A-1, dated 7.9.1949, he
himself has sold an extent of 6210 sq.ft. for a sum of Rs. 3,467.13.0, which works out to Rs. 0.45 ps. per sq.ft.; that this land is adjacent to the
Salem-Cuddalore railway line on the Salem-Ammapet Road, but the Land Acquisition Officer has not considered Ex.A-1 but considered 13 other
documents for his sale statistics, which have been executed from the year 1955 to 1959, but even from among the documents, he has not
considered items 7 and 9, since they were sold for higher price. RW.1 would further depose that under Ex.A-2 registration copy of sale deed
dated 12.12.1961, a plot nearby to the acquired land was sold for Rs.2 per sq.ft.; that though this sale deed is subsequent to Section 4(1)
notification, this document cannot be neglected or brushed aside since it had been sold only on the market value that was prevalent then. P.W.1
further relied on Ex.A-3 order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax to collect land tax from P. W. 1, wherein the value of the
land in question had been assessed at Rs.6 per sq.ft. on 1.7.1971; that as against the said assessment, P. W. 1 preferred an appeal before the Sub
Court, Salem, which had been dismissed confirming the order of the Assistant Commissioner.
Continuing to argue further, the learned Counsel for the appellant would point out that the lower court admits the increase of the land value day-
by-day and the potential value of the location, having all facilities, but taking into account Ex.A-1, which is a document of ten years prior to the
Section 4(1) notification, wherein the cost of the land was shown as Rs. 0.45 ps per sq.ft. and without properly considering Ex.A-2, which is of
the year 1961, wherein the nearby land was sold at Rs. 2 per sq. ft. and without considering that value and the value fixed under Ex.A-3, as early
as on 1.7.1971, by the Assistant Commissioner Urban Land Tax who assessed the value of the land at Rs. 6 per sq.ft. But the lower court has
arrived at the conclusion to fix the value of the land at Re. 1 per sq. ft. erroneously. The learned Counsel would further contend that while
determining the compensation, the court must sit in the armchair of the vendor and fix the market value and the court has to take the judicial notice
of the increase in the market price also. The learned Counsel would further contend that the exhibits marked through the appellant, to which he is a
party, would show that trend in the increase of the market value of the land in question and in furtherance of this the court has to ascertain the
market value of the land.
The learned Counsel for the appellant would then point out that in view of the enormous delay caused on the part of the Department, it is not
necessary to fix the market value as on the date of Section 4(1) notification itself; that Exs.A-1 to A-3 are the only documents available to fix the
value of the land; that Ex.B-5 is the document relied on by the department, which is dated 26.4.1957, i.e., two years prior to Section 4(1)
notification, in which a small piece of site of 522 sq.ft. has been sold at Rs. 0.20 ps per sq.ft. and the lower court itself has rejected this Ex.B-5,
and would further point out that no witness got examined regarding the Ex.B-5, as per the Supreme Court ruling; that as per the propriety of the
document to be relied upon, it should be marked examining anyone of the parties to the document and would cite a judgment of the Supreme
Court reported in Chintaman and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, , before the said proposition of law.
The learned Counsel would further contend that as far as this case is concerned, there was enormous delay on the part of the Government,
which consumed 18 years from 1959 to 1977 i.e., from the date of Section 4(1) notification to the date of passing of the award and during this
period there was tremendous increase in the market value of the land and there is nothing wrong in adopting the value of Rs. 6 per sq.ft. that was
fixed by the Assistant Commissioner to collect land tax from the appellant under Ex.A-3 and that the lower court sailing in between Exs.A-1 and
A-2 had fixed the price of the land at Re. 1 per sq.ft., which is arbitrary and erroneous. At this juncture, the learned Counsel would cite a judgment
of the Supreme Court reported in Meharban and others etc. etc. Vs. State of U.P. and others, , wherein it has been held that:
The court, while determining the compensation must sit in the armchair of a willing and prudent vendor and put a question whether the market value
sought to be determined would be capable of fetching that hypothetical price and should determine a just and adequate compensation for the land
acquired. In the instant case since none connected with the sale deeds was examined, the sale deeds are inadmissible in evidence though certified
copies marked u/s 51 -A are available. So, all the sale deeds stand excluded. It is the duty of the court to take all the relevant factors into account
before determination of the compensation. Applying the acid test, in view of paucity of evidence, instead of remitting the matter to the reference
court and prolonging the agony of the claimants the appropriate course would be to base the award of the reference court in respect of similar
lands which has become final. That would form the foundation and base to determine the compensation treating that area as a block. That was
determined after giving necessary deductions towards developmental charges, as required under law. The belting in this case is not reasonable for
the entire lands are situated in well-defined and developed blocks. The lands are possessed of immediate potential value as building sites. The city
is a fast-growing industrial and commercial city and in many a part it is already developed, there is pressure on the land for the developmental
activities viz., for building and commercial purposes. Under these circumstances, the court must take into account reasonable rise in prices.
The learned Counsel for the appellant would also cite a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Murari and Others Vs. Union of India
(UOI) and Others, , wherein considering the various circumstances under which the delay had been caused including the delay caused by the
landowners themselves in approaching the court, the Apex Court though declined to quash the acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay, but
observed that,
...having regard to the interest of the landowners who were likely to suffer loss in rating the price of the land with reference to the date of
notification u/s 4, directed payment of an additional amount of compensation to be calculated at the rate of 12 per cent per annum after expiry of
two years from 23.8.1974, the date of judgment of this Court in Aflatoon and Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Others, , till the date of
making of the awards by the Collector to be calculated with reference to the market value of the lands in question on the date of notification u/s
4(1) of the Act. We do not find any inconsistency in the said decision Ram Chand and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, and find
ourselves in respectful agreement to the view taken by this Court in the case of Ram Chand and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, .
The learned Counsel for the appellant would further contend that since there is enormous delay from the year 1959 till 1977 in passing the award
itself, the appellant is entitled for additional amount of compensation and would contend that the factors that remain to be seen are that the
appellant is entitled to the benefit of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984, thereby amending Section 23, wherein he cannot claim
any benefit u/s 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, but is entitled u/s 23(2) of the Act. He would further contend that the award was made on
3.12.1977; that the order of the reference court was made on 19.6.1984, which is a crucial date and falls in between the two limitations, one is
subsequent to the date of introduction of the Amendment Bill in the Parliament on 30.4.1982 and the other before the commencement of the Act
on 24.9.1984, therefore, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1-A), solatium u/s 23(2) and interest on excess compensation u/s 28.
The learned Counsel for the appellant would further contend that the question arose as to what date should be reckoned with if an appeal is
pending before the High Court or Supreme Court and would cite the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Union of India (UOI) and
Another Vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. Etc., , wherein it has been held that,
The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the court by way of
reference u/s 18 but, in our opinion, the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. Learned
Counsel for the respondents has strenuously relied on the general principle that the appeal is a re-hearing of the original matter, but we are not
satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking that principle. Learned Counsel for the respondents points out that the word ''or'' has been used in
Section 30(2) as a disjunctive between the reference to the award made by the Collector or the court and an order passed by the High Court or
the Supreme Court in appeal and, he says, properly understood it must mean that the period 30 April, 1982 to 24 September, 1984 is as much
applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector or the court. We think that
what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the court made between the
aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the court
made between the said two dates. The word ''or'' is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit u/s
30(2) is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the court made between the aforesaid two
dates, the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates. If the proceeding has passed to the stage
of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the
award of the Collector or of the court must have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984.
The learned Counsel would then point out that as to interest on solatium, there are divergent judgment and would cite two judgments, the
earlier one reported in Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala, and the other is reported in State of Haryana and Another Vs.
Joginder Singh, . In the first judgment cited, above Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala, , the question is whether ""interest"" is
an integral part of the word ""compensation"" under Sub-section (3) of Section 25 of the Regulation and the Supreme Court held therein that,
Market value'' and ''compensation'' are distinct expressions. Market value is one of the components"" in the determination of the amount of
compensation. The word compensation is used to recompensate or make reparation to the loss caused to the owner of the land. Therefore, it must
be held that Section 25(3) contemplates payment of interests on solatium to recompensate the owner of the land for loss of user of the land from
the date of taking possession till date of payment into court. The word compensation has been advisedly used by the legislature. Accordingly in this
case the claimant appellant is entitled to interest on solatium.
But, in the second judgment cited above State of Haryana and Another Vs. Joginder Singh, , it is held that,
Interest on solatium cannot be allowed."" The learned Counsel for the appellant would contend that in consideration of the Supreme Court
judgments, K. Sampath, J. of this Court has held that the claimant is entitled to interest on solatium, in the judgment pronounced in A.S.No. 1260
of 1986, dated 4.11.1997. The learned Counsel would further argue that the appellant is entitled to the interest on excess compensation u/s 28 of
the Land Acquisition Act and would elaborate saying that if any excess amount is awarded by the court including the High Court, then the excess
amount has to be calculated to pay interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from the date on which the Collector took possession of the land to the date of
payment of such excess amount; that possession in this case was taken in the year 1959; that the Order of the reference court gets merged with the
order of the High Court; that according to the implications of this provision, the excess amount has to be deposited and paid before the court with
interest at 9% p.a. from the date on which the possession was taken; that in this case, possession was taken on 4.2.1959, hence, interest at the
rate of 9% has to be deposited along with the difference of amount, ordered by the court; that each provision u/s 23(2) and u/s 28 are distinct and
different; that under proviso to Section 28, 4.2.1959 being the date of taking possession the interest has to be paid at 9% till one year of taking
possession and thereafter the interest has to be paid at 15% for each year.
The learned Counsel for the appellant would further contend that the appellant is also entitled to further interest u/s 34, but the Collector has
not paid the amount; that the awarded amount was deposited on 29.7.1977 in favour of Revenue Divisional Officer, Salem; that Section 34 says
that even that amount carries interest at 9% that the appellant is not claiming compensation u/s 31, but claiming the same u/s 23(1-A); that the
appellant is entitled to claim interest on excess compensation amount at 9% p.a from 4.2.1959 to 3.2.1960 and from 4.2.1960 onwards at the rate
of 15% till the date of payment u/s 28; that u/s 34 he is entitled to claim interest when the compensation is not paid or deposited on or before
taking possession of the land, at the rate of 9% p.a. from 4.2.1959 to 3.2.1960 and thereafter at 15% till the date of payment and the appellant
has to establish whether he is entitled to interest from the date of possession; that in the absence of amendment, he could claim interest at 4% p.a.;
that the appellant has established that he is entitled to interest at 9% and 15% as per the amended act; that the award amount had been deposited,
but the compensation amount was not deposited, hence, the appellant can avail the same u/s 34 and the application and the availability of Section
34 is not disputed and the question is whether the appellant is entitled to the interest on the enhanced compensation.
The learned Counsel would also cite four more judgments. The first judgment cited is one reported in The Special Tahsildar (L.A.) v.
Soodamani Animal (1991)2 L. W. 375, wherein it has been held that,
The award in this case was passed on 30.9.1982. The notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was made in the year 1962. It took nearly
20 years for the office to complete the Award enquiry and pass the award. It is wholly unjust to say that the claimant will be entitled at the rate of
Rs. 1,000 per cent only. No doubt, the court has to fix the value of the land as on the date of notification. But, having regard to the fact that more
than two decades had elapsed since the date of notification, it will be unjust to compel the claimant to accept the compensation at the rate which
was prevailing before 1962.
He would rely on another judgment reported in K.V. Krishna Iyer Vs. The State of Madras and Another, , wherein it has been held that,
In the instant case apart from the fact that there was unconscionable delay in the publication of the Section 6(1) notification, the requirement of
Rule 3(b) of the rules framed u/s 55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act provides that a date for hearing of objections preferred has to be fixed and
notice of the hearing of the objections should be given to the objection (owner of the land) who preferred objections and also to the department
requiring the land, and it has not been complied with. Further the declaration in Section 6(1) notification empowering the acquiring department to
take immediate possession after the publication of the notification u/s 9(1) was clearly irregular. Under the circumstances, the proceedings have to
be quashed.
He would further place reliance on the judgment reported in P. Appalamurthy and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, , wherein it
has been held that,
If the Government wanted to wait for the result of the proceedings under the ceiling laws, it was welcome to do so provided it withdrew the
notification issued under the Land Acquisition Act. But, it cannot have both ways.
It cannot say that it will keep the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act alive and, at the same time, wait for the result of the
proceedings under the ceiling laws, so as to ultimately opt for the more advantageous alternative. This would be an unreasonable and arbitrary
exercise of power. A notification cannot be issued for the purpose of the price, as the case may be, and then time to pass an award. Such a line of
thinking and the course of conduct is alien to the scheme and intendment of the Land Acquisition Act.
He would rely on another judgment reported in Murari and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , wherein it has been observed that.
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 23(1) and 11(1)- Compensation - Market value of the land has to be fixed with reference to date of
publication of notification u/s 4(1), irrespective of the dates on which declaration u/s 6 or award u/s 11 made or possession taken u/s 16 -
Provision not liable to be challenged on ground of being not in conformity with Article 31(2) (as stood prior to its deletion Article 31-A is
attracted. Where land acquired for agrarian reforms and development and not for development of a city (Delhi)- Hence the argument based on
second proviso to Article 31-A that the land belonging to a small agriculturist within ceiling limit cannot be acquired or the value of the land of the
agriculturists sought to be acquired should be determined on the price/ value prevailing on the date of award or taking of possession and not on the
value prevailing on the date of notification u/s 4(1) cannot be accepted - Constitution of India, Article 31-A.
Then, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant would argue that some percentage over and above the market value has been allowed,
since there is a long gap in between Section 4(1) notification and passing of the award; that when there are two conflicting judgments by the
Supreme Court, then the court should apply which judgment is more applicable to the facts of the case and would cite the following from the
judgment of K. Sampath, J. in A.S.Nos. 891 of 1989, 832 of 1990 and 833 of 1990:
The only requirement would be that, that the two apparently conflicting decisions must directly relate to and expressly decide the question that
arose between the parties. In Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. K.S. Subramanian, , the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
The proper course for a High Court is to try to find out and follow the opinions expressed by larger Benches of the Supreme Court in preference
to those expressed by smaller Benches of the court. That is the practice followed by the Supreme Court itself. The practice has now crystalised
into a rule of law declared by the Supreme Court. If. However a High Court is of opinion that the facts expressed by the larger Benches of the
Supreme Court are not applicable to the facts of the case, it should say so giving reasons supporting its point of view.
As has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Shri Ram Mehar and Others, , the legislature had its own reasons for
drawing a distinction between market value and compensation. I am therefore inclined to follow the earlier decision of the Supreme Court cited
supra. I am of the view that this ratio of the decision will apply to the instant case and I respectfully follow the same. Consequently, the contention
of the Additional Government Pleader that the claimants would not be entitled to interest on solatium will have to be rejected. The claimants would
be entitled to interest on solatium.
The learned Counsel would say that there are two approaches, one is to challenge the Section 4(1) notification on ground of delay in passing the
award and the other is in the compensation proceeding itself, calculating on the date of passing of the award and not on the date of notification for
fixing the market value.
The learned Counsel for the appellant would ultimately end up his argument saying that the appellant is entitled to all the benefits that are
provided with under the Land Acquisition Act, excepting of course u/s 23(1-A), i.e., under Sections 23(2), 28 and 34 and for interest on solatium
and also for additional compensation on account of delay, as contemplated in the case reported in Murari and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI)
and Others, .
On the part of the respondent, the learned Additional Government Pleader would contend that there are two sale deeds, one is Ex A-1 dated
7.9.1949 and the other is Ex.A-2 dated 12.12.1961 whereunder the appellant himself has sold some extent of land at Rs. 0.45 ps. and Rs. 2 per
sq.ft. respectively; that in between the two sale deeds, the learned Subordinate Judge has fixed the value of the land at Re. 1; that under Ex. A-3,
the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax assessed the value of the land at Rs. 6 per sq.ft. and the same was appealed against and nobody
knows as to what happened to the appeal. The learned Additional Government Pleader would further point out that all the four judgments cited by
the appellant reported in (1) Special Tahsildar (L.A.) v. Soodamani Ammal (1991)2 L.W. 375; (2) K.V. Krishna Iyer Vs. The State of Madras
and Another, ; (3) P. Appalamurthy and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, and (4) Murari and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI)
and Others, have been passed not in the matters decided under the Land Acquisition Act, but in constitutional matters filed under the L.P.As.; that
the value of Re. 1 per sq.ft. fixed as the market value of the land acquired from the appellant by the lower court is quite reasonable and acceptable
and the same may be approved by this Court also; that the appellant in this case is not entitled to the benefit u/s 23(1-A) since the Award was not
pending by 30.4.1982, the date of introduction of the Amended Act into the Parliament and 24.9.1984, the date of passing of the Amendment
Act, but the learned Additional Government Pleader would concede that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of solatium u/s 23(2), but at the
same time, there cannot be any interest on solatium. The learned Additional Government Pleader stiffly opposed the claim of the appellant for
interest on solatium, citing the recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Tehri Hydro Development Corporation v. S.P. Singh and Ors.
(199)1 S.C.C. 249 and would say that the proposition as propounded in Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala, , wherein the
question is whether ""interest"" is an integral part of the word ""compensation"" u/s 25(3) of the regulation and the Supreme Court held in the
affirmative, is no long a good Law. The learned Additional Government Pleader would also concede that the appellant is entitled to the benefits of
Sections 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act.
The points that arise for consideration are:
(1) What is the value of the land acquired for the purpose of compensation and whether the market value of the land acquired from the appellant
on the date of Section 4(1) notification i.e., on 4.2.1959 to be adopted for fixation of compensation in view of the long delay caused for passing
the Award?
(2) What shall be the criteria in fixing the value of the land acquired from the appellant and if so what shall be the compensation awarded to the
appellant?
(3) Whether the appellant is entitled to the other benefit of all the other provisions and the propositions of Law as claimed, if so, what are those
other benefits that he is entitled to?
Points I and 2: So far as the first point pertaining to the fixation of the market value of the land acquired from the appellant is concerned, it is
under Ex.A-1 sale deed dated 7.9.1949, a bit of land has been sold from out of the same block at Rs. 0.45 ps per sq.ft.; as per Ex.A-2 sale deed
dated 12.12.1961, another piece of land from the same block has been sold at Rs. 2 per sq.ft. Under Ex.A-3, the Urban Land Tax Authorities
have assessed the value of the land at Rs. 6 per sq.ft. as on 1.7.1971. All the above three documents have been marked by the appellant, thus
giving the court a free hand to assess the value of the land in a larger spectrum. On the contrary, on the part of the respondent, though five
documents have been marked as Exs.B-1 to B-5, Exs.B-1 to B-3 are the claim statements of the appellant, Ex.B-4 is the topo sketch. It is only
Ex.B-5, which is a sale deed dated 26.4.1957, whereunder a bit of land has been sold at Rs. 0.20 Ps per sq.ft. In fact, this document marked as
Ex.B-5 is focussed to counter the calculation arrived at by the appellant under all the three documents marked as Exs.A-1 to A-3.
It is the uniform case of the appellant that in the natural course, even ten years prior to the intention of the acquisition proceedings by
publication of Section 4(1) notification, a bit of land from the, entire block has been sold by the appellant himself at the rate of Rs. 0.45 ps. per
sq.ft. under Ex.A-1 and under Ex.A-2, another piece of land has been sold on 12.12.1961 i.e., two years after the Section 4(1) notification at Rs.
2 per sq.ft. and in the year 1971, the Urban Land Tax Authorities have fixed the market value of the land at Rs. 6 per sq.ft. Even though it is the
market price as on the date of publication of Section 4(1) notification that should be given effect to as per the statutory provisions, the appellant
would urge to look to the other side of the story that so far as the case in hand is concerned, Section 4(1) notification had been issued in the year
1959 and Section 6(1) notification had been made ten years later i.e., in 1969 and the Award had been passed only in the year 1977 i.e., after an
inordinate delay of 18 years from the date of Section 4(1) notification and hence the learned Counsel for the appellant would urge the court to take
Exs.A-1 to A-3 into consideration for fixing the market price of the land acquired. The learned Counsel for the appellant would particularly urge
the court to take into consideration Ex.A-3, wherein the Urban Land Tax Authorities themselves assessed the value of the land at Rs.6 per sq.ft.
and to adopt the same as the market value of the land in question.
It would further be argued on the part of the appellant that in the circumstances of the case, Ex.B-5 sale deed cannot at all be considered not
for its meager value of the land nor even for the fact that it had been executed two years prior to the Section 4(1) notification but on account of its
inadmissibility in evidence and would cite a judgment reported in The Collector, Raigarh Vs. Harisingh Thakur and Another, , wherein it has been
held that:
It is also not disputed that the Special Land Acquisition Officer did not lead any evidence worth the name to show that price of the comparable
sites in question and remained content with the production only of the sale statement made by Jujhar Singh, N.A.W.1. Now the sale statement
consisted mostly of sales relating to the year 1951 which is not relevant for the question in hand. Moreover the sale statement by itself without
examining either the vendors or the venders or the persons attesting the sale deeds is not admissible in evidence and cannot be relied upon.
The learned Counsel would cite yet another judgment, on the same proposition, reported in Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Sunil Chandra
Saha and Another, , wherein it has been observed that,
We do not propose to express any opinion on merits. Suffice it to state that neither the claimants nor the Land Acquisition Officer had adduced
any legally admissible evidence in proof of the market value prevailing as on the date of notification or in rebuttal. The appellants-beneficiaries are
entitled to a notice and participation in the award inquiry as well as in the reference and could adduce evidence in rebuttal to the claim of higher
compensation. Unfortunately, the appellants had no notice nor an opportunity to adduce evidence. Both the claimants and the Land Acquisition
Officer merely marked the sale deeds without examining either the vendor or the vendee to bring on record the circumstances in which the sale
deeds came to be executed, the distance of the lands to the acquired lands, the nature of the respective lands and whether they would offer
comparable sales to determine just and fair market value to the acquired lands. In the absence of such relevant and material evidence, it would be
difficult to determine compensation in respect of the acquired lands. The appeals are allowed accordingly. The award and decree of the reference
court as confirmed by the High Court stand set aside. The cases are remitted to the reference court for disposal.
Relying on the above two judgments and the judgment reported in Meharban and others etc. etc. Vs. State of U.P. and others, , Ex.B-5 being a
document, regarding which no vendee or vendor has been examined in the lower court, no decision could be arrived at based on Ex.B-5, so far as
the fixation of the market value of the land in the case in hand is concerned. On the contrary, the court can rely upon Exhibits in ''A'' series, two of
which are the sale deeds and the third one the order passed by the Urban Land Tax Authorities fixing the market value of the land at Rs.6 per
sq.ft., since in all the above exhibits - Exs.A-1 to A-3 - P.W.1, the appellant herein, is a party and he has adduced valid evidence pertaining to the
contents of the said documents, with due opportunity for the other side also to cross examine him and hence Exs.A-1 to A-3 could be basically
taken up for consideration since they have the evidentiary value with in the meaning of the above proposition of law. Moreover, all these
documents have come, into existence well before the period of the issue of Section 4(1) notification and the passing of the award and hence there
is nothing wrong in considering all the three documents. It would be fitting and prudent to take all the above three documents (Exs.A-1 to A-3) for
consideration to have a comparative study of each of the said documents with that of the other; since Ex.A-1 is a sale deed ten years prior to the
Section 4(1) notification, Ex.A-3 being the order fixing the value of the land by the Urban Land Tax Authorities 12 years later to the Section 4(1)
notification, and six years prior to the passing of the award and Ex.A-2 being a document of almost nearer to or around the period of issue of
Section 4(1) notification; in order to decide the land cost that was prevalent at the time of issue of Section 4(1) notification. If it is a case of single
document that too wherein a very small bit of property has been sold out, it may not be so appropriate to fix the land cost taking that document
alone into consideration, even if it is deviated a little by time. Since three documents are available, one almost around the period of issue of Section
4(1) notification and two others having arisen almost a decade before and after such notification, it would be more appropriate to consider all the
three documents, especially that of Ex.A 3, which should have been arrived at based on various and valid reasons, since the authors of the same
are the Government body.
Roughly, between Exs.A-1 and A-2, the increase in market value of the land is four fold and between Exs.A-2 and A-3 it is threefold and
even if an average of all the three values mentioned under Exs.A-1 to A-3 are arrived at, it would come around Rs. 2.80 ps. per sq.ft. and hence
with a liberal view, there is nothing wrong in fixing the cost of the land at Rs.3 per sq.ft. as at the time of issue of Section 4(1) notification in the
above matter. Hence, the cost of the land on the date of Section 4(1) notification is hereby fixed at Rs.3 per sq.ft. not only taking into
consideration Exs.A-1 to A-3 but also in consideration of the around importance that the location of the property has got even during the time of
acquisition. These points are answered accordingly.
Point No. 3: Coming to the next question of the benefit u/s 23(1-A) of the Act, it is admitted on the part of the appellant that he is not entitled
to the benefit under this provision of the Act and hence the appellant is not entitled for anything under this provision.
Regarding solatium as contemplated u/s 23(2), it is admitted even on the part of the respondent that the appellant is entitled to the same and
hence 30% solatium on the market value of the land as fixed by this Court is granted in favour of the appellant, in consideration of the compulsory
nature of acquisition made.
Coming to the benefit contemplated u/s 28 of the Act is concerned, it is also admitted on the part of the respondent that the appellant is entitled
to this benefit and he will have the interest at 9% p.a. from the date on which the Collector took possession of the land, on such excess amount
awarded by this Court over and above the award of the Collector, for the first one year and thereafter at 15% p.a for every subsequent year till the
date of realisation of the amount.
Coming to the next benefit contemplated u/s 34 of the Act, since the difference of amount of compensation that has been granted by this Court
on the market value of the property has not been paid or deposited by the Collector before taking possession of the land, this appellant becomes
entitled to the benefit of this Section, wherein for the excess amount not paid or deposited, it carries 9% interest for the first year and 15% interest
for the subsequent years. Hence, point No. 3 is decided accordingly.
So far as interest on solatium is concerned, the learned Counsel for the appellant would cite a judgment of the Apex Court reported in Periyar
and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala, , wherein it is glaringly stated that:
Accordingly in this case the claimant/appellant is entitled to interest on solatium
thereby meaning that it has not been held as a proposition of Law to be followed, but applied only to the facts and circumstances of that particular
case. On the contrary, in the recent judgment, that too cited by the counsel for the appellant reported in State of Haryana and Another Vs.
Joginder Singh, , it has been categorically held that,
Interest on solatium cannot be allowed.
Hence, this judgment is more emphatic on the question whether interest on solatium could be allowed or not. The further judgment of the single
Judge of this High Court cited by the appellant is from the decision in A.S.Nos.891 of 1989, 832 of 1990 and 833 of 1990. Since it is not brought
forth that the proposition of Law as propounded in the Apex Court judgment reported in State of Haryana and Another Vs. Joginder Singh, ,
(thereby holding that interest on solatium cannot be allowed) has been considered in the said judgment of the single Judge of this High Court, no
conclusion could be arrived at based on that judgment. Moreover, for the delay of 18 years said to have been caused from the date of publication
of Section 4(1) notification to the passing of the award, statutorily the interest of the claimant has been safeguarded, as seen from the decision
arrived at by this Court in point No. 3 above. Hence, it is hereby held that neither the interest on solatium nor the additional amount of
compensation sought for, in the circumstances of the case, need be necessarily granted in this case and hence the claim of the appellant for interest
on solatium and the additional amount of compensation on account of the delay caused in passing the award after publication of Section 4(1)
notification are hereby rejected.
In result, the above appeal suit is partly allowed in the above terms and with the costs of the appellant throughout.
The time to deposit the above amounts is fixed as three months from the date of this judgment.