Sakthidharan and Others vs The Kerala State Small Industries Development and Employment Corporation Ltd. and Others

S. Sankarasubban, J.—This writ appeal is filed by the Petitioners in O.P. No. 10593 of 1991. First Respondent in the Original Petition is the Kerala State Small Industries Development and Employment Corporation Ltd. Petitioners are small scale industries for assisting the industrial units and business enterprises. First Respondent advanced loans to the Petitioners ranging from Rs. 6,200 to 42,400. At the time when the loans were granted, agreements were executed. One of the agreements is produced as Ext. P-1. Clause 12 of that agreement enables the first Respondent to recover the amount due to it under the Revenue Recovery Act as though there is arrears of land revenue. Petitioners committed default. First Respondent then initiated proceedings under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. Those proceedings were challenged before this Court in O.P. No. 1858 of 1983. The contention before this Court was that an organisation like the first Respondent can invoke provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act only if a notification is issued by the Government u/s 71 of the Act. At that time, when action under the Act was taken, there was no notification u/s 71. Hence by judgment dated 14th November, 1986, this Honourable Court allowed the Original Petition quashing the revenue recovery proceedings. But it was further stated in the judgment that it shall not stand in the way of the first Respondent seeking appropriate reliefs on the basis of the notification which had come subsequently.

The Government of Kerala issued a notification u/s 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. This notification is dated 12th September, 1986. By this notification, it was declared that the provisions of the Act shall apply to the recovery of amounts due from any person to the Kerala State Small Industries Development and Employment Corporation Ltd. After the issuance of the above notification, demand notices were issued to the Petitioners. It is challenging these notices that the Original petition was filed. Counsel for the Petitioners took up the contention that at the time when they entered into agreement with the first Respondent, there was no notification enabling the first Respondent to recover the amounts under the Act and hence Clause 12 of the agreement was void. Further, it was contended that since the present notification was issued only in 1986, it cannot have any retrospective effect. The loans taken by the Petitioners were before the issue of the notification. The Corporation filed a counter-affidavit contending that it is entitled to recover the amounts as per the notification. The learned Single Judge held that after the issue of the notification, there was no impediment on the first Respondent in recovering the amount under the Act. Learned Single Judge further held that Clause 12 of Ext. P-1 agreement was void. But the Original Petition was dismissed. Against that the present writ appeal has been filed.

We heard Counsel for the Appellants, Mr. B. Krishnamani, Counsel for the first Respondent, Mr. M.A. Manhu and learned Government Pleader for Respondents 2 and 3.

Learned Counsel for the Appellants contended that since the notification was issued only in 1986, it is not applicable to transactions prior to that. We can''t accept this contention. Section 71 of the Revenue Recovery Act is as follows:

Section 71-Power of Government to declare the Act applicable to any institution.-The Government may, by notification in the Gazette, declare, if they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in public interest, that the provisions of this Act shall be applicable to the recovery of amounts due from any person or class of persons to any specified institution or any class or classes of institutions, and thereupon all the provisions of this Act shall be applicable to such recovery.

By virtue of the power u/s 71, Government issued Ext. R-1(b) notification. This notification clearly stated that all amounts due from any person to the first Respondent can be recovered by resorting to the provisions of the Act. No question of retrospective effect arises here. Learned Counsel for the Appellant referred to a decision in Padmanabhan v. District Collector 1981 K.L.T 738. That decision is distinguishable. The question there was whether the proceedings initiated under the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act would continue under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. Such question does not arise here.

If any amount is due from any person to the first Respondent on the date of the notification, then that amount can be recovered by invoking the provisions of the Act. There is no dispute that amounts were due from the Petitioners to the first Respondent on the date of Ext. R-1(b) notification.

The next contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellants is that unless there is a written agreement between the first Respondent and the Petitioners, that amount can be recovered under the Revenue Recovery Act, the provisions of Section 71 cannot be invoked. For this purpose, learned Counsel relied on Section 68 of the Act. Section 68 applies to recovery of certain Ors. dues to Government. Section 68 is as follows:

Application of the Act for the recovery of certain Ors. dues to Government-(1) All sums due to the Government on account of quit rent or revenue Ors. than public revenue due on land;

all moneys dues from any person to the Government which under a written agreement executed by such person are recoverable as arrears of public revenue due on land or land revenue, and all specific pecuniary penalties to which such person renders himself liable under such agreement or contract;

all sums declared by any Ors. law for the time being in force to be recoverable as arrear of public revenue due on land or land revenue; and

all fees and Ors. dues payable by any person to the Government, may be recovered under the provisions of this Act,

(2) Any person who has received from the Government a free grant of money for any agricultural or Ors. purpose, on default to refund the same consequent on his failure to observe any of the conditions of the grant, shall be liable to be proceeded against under the provisions of this Act for the recovery of the amount granted to him together with interest thereon and cost of process.

(3) Arrears of rent due to the Government, recoverable, as a result of any agreement, through a civil Court, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in such agreement, be recoverable as an arrear of public revenue due on land under the provisions of this Act.

(4) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the provisions of Sections 44 and 50 shall apply in the case of recovery of any sum under the provisions of this section.

(5) Without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (4), where any person has, by a written agreement, agreed that specific immovable property belonging to such person shall be security for the payment by him of any tax or Ors. amount due by him to the Government, any engagement entered into by such person with any one in respect of such property, during the period when the agreement is in force, shall not be binding on the Government.

It can be seen that u/s 5 of the Act whenever public revenue due on land is in arrear, such arrear together with interest and costs may be recovered under the provisions of the Act. Section 5 is confined only to public revenue due on land. Section 68 deals with Ors. dues to the Government which can be enforced under the Act. Under this, all moneys due from any person to the Government which, under written agreement executed by such person are recoverable as arrears of public revenue, can be recovered under the Act. But that is only regarding the amounts due from the Government. So far as the present case is concerned, it is governed by notification u/s 71. Notification is produced as Ext. R-1(b). The notification clearly says that the provisions of the Act shall be applicable for the recovery of the amounts due from any person to the first Respondent. Thus the only thing that is necessary is that amounts should be due from the parties to the first Respondent. The amounts may be due under various heads. It need not necessarily be that there should be a contract between the parties enabling the first Respondent to recover the amounts under the Act. It can also be seen that the notification u/s 71 sometimes restricts the application of the Act and restricts only to certain kinds of debt. But no such restriction is there so far as the present notification is concerned. Hence we are of the view that there is no inhibition for the first Respondent in invoking the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act against the Appellants. In this context, according to us, it is irrelevant whether a clause like Clause 12 appears in the agreement. Hence we are not considering the correctness or Ors. wise of the observation of the learned Single Judge that Clause 12 of the agreement is void. The finding on this aspect is not necessary for the decision of this case.

Hence we are of the view that learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the Original Petition holding that first Respondent is entitled to take revenue recovery proceedings against the Appellants.

The Writ Appeal is dismissed.