Sakthivel vs The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras-8 and another

Kanakaraj, J.—The Petitioner is an accused in C.C. No. 149 of 1980 which was pending on the file of the VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Madras for an offence under Railway Properties (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 (hereinafter called the R.P. Act, 1966). It is also stated that four witnesses have already been examined on the side of the prosecution. The Petitioner is now aggrieved by the order of the Respondents transferring all cases filed under the R.P. Act, 1966, to be transferred to the VIth Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore. The writ petition is to quash the said order of the Respondents dated 22.12.1983 as being illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code). In W.M.P. No. 11886 of 1985, George Town Bar Association was directed to be impleaded as a third party supporting the stand taken by the Petitioner herein.

The Petitioner is attacking the order both on general grounds as well as on certain hardships and prejudice caused to the Petitioner in the matter of conducting the trial of the case. I will first deal with the legal impediments for passing such an order of transfer. According to Mr. C.D. Sekkizhar, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, S. 16(3) of the Code vests every Metropolitan Magistrate with jurisdiction and power extending throughout the Metropolitan area. Therefore without amending the said provision of law, the VIIIth Metropolitan Magistrate or any other Metropolitan Magistrate can be stripped of his powers by a mere administrative order. It is also contended that S. 19(3) of the Code, which enables the Respondents to distribute the business among the Metropolitan Magistrate would not cover the present order of transfer. There is also reference to the appointment of a Special Magistrate and the powers of a Chief Judicial Magistrate in the districts u/s 192 of the Code, but I do not think that they have any relevance to the validity of the impugned order. It is not the case of the Respondents that the VIth Metropolitan Magistrate has been appointed as a Special Magistrate u/s 18 of the Code nor do they rely on S. 192 for the purpose of sustaining the impugned order.

A counter affidavit has been filed by the Respondents stating that Chief Security Officer, Madras of the Railway Department had written a letter to the Registrar of High Court on 3.9.1983 seeking conversion of the two railway courts at Egmore and Central Railway stations as regular Metropolitan Magistrate courts for the purpose of dealing with all cases filed by the Railway Police, Railway Protection Force and the Railway Department. This request of the Chief Security Officer was forwarded to the Registrar of High Court. It is in response to this request, the High Court directed in letter dated 20.12.1983, addressed to the Respondents, stating that the High Court is separately recommending to the government constitution of the Metropolitan Magistrates'' Courts for the trial of all cases arising under the R.P. Act, 1966 instead of converting the railway courts at the railway stations as Metropolitan Magistrate Courts. In the said letter the High Court also directed the pending sanction of the Government for the constitution of two Metropolitan Magistrate Courts for the purpose of trying offences under R.P. Act 1966, the VIth Metropolitan Magistrate Court may be earmarked to try all cases under the said Act. The High Court also directed the Respondents that the VIth Metropolitan Magistrate may be instructed to try and finish all the pending cases under the R.P. Act with expedition. It is in pursuance of the said direction of the High Court that the Respondent passed the impugned order dated 22.12.1983. It is contended that the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Magistrates had not been taken away by the impugned order and it is only in pursuance of the distribution of the business among the Metropolitan Magistrates, that the impugned order had been made.

The cases under R.P. Act were formerly being tried by different Metropolitan Magistrates in addition to their regular work. With a view to expedite the disposal of cases and for the sake of convenience the High Court directed the Respondents to earmark the cases to the VIth Metropolitan Magistrate. To understand the scope of the arguments it is better to extract here the relevant provisions of law. S. 16 of the Code is as follows:

Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates:

(1) In every Metropolitan Area, there shall be established as many Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates, and at such places, as the State Government may after consultation with the High Court by notification, specify.

(2) The Presiding Officer of such Courts shall be appointed by the High Court.

(3) The jurisdiction and powers of every Metropolitan Magistrate shall extend throughout the metropolitan area.

It is significant to notice that this section is slightly different from S. 14(2) in relation to the Judicial Magistrate of the Districts. S. 14(2) says that except as otherwise provided by S. 14(1), the jurisdiction and powers of every such Magistrate shall extend throughout the district. In other words, there is scope for providing otherwise in respect of the jurisdiction of a Judicial Magistrate, but S. 16(3) does not give any such power for providing otherwise in the case of a Metropolitan Magistrate. Therefore the jurisdiction and powers of every Metropolitan Magistrate shall extend throughout the Metropolitan area, without there being any qualification. S. 19(3) of the Code is as follows:

The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, may from time to time make rules as special orders, consistent with this Code, as to the distribution of business among the Metropolitan Magistrate and as to the allocation of business to an Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

The argument of both Mr. C.D. Sekkizhar for the Petitioner and Mr. M. Ravindran, for the Bar Association are misconceived. The thrust of the argument is that every Metropolitan Magistrate has jurisdiction over the territorial limits of this Court. It is stated that certain Police Stations are allotted to each Metropolitan Magistrate based on a geographical considerations. Therefore, so far as the cases arising under the R.P. Act, 1966, the same territorial jurisdiction should be available for every Metropolitan Magistrate. The first error in this argument is that so far as cases arising under the R.P. Act, 1966 are concerned they do not come through any Police Station. But the mere vital misconception relates to the conferment of jurisdiction and power, as distinct from allocation of business. The impugned order does not take away the jurisdiction or power conferred by S. 16 of the Act. It is purely within the power of the Respondents in the matter of allocation of business arising u/s 19(3) of the Code. If this distinction is kept in mind I am unable to see any difficulty in upholding the impugned order of the Respondents.

The other averments and complaints in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition are of a general nature, not arising out of the impugned order. In other words, such complaints do not affect the validity of the impugned order. For instance, the Petitioner says that it will be impossible for the VIth Metropolitan Magistrate to dispose of all the pending cases within the next three years. If the fresh cases are also taken into consideration, the arrangement is totally unworkable. But this complaint cannot be taken serious note of, because it is only a temporary arrangement pending sanction from the government on the suggestion of appointing two Metropolitan Magistrates to try cases under the R.P. Act 1966. Secondly, every attempt is made and decisions taken in the hope of expeditious disposal of cases. It may be that the desired effect is not achieved. But every new idea has to give a chance. On that account, the impugned order cannot be invalidated.

The Petitioner has referred to a number of cases and is seeking to show that the accused in those eight cases would be prejudicially affected. The difficulties enumerated do not in my opinion spring from the impugned order. Those difficulties will exist whether the cases are tried by the VIth Metropolitan Magistrate or by any other Metropolitan Magistrate.

Therefore, there is no merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.