Sakuntala Rajappa vs K. Kamala

K. Ganesan, J.—Mrs. K. Kamala the tenant respondent herein filed an application H.R.C. No. 2067 of 1969 out of which this civil revision

petition arises against Mrs. Sakuntala Raja:pi, the petitioner herein, u/s 8(5) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XVIII of 1960,

before the Rent Controller for permission for depositing into the Tribunal the rents for two months at the rate of Rs. 175 per month in respect of

the premises demised, viz., the building bearing door No. 164-C in Lloyds Road, Madras; and it was contended by the respondent that the

monthly rental was Rs. 175 only, that the electricity and water charges, which she had agreed to bear separately, did not form part of the monthly

rent stipulated, that as the petitioner would not give regular supply of water from 1st May, 1969, the respondent had made alternative

arrangements and was not liable to pay water charges any more and that, as the petitioner refused to receive the rent of Rs. 175, the respondent

was entitled to deposit the monthly rent into the Tribunal.

The application for deposit of rents was resisted by the petitioner substantialy on two grounds. The first is that the monthly rent was Rs. 275, Rs.

175 for rent for the premises and Rs. 100 for amenities As the total rent was over Rs. 25o per month, the premises was exempt from the operation

of the Rent Control Act and as such the rent Controller has no jurisdiction to entertain the application by virtue of the provisions of Section 30(ii) of

the Rent Control Act. The amenities agreed to be provided under the agreement of lease included not only water but also water closet, wash basin,

supercem coating, mosaic flooring, compound wall, extra electric fans, power plugs, shower etc. In the second place it is contended that, as the

building had been constructed after the commencement of the Act in 1964, the Rent Controller is barred from deciding the matter u/s 30(i) of the

Act.

The Rent Controller upheld the petitioner''s contention that the building was constructed after 196o, that the monthly rent was Rs. 275 and that

the building was therefore exempted from the operation of the Act. The Appellate Authority took a different view on both the points and

accordingly allowed the application filed by the respondent.

The two contentions which are urged before the Tribunals below are the subject-matter of this revision. On the question whether the building

was constructed after the year 1960, it appears to me clear that the petitioner has no case whatsoever. Section 30 of the Act provides that nothing

contained in the Act shall apply to any building the construction of which was, after the date of the commencement of this Act, completed and

notified to the local authority concerned. The section implies that the construction must have been completed after the date of the commencement

of the Act and that the construction must be notified to the local authority concerned. The petitioner''s husband R.W. 1 has deposed that the

building was constructed after 1960 and relies on Exhibit R-3 the sanctioned plan and Exhibit R-4 a permit issued by the Corporation of Madras

on 30th July, 1964 to put up the construction envisaged by the sanctioned plan Exhibit R-3. Exhibit R-3 is a plan dated 29th November, 1962 and

purports to show the proposed additions and alterations in premises No. 164, Lloyds Road, Royapettah. The building let out to the respondent-

tenant, on the other hand, bears door No. 164-C; and it is not clear from the evidence on record that the building No. 164-C which has been

demised to the respondent is the addition proposed by the plan Exhibit R-3. The plan admittedly refers to the bigger premises bearing No. 164,

Lloyds Road and shows the constructions which are proposed to be retained and the additions and alterations to be made as indicated by the red

line. Section 30(i) contemplates the construction of a new building; and it is not clear from the evidence that the premises demised in favour of the

respondent was a new building constructed after the year 1960. R.W. 1, the petitioner''s husband has no doubt asserted that the building was

constructed after the year 1960; but it is not clear from his evidence, as I have already indicated, that the additions proposed to be made under the

plan comprised the entire building leased out to the respondent.

Admittedly, there is no documentary evidence to show that the construction was notified to the Corporation; but it is not disputed that the

building had been taxed and it can therefore be legitimately presumed that the taxation has been made only after the construction was brought to

the notice of the Corporation.

In view, however, of the fact that it is not satisfactorily established that the premises leased to the respondent was constructed after the year

1960, it is obvious that the exemption sought for cannot be based upon the provisions of Section 30(i) of the Act.

The second question is not free from difficulty. The terms of the tenancy are admittedly embodied in a deed Exhibit R-1 dated 19th July, 1968,

and the tenancy is for a period of 11 months and the relevant terms thereof are: (1) The rent of the building per calendar month is Rs. 175 and for

amenities Rs. 100, in all Rs. 275 per month. (2) The tenant will hold herself responsible for the electric fittings, fans, sanitary fittings, wash basins

etc. (3) Electricity charges have to be borne by the tenant as per M.E.S. bill. (4) A sum of Rs. 825 has been paid by way of advance and must be

returned when vacant possession of the building is handed over at the expiry of 11 months.

(5) The rent is payable on or before the 5th of the succeeding calendar month.

In the reply notice Exhibit P-4 dated 26th June, 1969 admittedly, sent by the petitioner herein it is stated that the rent for the building was fixed

at Rs. 175 per month and that the respondent-tenant agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 100 per month for the amenities viz., electric fan, wash basin,

water and other amenities. P.W. 1 the respondent''s husband has sworn that the respondent was paying Rs. 175 as rent and Rs. 100 for water

facilities and that the respondent did not pay Rs. 275 as rent per month and has filed Exhibit P-1 series rent receipts issued by the petitioner to

show that for the months of September, November and December, 1968 and January, February, March and April, 1969, a sum of Rs. 175 per

mensem had been paid. For the month of March, 1969, a separate receipt for Rs. 100 has been issued by the respondent, evidently for amenities,

though under a receipt styled rent bill.

R.W. 1 the petitioner''s husband has sworn that the monthly rent was Rs. 275 as per the rental agreement Exhibit R-1 and that the sum of Rs.

825 received represented three months'' advance of rent.

Section 30(ii) exempts any residential building or part thereof occupied by any one tenant if the monthly rent paid by him in respect of that

building or part exceeds, two hundred and fifty rupees.

The petitioner contends that the monthly rent for the building let out to the respondent-tenant is the sum Rs. 275, and that the provisions of the

Rent Control Act of i960, will not therefore apply to the tenancy between the petitioner and the respondent. On behalf of the respondent it is

contended that the monthly rent for the building is; only Rs. 175 and that the Act will therefore apply to the tenancy.

Section 2(2) of the Rent Control Act of i960, defines ""building"" as any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for

residential or non-residential purposes, and includes (a) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut or part of

such building or hut and let or to be let along with such building or hut and (b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut

or part of a building or hut but does not include a room in a hotel or boarding house.

On behalf of the petitioner reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Karnani Properties Ltd. Vs. Augustin, , a case under the

West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950. In that case a flat consisting of a single room, a bath and a covered

Verandah was let at the monthly rent of Rs. 100; and the tenant was entitled to the use of a number of fans, plug points, towel racks, a basin, a

commode and a glass shelf; and the landlord also was bound to supply electric energy for the use by the tenant of lamps, fans, radio, ovens for

cooking, for ironing, laundering and refrigerators and also to supply service of night guards, sweepers, liftmen, etc., apart from repairing the electric

installations and sanitary fittings; and he has to bear the owner and occupier''s shares of Municipal taxes. In other words, the monthly rent of Rs.

100 according to the agreement, included the hire charges of the electric fans, the electric charges for the use of fans, lights, etc. It was*contended

that, as the tenancy comprised not only buildings and structures and permanent fixtures but also the supply of electric power, other amenities and

services, the Bengal Act was inapplicable to the tenancy. The Supreme Court has laid down, approving of the decision of a Division Bench of the

Calcutta High Court in Residence Ltd. Vs. Surendra Mohan Banerjee and Others, , that the Bengal Rent Control Act applied to such tenancies

and has made the following observations:

Under this head the question reduces itself to this: whether if by a stipulation between the landlord and the tenant the landlord agrees to provide for

additional amenities like electric power for consumption and such other facilities, the case is taken out of the operation of the Act The Act is

intended ''to make better provision for the control of rents of premises''. It has defined '' premises'' in very wide terms, as pointed above. Hence it

is difficult, if not impossible, to accept the contention that the Legislature intended the provisions of the Act to have a limited application depending

upon the terms which an astute landlord may be able to impose upon his tenants. In order fully to give effect to the provisions of the statute, the

Court has to give them the widest application possible within the terms of the statute. Having those considerations in view, we do not think that the

supply of the amenities aforesaid would make any difference to the application of the Act to the premises in question.

The second contention urged before the Supreme Court was that Section 9 of that Act (Bengal Act) dealing with the fixation of standard rent did

not in terms contemplate the enhancement or reduction of rent according as the charges for electric current and Government duty thereon were

enhanced or reduced. But the Supreme Court, while conceding that none of the Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 9 of the Bengal Act has any reference

to these considerations, relied upon the residuary clause, which is to the effect that, where no provisions"" of the Act for fixing standard rent apply

to any premises, (it may be fixed?) by determining the standard rent at a rate which is fair and reasonable. Following the English decision Property

Holding Co. Ltd. v. Clark L.R. (1948) 2 K.B. 630 and the case of Alliance Property Co. Ltd. v. Shaffer L.R. (1948) 2 K.B. 464, their Lordships

have observed that the term ''rent'' has not been defined in the Act, that it must hence be taken to have been used in its ordinary dictionary

meaning, that the term ''rent'' is comprehensive enough to include all payments agreed by the tenant to be paid to his landlord for the use and

occupation not only of the building and its appurtenances but also of furnishings, electric installations and other amenities agreed between the

parties, to be provided by and at the cost of the landlord; the conclusion is therefore irresistible that all that is included in the term ''rent'' is within

the purview of the Act and that the Rent Controller and other authorities had the power to control the same. They have also overruled the decision

of the Calcutta High Court in Residence Ltd. Vs. Surendra Mohan Banerjee and Others, , which is to the effect that amount paid as rent for the flat

does not include any payment for the additional facilities, and conveniences provided by the landlord for the use of the tenant and their Lordships

approved of the decision of the Appellate Authority in that case which applied the provisions of Clause (g) of Section 9 of the Act for determining

the fair and reasonable rent after taking into consideration the fact that electric charges as also Government duty and consumption of electric power

had been increased.

Reliance is also placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in K.G. Ramachandran

and Others Vs. Raval and Company and Another, . In that case, the tenant was paying an annual rent of Rs. 3,375, an annual contribution of Rs.

225 towards repairs and a further annual contribution of Rs. 220 towards taxes; and the dispute related only to the extra Municipal tax of Rs.

1,212 which was agreed to be paid by the tenant as a result of an oral agreement subsequent to the original registered agreement of lease. It was

held by the Division Bench consisting of Anantanarayanan, C.J. and Natesan, J., that the additional payment of the annual extra Mjnicipal tax of

Rs. 1,212 agreed to subsequent to the demise cannot be deemed to be part of the rent for two reasons: (1) that the additional payment cannot be

said to be consideration for the right of enjoyment of the premises; and (2) that as the original tenancy was by a registered instrument, it is not open

to the tenant during the currency of the tenancy to plead any variation of rent which is not evidenced by another registered instrument. The actual

decision is not relevant for our case; but the observations made by the learned Judges on the meaning of rent under the Madras Buildings (Lease

and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and the scope of Section 30 of that Act are quite relevant for our purposes. The relevant observations are these:

The word ''rent'' is nowhere defined in the Rent Act and it is not questioned that in the expression ''monthly rent'' found in Section 30 of the Act,

the word ''rent'' is not used in any special sense. As it is the amount of rent paid, that u/s 30 brings a tenancy within the purview of the Act or takes

it out of its operation, in the absence of any specific meaning being assigned to it, the word ''rent'' must be taken to be used as it is ordinarily

understood with reference to contractual tenancies. ''Rent'' is the whole amount agreed to ""be paid by a tenant to his landlord in respect of his

enjoyment of what is let to him, whether described as rent or not. Additional payments made for such things as fitments and payments in respect of

rates where the landlord is rated, all agreed to be paid by the tenant as consideration for the tenancy, will be rent. But the essential features of rent

in the absence of any special definition are: it must be the result of an agreement; and it must be in consideration, of the letting. Rent u/s 30 of the

Rent Act is a payment which the tenant is bound to make to his landlord for the demise.

The Judgment proceeds on the basis that Municipal taxes agreed to be paid by the tenant in that case Were part of the rent and the only

dispute was whether the additional Municipal tax agreed to be paid by the tenant under the subsequent agreement would form part of the rent or

not. The learned Judges have observed that Srinivasan, J., has proceeded on the basis that, if there is a sum of money, it may be rates, which a

tenant agrees to pay as consideration for the tenancy, it is rent and that no exception Was taken before them to this proposition, as one of law.

The learned Counsel for the respondent contends that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Karnani Properties Ltd. Vs. Augustin, and of this

Court in K.G. Ramachandran and Others Vs. Raval and Company and Another, cited above are distinguishable on facts and must be confined to

the facts of the case dealt with and must not be applied to the facts of the present case. It is contended that the definition of ''rent'' under the English

Rent Restrictions Act relied or. by the Supreme Court must be confined to cases arising under the English Rent Restrictions Acts, in view of the

peculiar features of those Acts, that the adoption by the Supreme Court of the definition of ''rent'' by the English Courts was not justified while

interpreting the term as found in the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 , that the definition of rent by the

Supreme Court must, in any event, be deemed to be based upon the peculiar provisions contained in the West Bengal Premises Rent Control

(Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 and cannot be applied to cases under the Madras Rent Control Act the provisions of which are dissimilar and

that the observations relating to ''rent'' made by this Court in K.G. Ramachandran and Others Vs. Raval and Company and Another, , are

opposed to the provisions of Section 30 of the Madras Rent Control Act of i960 and must in any event be deemed obiter and will not govern the

facts of this case. The learned Counsel pleads that the term ''rent'' contemplated by Section 30 of the Madras Rent Control Act must be taken to

be the compensation payable under the contract of tenancy only for the building or part of the same as denned u/s 2(a) of the Madras Act of 1960

(i.e., the building and any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building) and cannot therefore include the sum payable under the

tenancy for the provision of amenities like water, sanitary fittings, electric fans wash basins, etc.

Speaking for myself I am unable to brush aside the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent as frivolous in nature or without any

substance whatsoever. The Supreme Court in the case cited above has approved of the meaning of the word ""rent"" as defined by the King''s

Bench in Property Holding Co. Limited v. Clark L.R. (1948) 1 K.B. 630. The learned Judges who decided that English case have accepted the

dictum of Younger, L.J., in Wilkes v. Goodwin L.R. (1923) 2 K.B. 105, Which is to the effect that the word ''rent'' in the exception to Section

12(2) of the Rent Restrictions Act, 1920, meant not rent in the strict sense but the total payment under the instrument of letting and that the

exception assumed the rent so called may include for example board, payment of which is not rent. The Rent Restriction Act of the year 1920, by

Sections 12(2) which defined ''houses'' ""brought within the Act with reference to rent or rateable value by proviso (1), excluded from the Act

houses bona fide let at a rent which included payments in respect of board, attendance or use of furniture""; and the present Section 10 which was

introduced by the second Act of 1923, provided that the inclusion of the use of furniture or of attendance shall not cause the house to be deemed

to be bona fide let at a rent which includes either unless the amount forms a substantial part o f the whole ''rent''. Having regard to these provisions

the learned Judges upheld the view of Younger, L.J., referred to above and held that the word ''rent'' used in Section 12(1)(a) of the Act of 1920

must be given the same meaning as the word ''rent'' found in Section 12(2) of the Act. Section 12(1)(a) of the Act of 1920 was enacted with a

view to fix the rent; and the learned Judges have taken the view that the Legislature could not have intended that the word ''rent'' used in Section

12(1)(a) was intended to have a different meaning from the word ''rent'' used in the proviso to Section 12(2) of the Act.

Thus it is seen that, in defining the word ''rent'', the English Courts were influenced by the peculiar provisions found in the exception and the

general notion which prevails in England about the ''rent''; and the learned Counsel for the respondent therefore contends that the definition of the

word ''rent'' as accepted by the English Courts mast be confined to cases which arise under the English Rent Restrictions Act and cannot be

extended to cases under the Madras Rent Control Act where ''building'' has been specifically defined as building or hut and furniture supplied by

the landlord. He points out that Section 30 refers to monthly rent paid by the tenant in respect of the building or part and contends, by reference to

this provision, that the monthly rent contemplated by Section 10 must be the rent payable by the tenant for the use of the building and furniture

demised under the lease and that the compensation paid by the tenant under the contract for the use of any other amenity, whether referred to as

rent or not, must not be treated as part of the rent for the purposes of Section 30 of the Act.

Pursuing the same line of argument the learned Counsel contends that the Supreme Court ought to have held that the rent under the West

Bengal Rent Control Act meant only the compensation payable for the use of the building, furniture and fitments and that the adoption by that

Court of the wide meaning of the word ''rent'' given by the English Courts was not warranted by the provisions of the Bengal Rent Control Act.

''Premises'' has been defined by Section 2, Sub-clause 8 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950, as any building or part of a

building or any hut or part of a hut let separately and includes (a) the gardens, grounds and out-houses (if any) appertaining to such building or part

of a building or hut or part of a hut, and {b) any furniture supplied or any fittings affixed by the landlord for the use of the tenant in such a building

or part of a building or hut or part of a hut. According to the learned Counsel, there was no justification for adopting the so called popular meaning

of the word ''rent'' merely because the word is not specifically defined in the Act, when the West Bengal Rent Control legislation had chosen to

define the premises in precise terms.

The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in K.G. Ramachandran and Others Vs. Raval and Company and Another, , cited above is

also attacked by the learned Counsel on the same ground; and he further contends that, in view of the fact that the Legislature has specifically used

the words ""if monthly rent paid by him in respect of that building or part"" in Section 30, there was totally no justification for interpreting the word

''rent'' in the general popular sense of the word. According to the learned Counsel, keeping the definition of the word ''building'' in Section 2(2) of

the Madras Rent Control Act, 1960, in mind, the word ''rent'' must be deemed to have been used only to indicate the compensation payable under

the contract of tenancy for the use of the building and furniture only. The learned Counsel pleads that, in view of the language adopted in Section

30 of the Madras Rent Control Act, i960, the Division Bench was not justified in importing the definition of the term ''rent'' as used in the English

Rent Restrictions Act. He points out that the term ''rent'' as defined in the English dictionaries means only the sum paid by the tenant for the use of

land or houses and does not include the compensation payable for furniture, fittings and fixtures, services or board. At page 2536 of Stroud''s

Judicial Dictionary (Volume 3, III Edition) the following passage is found: ""Probably it may be said that the primary meaning of rent is the sum

certain, in gross, which a tenant pays his landlord for the right of occupying the demised premises"". The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on

historical principles defines the term as a return, or payment made (in money or in kind) by a tenant to the owner or landlord at certain specified or

customary times, for the use of lands or houses Webster''s. Third New International Dictionary (1965) defines the word as a pecuniary sum agreed

upon between a tenant and his landlord and paid at fixed intervals, by the tenant to the landlord for the use of land or its appendages (for a house).

It is further contended that the popular use of the Word ''rent'' in India or, in particular, Tamil Nadu does not include the charge payable for

even furniture, leave alone fixtures, services or board. According to the learned Counsel; the popular meaning of the word coincides with the

notion of rent as understood in the Transfer of Property Act and it is taken as consideration, for the transfer or a right to enjoy Immovable

property. In Indian villages (sic) houses alone are let and the question of providing water closets and toilet facilities like wash basin does not

generally arise. It is only in recent times that the provision of such facilities in the demised buildings has been thought of and that too only in towns;

and the introduction of the flat system in very recent times on the Bombay model has only brought in the notion of providing furniture and fittings in

rented houses. It is therefore strenuously urged that the adoption of the popular meaning of the word as understood in a ultra modem country,

England, in a less sophisticated country like India and particularly in Tamil Nadu, cannot be justified.

It is further contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the observations made by the Division Bench, in Ramachandra''s case

(1969) 2 M.L.J. 82 : 85 L.W. 476 : ILR (1969) Mad. 584, are obiter in. nature and that the decision must be confined to the facts of that case.

Admittedly, the case merely decides that Municipal taxes ''form part of the rent'' as used in the Madras Rent Control Act of 1960; and the question

of fixtures, amenities and services did not arise for consideration at all in that case. It is contended that the decision did not materially turn upon the

scope, effect, and operation of Section 30 the Madras Rent Control Act of 1960 and that the decision must be taken as an authority only for the

proposition that, where rent has been fixed by a registered instrument, the rent cannot be varied by any subsequent oral arrangement.

The learned Counsel for the respondent further points out that the decision of the Division Bench in K.G. Ramachandran and Others Vs. Raval

and Company and Another, , has ignored the very basis of the Supreme Court decision which is that the object of the rent control legislation which

has been enacted admittedly for the protection of the tenants from unscrupulous landlords must not be allowed to be defeated by the introduction

into the lease arrangement apart from the building, furniture and fitments, amenities like electric energy, services of night watchmen etc. The learned

Counsel therefore contends that the landlord in this case should not he permitted to escape the provisions of the Rent Control Act of i960 by

introducing into the lease arrangement amenities like water, wash basin, electric current etc., which do not fall within the connotation of the term

furniture"".

On behalf of the petitioner it is strenuously pleaded that the decision of the Division Bench in K.G. Ramachandran and Others Vs. Raval and

Company and Another, , on the meaning of the word ""rent"" are not obiter in nature and is binding on me sitting as a single Judge and that the

definition of rent adopted by the Division Bench had been made by the Supreme Court after an elaborate review of the authorities, both Indian and

English and that it would not be open to me to adopt a different definition of the word ""rent"" for the purposes of interpreting the provisions of

Section 30 of Rent Control Act.

The arguments of the learned Counsel admittedly sound attractive; but then, they can be urged with propriety only before another Bench or the

Supreme Court, if and when a further occasion arises for canvassing the scope and effect of Section 30 of the Rent Control Act of 1960,

particularly with reference to the meaning of the word rent found in Section 30. The decision of the Division Bench is one u/s 30(ii) of the Act; and

sitting as a single Judge, I am bound by the principle which underlies the decision of the Division Bench; and the basis of the decision is that rent is

a whole amount agreed to be paid by a tenant to his landlord in respect of his enjoyment of what is let to him whether described as rent or not and

that additional payments made for such things as fitments and payments in respect of rates where the landlord is rated, all agreed to be paid by the

tenant as consideration for the tenancy will be rent. In other words, the judgment implies that the term ""rent"" used in the Madras Rent Control Act,

1960, would include all payments agreed to be paid by the tenant to his landlord for the use and occupation not only of the building and furniture

but also for rates, electricity, water and other amenities including services. In other words, any sum of money which the tenant agrees to pay as

consideration for the tenancy would be rent.

The learned Counsel, however, contends that, even if the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in K.G. Ramachandran and Others

Vs. Raval and Company and Another, , about rent is taken as binding, it will still be open to the Court to find out whether the parties intended that

the additional payment for the amenities should be viewed as part of the rent or not; and it is contended that the parties in this case themselves have

stipulated that the rent for the building was Rs. 175 and that the addition of Rs. 100 stipulated as compensation for amenities was not treated by

the parties as being included in the rent of the premises. Strong reliance is also placed by him upon the fact that the petitioner-landlady had been

issuing separate receipts, one for the building and another for the amenities.

I am invited to the following observations made by Evershed, L.J., in Property Holding Co. Limited v. Clark (1948) 1 K.B. 630 cited supra:

...and I was at one time impressed by the argument that if the landlords chose to adopt so careful a distinction in the terms they put forward to the

tenant, they ought not now to be allowed to resile from the consequences of the distinction because for present purposes it suited them to do so.

But there is no sufficient evidence, in my judgment, to justify the assumption that the document was in fact the landlord''s document and to apply

accordingly the rule contra proferentes against the landlords.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the language of the lease as set out out in Exhibit R-1 shows that the sum of Rs. 100 paid

for amenities was included in the rent of the building and that the clause in that document is to the effect that the rent of the building in all was Rs.

275 per month; and emphasis is laid on. the fact that a sum of Rs. 825 which is thrice the sum of Rs. 275 the monthly rent stipulated, had been

paid by way of advance.

On a fair construction of the terms of tenancy set out in Exhibit R-1 and taking into account the subsequent conduct of the petitioner in issuing a

separate receipt for the rent of the house and a separate receipt for the amenities, I am satisfied that the parties intended that the monthly rent was

only Rs. 175 and that the principle referred to by Evershed, L.J., is applicable to this case. In any event, the observations of the Supreme Court in

Karnani Properties Limited v. Miss Augustine 1975 S.C.J. 177 : 1975 S.C.R. 20 : AIR 1957, that it will not be open to the astute landlord to

defeat the provisions of the Act by introducing clauses into the lease which would take the lease away from the operation of the Act will apply with

great force in this case. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the monthly rent of the premises in question was only Rs. 175 and the result is the

exemption claimed by the petitioner from the operation of the Madras Rent Control Act of 1960 by virtue of the provisions of Section 30 cannot

be granted.

In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed; but, under the circumstances, without costs.