Samithurai Thevar K. and Others vs T.E.S. Batcha

K.N. Mudaliar, J.—Accused 1, 2 and 6 are the Petitioners. They hare been convicted for an offence under Section. 500 I.P.C. Accused 1

to 10 are the waramdars of the trust lands belonging to Haji Naina Mohamed Ambalam Madarsa Musafar Khana In Abiramam. Mahomed Yassin

Is the trustee. His father-in-law is one Batcha. He is the power of attorney agent. He is the complainant in the case, examined as P.W. 1.

About ten days prior to the visit of the Minister of Local Administration to the village called Abiramam, the accused formed an agricultural

association. Accused 1 is the President of the Association. Accused 2 is the Secretary. Ex. P. 3 is the address presented to the Minister over the

names of accused 1 and 2. There is no doubt that Ex. P. 3 contains defamatory matter. In fact it contains a scurrilous allegation that under the evil

advice of the complainant, P. W. 1, his son-in-law Mohamed Yassin has been misappropriating and misusing the funds.

A complaint was subsequently laid by P.W. 1 and as noticed by me above, ten accused including Accused 1, 2 and 6, were accused of this

offence and out of whom accused 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 have been acquitted.

On behalf of the Petitioners (accused 1, 2 and 6) Mr. Gopalaswami, counsel for the Petitioners argued that P. W. 1 being the power of attorney

agent he is not competent to lay this complaint against the accused in view of Section 198 Code of Criminal Procedure and he cited In support of

his proposition the authority reported In A. Sambandam and Another Vs. G. Natesan, I find no support to the argument of Mr. Gopalaswami,

because the offence contemplated in the said decision is one u/s 496 or 498 I.P.C. read with Section 193 Code of Criminal Procedure Section

198 Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates the making of a complaint ""by some person aggrieved by such evidence."" In my opinion, the

contents of Ex. P. 3 would constitute defamation of both the complainant and his son-in-law, Yassin. Assuming for one moment that Ex. P. 8

contained only defamatory allegations against Yassin alone, even then in my view, P. W. 1 the complainant is competent to make a complaint

against the accused by virtue of his position as the father-in-law of Yassin, for, in view of the phraseology of Section 198, I consider that P.W. 1

would be a person aggrieved by such offence. The language is wide enough to cover the complainant, the father-in-law of Yassin, in making a

complaint competently in the eye of law. Whether P. W. 1 has the legal competence of making a complaint as the power of attorney agent does

not strictly arise, in view of my finding in favour of P. W. 1 having this legal competence to make a complaint as the father in-law of Mr. Yassin. At

any rate that does not strictly arise in this case in view of the relationship as the father-in-law of Yassin who is the principal target of this defamatory

allegation in his capacity as the Trustee of the Musafar Khana. The learned Public Prosecutor dated the ruling reported in In Mrs. Pat Sharpa v.

Dwijendranath, (1964) 1 Cri. L.J. 367, wherein the Division Bench holds that it cannot be laid down as an inflexible rule that the expression ''same

person aggrieved in Section 198 Code of Criminal Procedure will only be limited to the person actually defamed or affected. The section does not

say that complaint can only be made by the person defamed. What it requires is that the complaint must be made by ''some person aggrieved''. The

expression ''some person aggrieved'' was not intended to be restricted to the persons actually defamed. It must be determined in each case

according to its own circumstances whether the complainant could be said to be in a legal sense a person ''aggrieved'' within the meaning of

Section 198, Code of Criminal Procedure.

In my view, the person aggrieved need not necessarily be the person defamed. The stubborn fact that emerges form this case is that P.W. 1, the

complainant, himself is a person defamed in addition to his son-in-law, Yassin being defamed. Therefore, the complaint made by P. W. 1 is quite

competent in law.

The second argument of Mr. Gopalaswami is that under the evil advice of the complainant (P.W. 1) the defamatory allegation, i.e. the son-in-

law Yassin has been misusing and misappropriating the funds of the Trust as alleged to have been made whereas the text of the charge Is that

Accused 1 signed as President of the Agricultural Sangam the welcome address and that P. W. 1and his son-in-law Yassin were misusing and

mismanaging the property and income belonging to the trust intending to harm or having reason to believe that such imputation would harm the

reputation of the said Batcha and his son-in-law Yassin. It is true that Mr. Gopalaswami''s contention is wall-founded inasmuch as the allegation

against the father-in-law is not accurately worded. According to the contents of Ex P. 3, the complainant has not been charged with misusing or

misappropriation of funds. He has been charged with giving evil advice to the son-in-law who is said to be misappropriating and misusing the funds

No doubt there is this defect in the charge. The question is whether this irregularity or infirmity has occasioned any prejudice to the accused. All

that accused I pleaded in his examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure is that he is not guilty, when the entire evidence of P. W. 1 has

been summed up and put to accused 1.

That apart, accused 1 pleads that Exception 8 to Section 499 could certainly be availed of u/s 537 (b) Code of Criminal Procedure no finding

or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity In the

charge. Mr. Gopalaswami has not even argued before me that this has occasioned failure of justice. It is unnecessary for me to find that in the

circumstances of this case, Exception 8 to Section 499 I.P.C. is totally unavailing to the Petitioners Mr. Gopalaswami farther argued that so far as

accused 1 is concerned, he is an illiterate, that there is no evidence to show that accused 1, knew the contents of Ex. P. 3. 1 am afraid I cannot

accept this argument. Accused 1 is elected as President of the Agricultural Association and in the name of the Agricultural Association and also in

the name of accused 1 as President of the said Association, the welcome address (Ex. P. 3.) was presented. As already noticed, Ex. P. 3 contains

defamatory allegation against P.W. 1 and his son-in-law, Yassin. There is the evidence that accused 1 gave the welcome address, Ex. P. 3 and

asked P.W. 2 to read it over as he could not reed it well. This does not mean that accused-1 is an illiterate. I have no doubt in my mind that

accused-1 while presenting the address and asking P.W. 2 to read it over, knew full well the contents of Ex. P. 3. Therefore accused 1 has

published Ex. P. 3 with intent to defame both P. W. 1 and his son-in-law Yassin.

Regarding accused 2, there is really no evidence implicating this accused because no overt act has been alleged or proved against accused 2 either

in regard to the printing of Ex. P. 3 or the publication of the same. Therefore accused 2 is acquitted.

So far as accused 6 is concerned, the evidence that he distributed the welcome address Ex. P. 3 containing defamatory allegation amongst

members of the public including P.W. 3, has been accepted and acted upon by the court below. I see no reason to differ from the appreciation of

the trial Magistrate in regard to the guilt of accused 6. When accused 6 distributed the copies of Ex. P. 3, there is no doubt that he knew the

contents of Ex, P. 3. It is not urged before me that accused 6 is an illiterate either 8. The revision petition of accused 1 and 6 is dismissed; accused

2 is acquitted allowing the revision so far as fee is concerned. The fine if paid by accused 2 may be directed to be refunded.