High CourtsSingle Bench

Samtel Color Ltd. vs State of U.P. and Others

Allahabad High Court · Decided on 7 October 1996 · Citation: (1996) 10 AHC CK 0023

HON’BLE JUDGES
Paritosh K. Mukherjee, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 — Section 10, 12
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
C.M.W.P. No. 20777 of 1990
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Judgment

10 paragraphs · 566 words

Paritosh K. Mukherjee, J.—M/s. Samtel Color Limited, Ghaziabad, the Petitioner has filed the present writ petition, inter alia, challenging the order passed by Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ghaziabad, dated 14th March, 1990, contained in Annexure-3 to the writ petition, whereby the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ghaziabad has taken the view that since the job performed by the Petitioner-company is regular and permanent, in nature, the provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') do not apply.

2.

According to Sri. J.N. Tewari, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the Petitioner-company. Section 12 of the Act provides for grant of licence to the Contractors. Once the Petitioner having been granted licence, it cannot be cancelled in the manner, it has been done in the present case.

3.

According to the Petitioner, it had again filed an application for enlisting as Contractor, which has been rejected by the impugned order dated 14.3.1990 with the observation that since nature of job rendered by the Petitioner-company is of regular and permanent nature, no licence under the Act can be granted to the Petitioner.

4.

In paragraph 15 of the writ petition, the Petitioner has specifically asserted that the State Government has not issued any notification u/s 10 of the Act prohibiting employment of contract labour in the process in which Petitioner engages contract labour.

5.

That being the factual position, according to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ghaziabad has acted without jurisdiction in refusing to grant fresh licence under the provisions of the Act.

6.

In this connection, Sri. Tewari also drew my attention to a decision in Vegoils Private Limited Vs. The Workmen, , wherein it was observed that no doubt, the Industrial Tribunal referred to Section 10 of the Central Act, but the Tribunal misapplied those provisions when it directed abolition of contract labour regarding loading and unloading operations. The Hon''ble Supreme Court further held that Provincial Government has exclusive jurisdiction in regard to prohibition of employment of contract labour. Industrial Tribunal cannot issue directions to an establishment to abolish contract labour.

7.

The aforesaid view has been followed in Workmen, Nilgiris Cooperative Marketing Society v. State of Tamil Nadu (1989) 2 SCC 724, wherein it has been held that the High Court cannot abolish contract labour nor can it prohibit a principal employer from engaging contract labour in case where the Government had not abolished contract labour by an order u/s 10 of the Act.

8.

The aforesaid view has been consistently followed by the Apex Court, of late, it has been followed in the case of Gujarat Electricity Board, Thermal Power Station, Ukai Vs. Hind Mazdoor Sabha and Others, .

9.

That being the legal position, in my view, the order passed by the Deputy labour Commissioner, Ghaziabad was without jurisdiction. It deserves to be quashed.

10.

In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The Deputy labour Commissioner, Ghaziabad is directed to grant licence to the Petitioner alter taking into consideration the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, and, the decisions of Apex Court, referred to in the body of this judgment, not being minuted by his earlier decision, within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment, after affording opportunity of hearing lo the concerned parties. The parties shall bear their own costs.