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Judgment
23 paragraphs · 1,239 wordsAvneesh Jhingan, J
[1] Today physical hearing was held but on request of learned counsel for the petitioner, the matter is taken up by way of hybrid hearing.
[2] This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is filed for quashing of FIR No. 220, dated 15th July, 2021, under Sections 406, 420, 506 IPC, registered at Police Station Pehowa, District Kurukshetra and all consequent proceedings arising therefrom, on the basis of compromise dated 2nd September, 2021.
[3] Brief facts of the case are that complaint was made by Dilbagh Singh [hereinafter referred to as 'complainant'] that he was duped of Rs. 32 lakhs by the petitioners on pretext of sending him abroad. Neither the complainant was sent abroad nor money returned.
[4] During pendency of proceeding, the parties entered into a compromise and filed this petition. On 28th September, 2021, the parties were directed to appear before the Illaqa Magistrate/ trial Court for recording of their statements. A report dated 1st October, 2021 is received from the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Pehowa. Relevant portion of the report is reproduced below:-
"On the other hand, accused vide their joint statement dated 01.10.2021 submitted that they have entered into a compromise with complainant Dilbagh Singh in present case whereby the complainant does not wish to continue present case against them. They have no objection if the present case is quashed by the Hon'ble High Court. As per FIR, there are three accused in present case namely Sandeep Kumar, Daljit Kaur and Ram Chand and none of them is a proclaimed offender....."
[5] Full Bench of this Court in Kulwinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab, 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1052, has held:-
"The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the Cr.P.C. which can affect the inherent power of this Court under Section 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in noncompoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.
The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be exercised Ex-Debitia Justitia to prevent an abuse of process of Court. There can neither be an exhaustive list nor the defined para-meters to enable a High Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has no limits. However, the High Court will exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and caution. The exercise of power has to be with circumspection and restraint. The Court is a vital and an extra-ordinary effective instrument to maintain and control social order. The Courts play role of paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony and ever- lasting congeniality in society. Resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise between two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate and prompt attention of a Court which should endeavour to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery."
[6] The Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others v. State of Gujarat and another, 2017 AIR (SC) 4843 has expounded principles governing the exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The relevant portion is reproduced as under:-
"15. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions :
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."
[7] The issue in the present case has colour of commercial dispute. The parties have settled the differences and have decided to settle the issue and not to litigate any further. No useful purpose would be served by continuing with the trial. To meet the ends of justice, the FIR mentioned above and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.
[8] The petition is allowed.
