Sandip Roy & Ors vs State of West Bengal and Ors

Rajarshi Bharadwaj, J

The petitioners in the present writ petition are primary school teachers appointed in February 2025 under the much-delayed recruitment process initiated in 2009 by the North 24-Parganas District Primary School Council. The recruitment notification, published on 23rd April, 2010, prescribed only Madhyamik or equivalent qualification with the ability to read and write in the chosen medium. Many of the petitioners, being university graduates with B.Ed. training, applied and duly appeared in the written examination in February 2011. Following allegations of irregularity, favouritism and manipulation, the then Governor of West Bengal, by an order dated 21st June, 2012, annulled the process for four districts including North 24-Parganas and directed de-novo examinations.

The de-novo examination was conducted in March 2014 followed by aptitude tests and interview in November the same year. Based on academic records, written test and interview performance, panels were prepared and duly approved by the Commissioner of School Education in June 2015. Despite this approval, the District Primary School Council did not release appointments, leaving eligible candidates waiting. Protracted litigation ensued and ultimately, this Court in January 2021 directed the Council to publish panels and issue appointments, even by creating supernumerary posts. As a result, a panel was published in February 2021 and appointments were given to a batch of empanelled candidates later in 2021. However, the entire process continued to face judicial scrutiny because many eligible candidates were left out. In April 2024, by a comprehensive order passed by Hon’ble Justice Rajasekhar Mantha, it was directed that all candidates called to the interview in the 2009 process, provided they had filed writ petitions by 24th April, 2024, would be entitled to appointments. In consequence, the present petitioners too received appointment letters, albeit only in 2025, bringing closure to a recruitment exercise that had stretched for over sixteen years.

In the intervening years, there were transformative changes in the law of teacher qualifications under Section 23 of the Right to Education Act, 2009. Notifications of the National Council for Teacher Education in 2010 and 2011 mandated minimum qualifications of Higher Secondary with 50% marks together with D.El.Ed., or Graduation with D.El.Ed. For a time, candidates with B.Ed. degrees were also considered eligible, provided they underwent a six-month Bridge Course. This temporary window was expanded through the 2018 notification, which allowed B.Ed. holders to be directly recruited to primary schools subject to such course. However, that notification per se was challenged and set aside by the Supreme Court in August 2023 in Devesh Sharma v. Union of India reported in (2023) 18 SCC 339, which held that B.Ed. was not an appropriate qualification for primary school pedagogy.

On 8th April 2024, while dealing with subsequent applications, the Supreme Court clarified that its judgment in Devesh Sharma (supra) would be prospective in operation. Thus, it protected the services of those candidates with B.Ed. who had been appointed before 11th August 2023, but required them to undergo a six-month Bridge Course specially designed by NCTE in order to continue in service. For those appointed after 11th August, 2023, B.Ed. would not be valid and only the two-year Diploma in Elementary Education would be acceptable. In consequence, teachers appointed in 2021 under the same recruitment process came within the protective umbrella, while the present petitioners, appointed only in 2025, stand outside it. They now urge that such differentiation is unjust, since both sets of teachers were appointed from the 2009 recruitment and the delay was caused altogether by the lapses of the State and its agencies. Their plea is to be allowed to undergo the six-month Bridge Course like the others, or at least not to be compelled exclusively to pursue the two-year D.El.Ed.

Learned Counsel appearing for the State submits that the petitioners, though participants in the 2009 selection process, were appointed only in 2025 pursuant to the order dated 25.04.2025 in WPA 20966 of 2024. They now seek the benefit of the six-month bridge course directed in WPA 18895 of 2024, relying on the judgment in Devesh Sharma (supra).

It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by judgment dated 11th August, 2023 in CA 5068/2023 and clarification dated 08th April, 2024, laid down that only teacher appointed with B.Ed. under the 2018 NCTE Notification and in service prior to 11th August, 2023 are entitled to the bridge course. The petitioners fall outside this category, since their appointments took place much later. Reliance on WPA 18895 of 2024 passed by this Court, is misplaced, as wrong decisions cannot be cited for parity, as held in State of Odisha v. Anup Kumar Senapati, reported in (2019) 19 SCC 626 and Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. v. Union of India reported in 1984 Supp SCC 457 wherein it was held:

“13. …We have, however, to point out that the grievance of the appellant even if it is well founded, does not entitle the appellant to claim the benefit of the notification. A wrong decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim the benefit on the basis of the wrong decision…”

Further, NCTE/NIOS public notices dated 07th April, 2025 and 01st August, 2025 restrict the bridge course to the aforesaid category of teachers. The petitioners, having not challenged those notices, are precluded from seeking relief contrary thereto. The State, however, has no objection if the petitioners undergo the regular 2-year D.El.Ed course, subject to fulfilling eligibility criteria.

Learned counsel for respondent no. 3 being the Commissioner of School Education, files a report asserting that the petitioners cannot take advantage of the six-month Bridge Course as they were appointed to service only in 2025. The Commissioner points out that the Supreme Court has explicitly drawn a line at 11th August, 2023, the date of the judgment in Devesh Sharma (supra) and determined that candidates appointed thereafter cannot rely on B.Ed. for validity of appointment. While pre-August 2023 appointees are protected subject to bridge training, after that cut-off date the law requires the mandatory two-year D.El.Ed. qualification. The Commissioner therefore maintains that the petitioners must compulsorily undergo and complete the two-year D.El.Ed. programme either in regular or ODL mode. Their B.Ed. qualification can no longer be accepted as valid and they cannot be permitted to align themselves with those appointed in 2021. Therefore, the respondent no.3 rejected the claim for parity and instead insisted on fresh compliance with statutory qualifications.

Learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 4 submits that as far as the six-month Bridge Course is concerned, the West Bengal Board of Primary Education has no authority to make arrangements. The Bridge Course is solely within the purview of NCTE and NIOS. If and when NCTE and NIOS operationalize the scheme, eligible teachers will be allowed admission as per those guidelines. Thus, the Deputy Commissioner, in effect, distances the State authorities from any active responsibility for implementing the six-month Bridge Course.

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the records this Court is of the view that the present petitioners are required to undergo the full two-year Diploma in Elementary Education notwithstanding their B.Ed. qualification. The reasons are manifold.

First, the law after Devesh Sharma (supra) is unmistakably clear. The Supreme Court unequivocally quashed the notification that had extended B.Ed. eligibility to primary schools and ruled that such qualification was not appropriate for teaching young children. B.Ed. is designed for teaching adolescents in secondary schools, focusing on subject content and disciplinary methods, whereas elementary education demands a different training in child psychology, foundational literacy and numeracy and activity-based pedagogy. To blend the two pathways is to compromise the standards of early education.

Second, the protective order of 8th April, 2024 cannot be stretched beyond its text. What the Supreme Court saved was the service of those already appointed as of August 2023. To them alone is the six-month Bridge Course granted as a one-time device, in equity, to prevent loss of livelihood. Their case stands on special footing, it is an exception to the rule. For post-2023 appointees, no such exception exists. Extending it to the present petitioners would amount to rewriting the Supreme Court’s order, which a High Court cannot do. In this context, it is apposite to recall the dictum of the Supreme Court in Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey reported in (1976) 3 SCC 334, that “It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the precise facts which constitutes its ratio decidendi, and that even one additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions.” The situation of teachers appointed prior to 11th August, 2023 and those appointed thereafter is one such vital distinction. Hence the ratio in WPA 18895 of 2024 granting the benefit of the bridge course to 2021 appointees cannot, by mechanical application, be extended to the present petitioners.

Third,  although  the  petitioners  lament,  with  justification,  that  their belated appointments were caused by the State’s own negligence, such delay cannot convert an impermissible qualification into a valid one. Equality under Article 14 cannot be pressed into service to perpetuate wrong. The Supreme Court in State of Odisha v.Anup Kumar Senapati reported in (2019) 19 SCC 626, reaffirmed that there is no concept of „negative equality‟ under Article 14. If a legal right exists, it must be enforced equally, but where no right exists, none can demand parity merely because others were inadvertently or wrongly favoured. As further emphasized in Basawaraj v. LAO, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, Article 14 cannot perpetuate illegality or irregularity. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Therefore, the benefit extended to candidates appointed before August 2023, albeit on equitable grounds, cannot be invoked by the present petitioners. The Supreme Court’s classification, based on the date of appointment, carries a rational nexus, all teachers appointed while B.Ed. was considered valid are saved subject to bridge training, whereas those appointed thereafter must conform strictly to the statutory standards. This ensures reasonably uniform treatment of teachers and preserves educational integrity going forward.

It has also been observed by the Supreme Court in State of U.P and another v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd and another reported in (1991) 4 SCC 139 that:

“A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent.”

The protective orders obtained by earlier batches of teachers cannot be stretched  as  binding  precedent  to  cover  petitioners  who  stand  outside  the protected class, because those orders were based on specific equity considerations, not on a declaration of general law.

Fourth, a six-month Bridge Course is at best a patch-work measure. It does not impart the full practical experience embedded in two years of D.El.Ed. If this Court were to allow present petitioners to undertake only the Bridge Course, primary school children would be taught by inadequately prepared teachers, a result contrary to legislative policy and Supreme Court mmandate.

This Court notes that a coordinate bench, while deciding WPA 18895 of 2024 (Sairul Molla & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors.), permitted teachers appointed in 2021 to undergo the six-month Bridge Course, thereby allowing the continuation of their services with consequential benefits. The present petitioners, though part of the same recruitment process, stand appointed later, i.e., in 2025 due to prolonged administrative delays and therefore fall technically outside the scope of the Apex Court’s order dated 8th April, 2024.

The apparent conflict, therefore, is not merely academic but strikes at the heart of parity among similarly situated candidates. Since this Court is not inclined to extend the benefit of the six-month Bridge Course and is of the view that the petitioners would be required to undergo two years of D.El.Ed, the inevitable consequence would be that they are deprived of significant service advantages such as seniority, scale of pay and other attendant benefits. Given that one coordinate bench has taken a different view in respect of candidates from the same recruitment exercise and as this Court is constrained by the binding pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, adherence to established legal principles mandates that the matter be placed before a Larger Bench for adjudication.

Accordingly, this Court refrains from conclusively adjudicating on whether the petitioners may be granted the benefit of the six-month Bridge Course or must compulsorily undergo the two-year D.El.Ed. program. Since this Court is unable to concur with the view taken by the coordinate Bench in respect of candidates, including the petitioners arising from the same recruitment exercise, the matter requires to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench, so that the inconsistency may be settled authoritatively in law.

In view of the above, the present writ petition is not being dismissed on merits but is directed to be placed before a Division Bench/Larger Bench for consideration on the specific issue indicated hereinabove. All pending applications shall remain pending and shall be considered along with the writ petition by the Larger Bench.

Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon fulfilment of requisite formalities.