Sandireddy Suseela vs Government of Andhra Pradesh and others

The petitioner seeks that the Order No.1 of 1999 passed by the Assistant Project Director, Integrated Child Development Project Office, S.M. Puram at Ponduni, where under she was sought to be removed from the post of Anganwadi Worker, to be declared as illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice.

The case of the petitioner inter alia as averred in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition is that pursuant to the advertisement given by the respondents 2 to 4 she applied for the post of Anganwadi Worker and in the interview conducted in the month of December, 1998 she was selected under an unanimous resolution passed by the 5th and 6th respondents. Pursuant to the same, the second respondent issued proceedings dated 1-1-1999 and accordingly the petitioner joined in the said post in the first week of January, 1999. Eversince she has been working as Anganwadi Worker. On account of the local politics an order was passed by the second respondent removing the petitioner from service by Order No.l of 1999, dated 5-3-1999 without issuing any notice to the petitioner. Now she assails the said order as aforesaid.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the Mothers'' Committee, which is competent to select, has unanimously selected the petitioner by its resolution and having allowed the petitioner to work as Anganwadi Worker, she cannot be removed from service under the impugned orders.

The learned Government Pleader appearing for Women and Child Welfare on the other hand contends that the petitioner is not eligible to be appointed as Anganwadi Worker as she has not attained the requisite age, and therefore, the impugned order cannot be questioned. The learned Counsel for the 7th respondent who has been subsequently impleaded as a party contends that there has been no appointment in favour of the petitioner, and therefore, the petitioner cannot question the impugned order as she is not eligible to be appointed.

The petitioner is a resident of Vullivalasa village. On her own showing she is aged 19 years at the appropriate time. She passed SSC and married a person belonging to scheduled caste as intercaste marriage. Pursuant to the notifications issued calling for the applications for the selection of a candidate for the post of Anganwadi Worker the residents of Vullivalasa village heldameetingon30-12-1998. Themembers in that meeting in turn selected six members so as to constitute a Mothers'' Committee and that Committee unanimously selected the petitioner as the daughter-in-law of the village and appointed her as Anganwadi Worker on 1-1-1999. Obviously she has been working since then as Anganwadi Worker. While so, under the proceedings dated 5-3-1999 the Project Officer, ICDS Project, S.M. Puram, cancelled the appointment of Ihe petitioner on the ground that the appointment of the petitioner was not in order and it is not in accordance with the rules and regulations.

The learned Government Pleader appearing or the respondents 1 to 4 submits that one should be of the age of 21 years so as to be eligible to be appointed as Anganwadi Worker. The eligibility criteria annexed to the notification inviting the applications for the post of Anganwadi Worker inter alia include in condition No.2 that Ihe candidate should be within 21 to 40 years of age and the candidate should be a married woman. In case there are no eligible married women, unmarried can be selected. The second condition therefore stipulates a minimum age. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the ru!e does not specifically says that one should pass 21 years so as to be eligible and at any rate it is not mandatory. I am afraid I cannot accede the contention of the learned Counsel inasmuch as the eligibility criteria have been given in the notification itself while inviting applications. No doubt the words ''about within 21-40'' have been mentioned therein, but unlike other conditions there has been no relaxation of the age rule. The rule, which comprehends the condition in regard to age, also embraces a condition that the candidate should be a married woman. But relaxation has been given therein (hat in the event of a married woman not being available an unmarried person can be appointed. No such relaxation has obviously been given in regard to the age. Admittedly the petitioner was 19 years old at the relevant time even as per her own showing. Apparently therefore, she was not eligible to apply for the post pursuant to the notification.

The District Collector is the supervising authority as can be seen from the scheme for the appointment of Anganwadi Workers and he is the Chairman of the Committee constituted for the selection of Anganwadi Workers as per G.O. Ms. No.132, dated 26-8-1991. Under G.O. Ms. No.79, dated 29-12-1998 an amendment was issued by adding a para that the existing procedure of selection of Anganwadi Workers and helpers stipulated in G.O. Ms. No.132, dated 26-8-1991 shall be continued. The contention that the said GO has no application to the present case cannot be countenanced as the selection in this case was done on 1-1-1999. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that this GO was communicated on 5-1-1999 merits no consideration in view of the fact that the aforesaid GO comes into effect on the date on which it was published in the Gazette, Obviously it was published on 29-12-1998. In view of the same, the procedure as envisaged in the earlier G.O. Ms. No.132, dated 26-8-1991 should be followed. As per this GO the District Collector will be the Chairman. The Programme Officer of ICDS Cell shall be the Convenor. Apart from these two there are four members consisting of local MLA, DMHO of the District, Assistant Director/District Women and Child Welfare Officer and CDPO. Perhaps by following G.O. Ms. No.48, dated 28-7-1998 where the Collector was not the Chairman of the Committee the process has been undertaken in this case. But G.O. Ms. No.48, dated 28-7-1998 applies only in respect of the new projects and in respect of all the on going ICDS projects. The procedure contemplated under G.O. Ms. No.132 alone applies as specified in G.O. Ms. No.79, dated 29-12-1998. In fact, in G.O. Ms. No.79, dated 29-12-1998 the G.O. Ms. No.48, dated 28-7-1998 has been referred to. The selection process undertaken in this case itself obviously not in accordance with G.O. Ms. No.132. Further more, the age of the petitioner is being 19 years, and as per the eligibility criteria one requires to be within 21-45 years, she cannot also answer the same. In that view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be said to be illegal.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner in support if his various contentions seek to place reliance upon the following judgments:

Shanker Charan Tripathi v. Public Service Commission of Allahabad High Court 1992 (7) SLR 456, Mridula Chandna v. Panjab University Through its Vice-Chancellor of Punjab and Haryana High Court 1992 (7) SLR 710, Chetna Sharma v. Kuruskshetra University of Punjab and Haryana High Court 1993 (3) SLR 319, Narendra Kumar Changani v. State of Rajasthan High Court 1993 (3) SLR 810, K.M. Duraiswamy v. The Special Officer, The Coimbatore Division, Rural Cooperative Housing Society Limited of Madras High Court 1993 (4) SLR 465, Miss Snigdha Sardar v. Chief General Manager, South Eastern Coalfieldes Limited of Orissa High Court 1993 (7) SLR 383, and Jai Kumar Singh v. Inspector General Police, CRPF of Andhra Pradesh High Court 1994 (2) SLR 578.

In the first case referred to above, the writ petitioners pursuant to the advertisement submitted their applications, which were initially found to be in order and at the time of the interview after the written examination certain defects in the application forms were noticed and they were not permitted for the interview. Under the circumstances, the equitable principle of estoppel has been invoked. In the second case, the writ petitioner sought admission into Master of Library and Information Science Course on the reservation category of defence personnel. Later it appears that it was filled from open category. In the meanwhile the petitioner completed her course and her result was also declared. In the circumstances, the writ petition was allowed. In the third case, the petitioner who passed 10 + 2 examination sought admission into BA degree Part-I examination as a private candidate. She was asked to send her marks certificate and accordingly she sent her marks statement and result was declared showing that as "Result Late Eligibility" on the ground that she passed Senior Secondary Certificate Examination, with full subjects and she cannot be allowed to pass two tests in one academic year. Initially interim direction was issued directing to permit her to appear in the next examination subject to final decision in the writ petition. When the writ petition has come up for hearing more than three years have been elapsed and in the period interregnum she completed B.A. Part-II and Part-Ill also. Under the circumstances, her admission was directed to be regularised. In the fourth judgment, as per Rule 9 of Rajasthan Subordinate Court (Ministerial Establishment) Rules a candidate must not have attained the age of 31 years on the first of January of the year following the date of application. When challenged the words "on the first day of January of the year following" have been directed to be struck down and instead it has been directed to be reads as "one must have attained the age of 18 years and must not have attained the age of 31 years on the date of application". In the fifth judgment, the petitioner was appointed to the post of Secretary of the Society although he was above 30 years old at that time by addressing the Registrar of the Societies to relax the age qualification in the year 1982. In the month of August, 1984 his services were terminated on the ground of over age at the time of his initial appointment. In the circumstances, the Court held that when he was competent person having the requisite qualification even according to the resolution passed by the Society having regard to the fact that in his continuous service there has been no bad remark it is a fit and proper that his services be regularised by properly amending the bye-law relaxing the age qualification. No such relaxation has been given in the instant case. In the sixth case, the service of the writ petitioner who is a confirmed teacher has been terminated on the ground that there has been a change of management as the school has been handed over to a new management. Applying the principles of natural justice the petitioner was directed to be absorbed and in the seventh case, the service of the writ petitioner was terminated on the ground that the claim of the petitioner that he is a domicile of Gujarat State was found to be false on enquiry. Termination order was set aside ultimately by this Court as no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. The above judgments have no application to the present facts of the case. The selection process has been undertaken in this case contrary to the procedure enjoined under the two GOs., referred to supra. The Committee, which has under taken the process, is not competent. The petitioner is not eligible, as she did not possess the requisite age. No regular appointment order has been issued to the petitioner. For the above reasons the petitioner cannot invoke the principles of natural justice in this case.

Apropos the main contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is against the principles of natural justice as no show-cause notice has been issued to the petitioner before passing the same, in view of the above discussion, obviously the selection process itself is not in accordance with the rules. Further more, the petitioner has not attained the requisite age, and therefore, even if a show-cause notice is issued the position cannot be improved. The learned Counsel for the 7th respondent in this regard placed reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyama Pardhi etc. 1996 (1) SLR 66. The Apex Court held that in cases where the rules specifically provide, the qualification as a condition for appointment and that prescribed qualifications had not been satisfied, the initial selection per se is illegal and the later appointment thereof is in violation of the statutory rules, and therefore, the question of violation of the principles of natural justice does not arise. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Aroot Ramaswamy Mudaliar Educational Institution Vs. The Educational Appellate Tribunal and Another, . It has been held in Para 8 of that judgment as follows:

"Giving of opportunity or an enquiry of course is a check and balance concept that no one''s right be laken away without giving him/her opportunity or without enquiry in a given case or where the statute requires. But this cannot be in a case where allegation and charges are admitted and no possible defence is placed before the authority concerned. What enquiry is to be made when one admits violations? When she admitted she did not join M. Phil course, she did not report back to her duty which is against her condition of leave and contrary to her affidavit which is the charge, what enquiry was to be made? In a case where the facts are almost admitted, the case reveals itself and is apparent on the face of the record, and inspite of opportunity no worthwhile explanation is forthcoming as in the present case, it would not be a fit case to interfere with the termination order".

Coming to the instant the position could not have been improved even if a notice has been issued and the petitioner has been heard. When the petitioner was not eligible to apply, as she did not attain the requisite age she could not have put forth any valid and plausible explanation to the insurmountable position. In view of the two authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court, the contention that the impugned order is opposed to principles of natural justice merits no consideration.

Since the selection process itself is in flagrant violation of the GOs., referred to above, it cannot be regularised by the intervention of the Courts keeping in view that the petitioner has been allowed to work for a few months. I, therefore, see no sufficient reason to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the Project Officer, ICDS. In that view of the matter, the writ petition must fail. However, the petitioner cannot be prevented from applying to the post if a fresh notification is issued in this regard by the Competent Authority. Her application deserves due weight provided the eligibility criteria is satisfied in view of her previous service.

In the result the writ petition is dismissed. Under the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.