High CourtsDivision Bench

Sangat Singh vs Atma Rama

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 8 July 1952 · Citation: (1952) 07 P&H CK 0008

HON’BLE JUDGES
Passey, J · Chopra, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Patiala Alienation of Land Act, 1972 — Section 23, 3, 3(1), 4
CASE NUMBER
L.P.A. No. 42 of 2006
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Judgment

24 paragraphs · 2,062 words

Chopra, J.—A sale by a Brahman of village Sekha in Tehsil Barnala in favour of Atma Ram respondent was preempted by Sangat Singh Appellant, a Jat of that village, on the ground that he was a Malak Ala and thus had a preferential right of preemption. The suit was decreed by both the Courts below. In a petition for revision by the Defendant to this Court it was urged that since the Plaintiff did not belong to the same group of agricultural tribes as the vendor Section 14, Preemption Act stood in his way to get a decree for pre-emption. The plea was accepted by a Single Bench of this Court and the revision was consequently allowed and the suit disanissed. This is a Letters Patent appeal by the Plaintiff against the decision of the Single Bench.

2.

The contention of Shri Kishori Lal, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, in the first instance is that Section 14, Pre-emption Act had no application to the case because the vendor who was a Brahman could not be regarded as an agriculturist vis-a-vis the Plaintiff who was a Jat of the same village. In order to have a clear understanding of the arguments advanced reference is to be made to the relevant law on the points involved. Section 3(1), Patiala Alienation of Land Act is to the following effect:

Save as is hereinafter provided a person who desires to make a permanent alienation of his land shall be at liberty to make such alienation when ... (a) The alienor is not a member of an agricultural tribe

or

(b)...

(c) The alienor is a member of agricultural tribe and the alienee is a member of the same tribe or of a tribe in same group.

Section 4 of the Act gives the Ijlas-i-Khas (Government) power to notify agricultural tribes and groups 31 agricultural tribes. Its Sub-section (1) translated into English is as follows:

The Ijlas-i-Khas shall by notification in the official gazette determine what bodies of persons in any Tehsil or group of Tehsils are deemed to be agricultural tribes or groups of agricultural tribes for the purposes of this Act.

3.

In a notification issued by the Ijlas-i-Khas under this section Jats, Rajputs, Gujjars and Brahmans were declared as agricultural tribes in Barnala Tehsil. There are four explanations attached to this notification. Explanation 3 of them provides

that wherever Brahmans have been declared to form an agricultural tribe they would be regarded as a separate group, which means that they can sell or buy lands among themselves in their own groups and as against other agricultural tribes they would be regarded as non-agriculturists, and vis-a-vis non-agriculturists they would be regarded as agriculturists.

The above is followed by explanation 4 and part (b) of the later (sic) lays down that "in any tehsil all such tribes will form a group of agricultural tribes." The result of this notification was that in Tehsil Barnala three tribes namely Jats, Rajputs and Gujjars were declared to form a general group of agricultural tribes and Brahmans were declared to form one single and special group by themselves with certain restrictions placed on their rights to purchase and sell land in Tehsil.

4.

Section 14, Pre-emption Act reads as follows:

No person other than a person who was at the date of sale a member of an agricultural tribe in the same group of agricultural tribes as the vendor shall have a right of preemption in respect of agricultural land sold by a member of an agricultural tribe.

5.

This section places no restriction upon the sales by non-agriculturists and only aims at preventing the passing of the agricultural land of a member of an agricultural tribe to a person who is not a member of the ''same group to which the vendor belongs. If the section applies the Plaintiff in the present case before he can be granted a decree for preemption, in addition to proving that he is possessed of any of the qualifications u/s 15 to defeat the vendee, has further to show that he is a member of an agricultural tribe in the same group of agricultural tribes as the vendor.

6.

The case of the respondent is that since Brahmans, to which tribe the vendor belongs, have been declared as agriculturists in Barnala Tehsil Section 14, Pre-emption Act applies and since the Plaintiff is not a member of the same group as the vendor he is debarred from exercising the right of pre-emption and no decree for pre-emption in his favour can be passed as provided by Section 23 of the Act. The contention of the Appellant on the other hand is that according to the notification referred to above a Brahman of Tehsil Barnala, as the vendor is, is not to be regarded as agriculturist as against a Jat, to which tribe the Plaintiff belongs. It is, therefore, urged that so far as the Plaintiff is concerned the sale was not by a member of an agricultural tribe so as to invoke the provisions of Section 14, Pre-emption Act.

The argument is that Section 14 was only intended to obviate the anomaly of a person getting the land of an agriculturist, which he could not get by means of a direct sale, through a preemption decree and that since by virtue of explanation 3 added to the notification the Plaintiff was entitled to purchase the land from the vendor Section 14 could not create an impediment in the way of his getting it through a pre-emption decree.

The argument, however, is fallacious for more than one reason and I have no hesitation to hold that Section 14, Pre-emption Act applies to the facts of this case. In the first instance the Section applies to all sales of agricultural lands by a member of an agricultural tribe. For its application we have not to see in which group of agricultural tribes the vendor falls, whether his rights are restricted with respect to a member of another agricultural tribe and whether vis-a-vis a member of another agricultural tribe he may possibly be considered as a non-agriculturist. We are to take the Section as it is and not to read into it words which are not there. When once the meaning is plain it is not the province of a court to scan its wisdom or its policy because the duty of a court is not to make the law but to expound it as it is. To accept the argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellant and to hold that the Section has no application to the sale by a member of a notified agricultural tribe'' when it is sought to be pre-empted by particular class of persons having peculiar rights as against the vendor, would amount to importing something into the enactment merely on the basis of a speculation as to the intentions of the legislation. No such judicial addition can be made to the plain and unambiguous language of the section as already observed Brahmans were notified as one of the agricultural tribes in Tehsil Barnala and the mere fact that an explanation added to the notification places certain restrictions on their rights to purchase land from members of the other group of agricultural tribes cannot take them out of the class of agricultural tribes. The result, therefore, is that the Section applies and the Plaintiff in order to, succeed in the suit must show that he belongs to the same group of agricultural tribes as the vendor.

7.

The very contention of the Appellant that as against him the vendor cannot be regarded as a member of an agricultural tribe appears to be faulty and unacceptable. The illustration with which explanation 3 concludes and which has been reproduced above, no doubt supports the contention but I am very much doubtful if the Government while declaring certain tribes as agriculturists and putting them in different groups could also limit the effect of the declaration in any way and make provision for the rights of the different tribes or groups of tribes ''inter se''. My own view is that these rights could be created and limitations placed only by the Land Alienation Act itself and that the Government in doing so went beyond the powers conferred on it by the Act.

8.

Section 4 of the Act under which the notification was issued and which has already been reproduced authorised the Ijlas-i-Khas only to determine and declare the agricultural tribes or group of agricultural tribes in a Tehsil and to go no further. As regards the effect of such declaration and the rights created thereby we must look to the provisions of the Act itself. Section 3 of the Act provides that a permanent alienation pf his land by a member of an agricultural tribe shall not be valid without sanction of the Deputy Commissioner unless the vendee of such alienation is also a member of the same tribe or a tribe in. the same group as the vendor. After the Ijlas-i-Khas had determined and declared that in Tehsil Barnala Jats, Rajputs and Gujjars formed one group of agricultural tribes and Brahmans another and a separate group, a permanent alienation of land by a Brahman in favour of a Jat of the same place was invalidated by Section 3 of the Act, unless sanction of the Deputy Commissioner was obtained. Any-thing that was expressly declared to be invalid by the Act could not be authorised or validated by a notification issued under the Act. The result, therefore, is that the illustration added to explanation 3 of the Notification runs con-tra to the Act itself and is ultra vires the rulemaking power of the Ijlas-i-Khas.

9.

Shri Kishori Lal lastly contends that even if Section 14, Pre-emption Act applied to the case the Plaintiff was a member of the same group of the agricultural tribes as the vendor and hence he was entitled to pre-empt the same (sic) in question. Reliance is placed on part (b) of explanation 4 of the said notification and it is urged that Brahmans and Jats formed one group of agricultural tribes in Tehsil Barnala. The contention, however, is without any substance. The counsel forgets that explanation 4 followed what was stated in explanation 3 and was, therefore, to be read as-subject to the latter. If explanation 4 had stood alone the four tribes declared to be the agricultural tribes in Tehsil Barnala would have formed one single group of such tribes, but it has not to be lost sight of that explanation 3, which precedes it, creates a special group of Brahmans in every tehsil in which they were declared as agriculturists. It is correct that part (b) of explanation 4 is not very happily worded and taken independently is susceptible of the interpretation placed on it by the Appellant. Such an interpretation would, however, make explanation 3 meaningless and redundant. It is an elementary rule that construction is to be made of all the parts of an Act together and not of one part by itself. This is indispensable even when the words are the plainest.

Where two co-ordinate Sections of a statute are apparently inconsistent, effort must be made to reconsile them and one must be read as a qualification of the other. A construction which would make any provision of the same law redundant must always be avoided and the provisions of one Section should not be used to defeat those of another. Explanation 4(b) should, therefore, be construed subject to explanation 3 and the former should be confined to refer to tribes other than Brahmans. It consequently follows that Brahmans in Tehsil Barnala formed a special group of themselves and the rest of the tribes another and a general group. Section 14, Pre-emption Act requires that a person possessed of any of the qualifications u/s 15, in order to get a pre-emption decree'' with respect to a sale by an agriculturist, must also show that he is a member of the same group of agricultural tribes as the vendor. This Section clearly stands in the way of a member of a general group to pre-empt the sale by a member of a special group and vice versa.

10.

In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Passey, J.

11.

I agree.