Sanjay Kumar Chetan vs State of Chhattisgarh and Another

Satish K. Agnihotri, J.—Shri Y.S. Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents submits that no notice is necessary in the matter as he is ready to argue the matter on merit. Accordingly, with the consent of the parties, the matter is taken up for hearing finally.

By this petition, the petitioner seeks to impugn the order dated 20.07.2006 (Annexure P/1) whereby, the application dated 17.07.2006, filed by the petitioner for compassionate appointment, was rejected on the ground that as per circular, application should have been made within a period of six months from the date of death of the deceased employee. The application, being time bared, was accordingly rejected.

The indisputable facts, in nutshell, are that the father of the petitioner working as Police Constable in Police Station, Bilaspur, Distt. Bilaspur, died in harness on 24.10.1991. Bilaspur district, then, was a part of the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh. The present state of Chhattisgarh came into existence on 01.11.2000. The petitioner filed an application for compassionate appointment on 17.07.2006 after a period of about 15 years allegedly on attaining the age of majority. The said application was rejected by order dated 20.07.2006 (Annexure P/1). Thereafter, a representation was made. The petitioner has filed this petition on 13.04.2008 after a period of about 20 months, seeking quashing of the impugned order dated 20.07.2006 and a suitable direction to the authority concerned to grant compassionate appointment to the petitioner.

Shri Rishi Rahul Soni, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the case of the petitioner is governed by circular dated 10.06.1994 (Annexure P/3) wherein, in clause-5, it is provided that a minor can make an application for compassionate appointment on attaining the age of majority. Shri Soni would further contend that memo dated 01.05.2000, wherein, it is provided that the application for compassionate appointment be made within a period of six months, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Thus, the order dated 20.07.2006 (Annexure P/1), passed by the respondent No. 2 is bad in law and deserves to be quashed.

Per contra, Shri Y.S. Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State, would submit that the compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule and compassionate appointment is given to tide over the sudden financial crisis of the family of the deceased employee. The father of the petitioner died on 24.10.1991. Family of the petitioner has survived and the petitioner has failed to make even an application before 17.07.2006. The petitioner waited for more than 15 years and the family has survived with its own sources. The circular dated 10.06.1994 is not applicable to the present case as subsequent circular dated 01.05.2000 and further circular dated 02.02.20006 were granted time to time. Since the application was made recently in the year July, 2006, the prevailing circular would be applicable.

Shri Thakur further submits that the circular dated 02.02.2006 provides for dependent of the deceased to make an application for compassionate appointment within a period of six months from the date of death of government employee. The State government has taken a decision not to consider those cases wherein the government employee has died before 1.11.1997. The said circular is approved by this Court. In the present case, father of the petitioner died on 24.10.1991. Thus, the application is even otherwise not maintainable.

Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the pleadings and documents appended thereto it is evident that circular dated 10.06.1994 was not prevailing when the application in the present case was made. The said circular was issued by the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh. The present State of Chhattisgarh has passed subsequent circulars. Recently, the State of Chhattisgarh, by circular dated 02.02.2006, has provided for making an application within a period of six months only in the case where the employee died after 01.11.1997. In the present case, father of the petitioner died on 24.10.1991.

It is well settled that the appointment on compassionate ground is not a method of recruitment, but, is a facility to provide for immediate rehabilitation of the family in distress for relieving the dependent family members of the deceased employee from destitution. In other words, the object of compassionate appointment is to enable penurious family to tide over the sudden financial crisis and is not to provide employment. It is also well settled that mere death of the employee does not entitle his family to claim compassionate appointment if the family members could sustain themselves financially from other sources of income.

In Haryana State Electricity Board and another Vs. Hakim Singh, the Supreme Court held that "the whole object of any compassionate appointment schemes is to give succor to the family to tide over the sudden financial crisis befallen the dependents on account of the untimely demise of its sole earning members".

In the matter of State of Manipur Vs. Md. Rajaodin, AIR 2003 SCW 4339 the Supreme Court, after having heard various cases on compassionate appointment, observed as under:

In Smt. Sushma Gosain and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, it was observed that in all claims of appointment on compassionate grounds, there should not be any delay in appointment. The purpose of providing appointments on compassionate ground is to mitigate the hardship due to death of the bread-earner in the family. Such appointment should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. The fact that the ward was a minor at the time of death of his father is no ground, unless the scheme itself envisage specifically otherwise, to state that as and when such minor becomes a major he can be appointed without any time consciousness or limit. The above view was reiterated in Smt. Phoolwati Vs. Union of India and Others, and Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Bhagwan Singh, . In Director of Education (Secondary) and Another Vs. Pushpendra Kumar and Others, it was observed that in matter of compassionate appointment there cannot be insistence for a particular post. Out of purely humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided the family would not be able to make both ends meet, provisions are made for giving appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for appointment. Care has, however, to be taken that provision for ground of compassionate employment which is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions does not unduly interfere with the right of those other persons who are eligible for appointment to seek appointment against the post which would have been available, but for the provision enabling appointment being made on compassionate grounds of the dependant of the deceased employee. As it is in the nature of exception to the general provisions it cannot substitute the provision to which it is an exception and thereby nullify the main provision by taking away completely the right conferred by the main provision.

The Supreme Court in the case of State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others Vs. Sajad Ahmed Mir, in para 11 has held as under:

11...it is that such an appointment is an exception to the general rule. Normally, an employment in the Government or other public sectors should be open to all eligible candidates who can come forward to apply and complete with each other. It is in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution. On the basis of competitive merits, an appointment should not be departed from except where compelling circumstances demand, such as death of the sole bread winner, the family survived and the family suffering because of the setback. Once it is proved that inspite of the death of the breadwinner, the family survived and substantial period is over, there is no necessity to say "goodbye" to the normal rule of appointment and to show favour to one at the cost of the interest of several others ignoring the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.

In view of the above well settled principle of law applying to the facts of the case on hand, the petitioner does not deserve any relief. There is no merit in this petition. The petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.