AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
The petitioner, by way of the present writ petition, has prayed for quashing the order dated 06.11.2000, whereby and whereunder the petitioner has
been inflicted with a major punishment of removal from service. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing of the appellate order dated 14.08.2003.
The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was initially appointed as Clerk-cum-Cashier on 28.04.1994 and was temporarily posted at the
Branch office Budha Colony, Patna whereafter, he was permanently posted w.e.f. September, 1994 at the Branch office, Saksohra, Dist-Patna. On
07.10.1997, the petitioner was served with a charge sheet containing various allegations against the petitioner herein. The petitioner had filed his reply
denying all the charges. Thereafter, vide letter dated 17.02.1998, the disciplinary authority appointed an Inquiry Officer as well as a Presenting Officer
and a regular departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner herein. The inquiry was effectively held only on three dates. The Inquiry
Officer submitted an inquiry report dated 15.01.2000 which was forwarded to the petitioner vide letter of the Bank dated 8/16.02.2000. The petitioner
had then filed his response to the so called show cause notice pointing out the various infirmities. After receipt of the reply of the petitioner herein, the
respondent-Bank had then served a second show cause notice dated 05.08.2000, proposing punishment of removal from the services of the Bank, to
the petitioner herein, which was duly replied to by the petitioner herein, whereafter the disciplinary authority had passed the final order dated
06.11.2000 inflicting upon the petitioner, the punishment of removal from service. The said order of punishment dated 06.11.2000 was appealed
against by the petitioner before the Zonal Manager and the appellate authority by an order dated 14.08.2003 dismissed the appeal of the petitioner
herein.
The learned counsel for the petitioner, referring to the inquiry report, has submitted that a bare perusal of the inquiry report dated 15.01.2000 would
show that none of the charges have been conclusively proved and the entire inquiry report is based on surmises and conjectures, hence is perverse
and fit to be set aside. The learned counsel for the petitioner, referring to the discussion of charge no. I(A) made in the inquiry report, has submitted
that the said discussion would show that only two sums of Rs. 500/- and Rs. 1000/- can at best be said to have been deposited in the account of the
petitioner herein which, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be misappropriation of huge amount. Infact, the Inquiry Officer at internal page no.
4 of the inquiry report has opined that the said charge cannot be said to have been proved consequently. As far as part 2 of charge no. I(A) is
concerned, nothing has been brought on record during the course of the departmental inquiry to show that any amount was credited to the account of
the petitioner herein. Now, coming to part 3 of charge no. I(A), the petitioner has duly explained the credit of certain small sums of money in his
account, however the Inquiry Officer has not given any finding against the petitioner herein. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that
charge no. I(B) pertains to the petitioner permitting unauthorized persons to handle cash and perform other clerical duties on various dates in the
Branch. In this regard, the Inquiry Officer has stated that the petitioner was not the authority who could have allowed such persons to work, hence
this charge also fails as far as the petitioner is concerned.
Charge no. I(C) pertains to the petitioner marking his presence by tampering the attendance register. In this regard, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that the attendance register was not produced during the course of the inquiry so as to substantiate the said charge, hence it
cannot be said that the said charge has been conclusively proved as against the petitioner herein. Thus, the submission of the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the inquiry report is based on no evidence and moreover, no material has been brought during the course of inquiry so as to
substantiate even a single charge out of the bunch of charges leveled against the petitioner herein.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the disciplinary inquiry is a quasi-judicial inquiry to be held in consonance with the
principles of natural justice, hence the Inquiry Officer is required to apply his mind to the evidence, discuss the evidence and then give his finding
which should be supported by reasons. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment reported in (2005) 3PLJR
142 (Sri Jai Prakash Narayan v. The State of Bihar and ors.). The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2009) 2SCC 570 (Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and ors.) to contend that mere production of
documents is not enough and contents of the documentary evidence has to be proved by examining witnesses, which has not been done in the present
case. The learned counsel has also referred to the letter of the Sr. Regional Manager, Regional office, Patna, the disciplinary authority who has
passed the impugned order of punishment dated 06.11.2000, written to the Chief Vigilance Officer (Vigilance Cell) to contend that the said disciplinary
authority has himself admitted that Inquiry Officer was biased to some extent. Thus, it is submitted that once the disciplinary authority himself has
accepted that the Inquiry Officer was biased, the said inquiry report cannot be relied upon for the purposes of inflicting punishment on the petitioner
herein. Lastly, it is submitted that the Senior Regional Manager, the disciplinary authority of the petitioner herein, vide his letter dated 18.09.2000 had
written to the Chief Vigilance Officer (Vigilance cell), observing therein that since there is no complaint against the petitioner regarding his behaviour
as a Bank employee, the punishment of removal from service is too harsh, hence it is proposed to award punishment of stopping of six future
increments, but nonetheless, despite the said observation of the disciplinary authority, the petitioner has been inflicted with the punishment of removal
from service.
At this juncture, it would be pertinent to refer to the reply filed on 06.09.2004, on behalf of the respondents to the supplementary affidavit filed on
behalf of the petitioner, paragraphs no. 9 and 10 whereof are reproduced hereinbelow :-
That in their advisory capacity, the vigilance cell of the bank headed by the Chief Vigilance Office advised for the infliction of the
punishment of discharge from service with superannuation benefits as would be due otherwise on that stage and without disqualification
from future employment that is the punishment for which the disciplinary authority had himself proposed earlier by his letter dated
05.08.2000 contained in Annexure-7.
That on the receipt of the advice from the vigilance cell of the bank, the disciplinary authority made a fresh application of his own
independent mind bereft of any extraneous influence to the entire records of the enquiry and on consideration thereof was of the opinion
that the proposed punishment of discharge from service was the befitting punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case and
accordingly by his order dated 06.01.2000 (Annexure-1) he awarded the impugned punishment of discharge from service.
In this context, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the disciplinary authority has not applied his independent mind
and has passed the impugned order of punishment on the basis of the directive of the Chief Vigilance Officer which is contrary to the
prevailing law and vitiates the order of punishment dated 06.11.2000.
Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has submitted that there is no procedural lapses in conduct of the disciplinary
proceedings, hence no interference is required in the order of punishment dated 06.11.2000. It is further submitted that this Court would
not sit in appeal over the report of the inquiry officer and the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority and re-appreciate
the entire evidence, inasmuch as power of judicial review in disciplinary proceeding cases are limited.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the materials on record. It is apparent from the inquiry report dated 15.01.2000,
as discussed at length hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs, that no material whatsoever conclusively points towards the guilt of the petitioner
herein. Infact, the present case is a case of no evidence apart from the fact that most of the charges have been found to have not been conclusively
proved. Moreover, even the disciplinary authority has opined that the Inquiry Officer appears to be biased to some extent, hence, in such view of the
matter, the said inquiry report is perverse and cannot be relied upon. Another aspect of the matter is that the disciplinary authority itself has opined in
its letter written to the Chief Vigilance Officer that the behaviour and conduct of the petitioner has otherwise been good and the punishment of
removal would be too harsh, hence it would be proper to inflict punishment of stoppage of six future increments. The statement of the respondents in
their reply dated 06.09.2004 clinches the issue in favour of the petitioner, inasmuch as apparently upon the direction of the Chief Vigilance Officer,
punishment of removal from service has been inflicted upon the petitioner herein. Thus, apparently, the disciplinary authority has not applied its
independent mind while passing the impugned order of punishment dated 06.11.2000 and there is an apparent aberration in law, vitiating the said order
of punishment.
For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, it is apparent that the entire inquiry report is perverse, based on no evidence, and the order of punishment
dated 06.11.2000, by which the petitioner has been inflicted with the punishment of removal from service, which is based on the perverse inquiry
report, is also not tenable in the eyes of law. Apart from what has been stated hereinabove, the disciplinary authority while passing the said order of
punishment dated 06.11.2000 has been influenced by other considerations, hence the order of punishment dated 06.11.2000 is fit to be set aside and
accordingly, the order dated 06.11.2000 issued by the respondent-Senior Regional Manager and the disciplinary authority of the respondent-Bank is
quashed. In view of the fact that the order of punishment dated 06.11.2000 has been quashed, the appellate order dated 14.08.2003 is bound to fall and
is accordingly, set aside as well.
The writ petition is allowed.