Sanjay Sharma vs State Of H.P. & Anr

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The applicant/petitioner has filed the present application for condonation of 204 days’ delay in filing the revision petition.

It has been asserted that the applicant has challenged the order dated 03.10.2024, vide which the learned trial Court put the notice of accusation to the applicant. The applicant applied for a copy of the order on 01.04.2025, which was prepared on 02.04.2025 and was supplied on 03.04.2025, and the instant petition was filed on 25.04.2025. There is a delay of 204 days in filing the petition. The applicant was not aware of the fact that the order was to be challenged within the stipulated period of time. Learned counsel representing him did not guide the applicant to challenge the order putting the notice of accusation to the applicant. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and the delay in filing the revision petition be condoned.

The application is opposed by filing a reply. It has been asserted that the applicant had filed an application seeking his discharge, which was dismissed by the Court on 09.02.2024. Notice of accusation was put to the applicant, and the matter was listed for examination of prosecution witnesses. The party seeking the condonation of delay has to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay, as mere assertion of the oversight of the counsel is not sufficient. The applicant had accepted the order passed by the Court, and he cannot challenge it. Hence, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed.

I have heard Mr Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Karun Negi, Advocate, for the applicant/petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.

Mr Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Advocate for the applicant, submitted that the applicant could not file the revision petition within the stipulated period because he was not advised of the period of limitation by the counsel representing him before the learned Trial Court. He contacted the present counsel, who advised him to file the revision. The person cannot be penalised for the fault of his counsel. Therefore, he prayed that the present application be allowed and the delay in filing the revision be condoned.

Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the applicant has failed to show any reasonable cause for not filing the revision within the stipulated period of limitation. The ignorance of the law is no excuse, and the plea taken by the applicant that he was not advised by the learned counsel representing him about the limitation cannot be accepted. Therefore, he prayed that the present application be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

Reply filed by the State shows that the applicant had filed an application seeking the discharge, which was dismissed by the learned Trial Court on 09.02.2024. Subsequently, notice of accusation was put to the applicant on 03.10.2024. The applicant claimed that he was not advised about the limitation by the counsel. This plea will not help the applicant/petitioner because every person is presumed to know the law, and ignorance of the law is no excuse.

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380, that the tendency of throwing the blame upon the counsel to get rid of the limitation cannot be encouraged. It was observed:

“10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a ten- dency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay, as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.

In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185, wherein this Court observed as under:

—

“8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and state- ments, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal, i.e. the party who en- gages him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misde- meanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant, but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely diffi- cult. The observations made in Rafiq [(1981) 2 SCC 788: AIR 1981 SC 1400] must not be understood as an absolute propo- sition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was an ongo- ing suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a villager residing away from the city, where the court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic, ignorant villager but a private limited company with its head office at Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where their in- terest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not disposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing, they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. Maybe it was part of their delaying tactics, as alleged by the plaintiff. Maybe not. But one thing is clear: they chose not to cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.” (Emphasis supplied)

As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the deci- sion of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Co. v. The Em- ployees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:—

“The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allow- ing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigi- lantibus non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time, as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraud- ulent claims.” (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the applicant cannot take advantage of the plea that his counsel had not advised him about the period of limitation.

The applicant has not mentioned that he had taken any action against the learned counsel for not advising him properly, and the revision petition shows that the learned counsel who had represented the applicant during the proceedings seeking discharge is still representing the applicant; therefore, the applicant’s claim that he was not advised properly cannot be accepted.

There is no other reason for the condonation of the delay.

It was submitted that the applicant has a very good case on merits, and the delay should be condoned. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, that the delay cannot be condoned because of the merits of the claim. It was observed:

“15. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while consider- ing whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits be- cause of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be pre- sumed to be a non-deliberate delay and in such circum- stances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for con- donation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally bal- anced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the mat- ter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time.”

In view of the above, there is no sufficient cause for condonation of delay; hence, the present application is dismissed.

Cr. R/3339/ 2025

Since the application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, hence, the revision petition is also dismissed as barred by limitation.