Tribunals and Commissions

SANJEEV KUMAR vs ROCKLAND LEASING LTD.

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission · Decided on 22 April 1993 · Citation: 1993 2 CLT 508 : 1993 2 CPR 183 : 1994 1 CPJ 212

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.S.Dewan , R.L.Gupta , Gurkanwal Kaur J.
RESULT
complaint disposed of
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Judgment

5 paragraphs · 1,078 words
1.

THIS case is concluded against the complainant on the preliminary question of territorial jurisdiction by the decision of the Supreme Court in Barreilly Development Authority & Anr. v. Ajaipal Singh & Ors., (1989) 2 SCC 116. The issue involved in this case is pristinely legal, the facts relevant thereto may be noticed with relevant brevity.

2.

IT is alleged in the complaint that Rockland Leasing Ltd., New Delhi is admittedly a registered company running its business in India in financial matters like acceptance of deposits, advances, lease finances and provide loans under vehicle finance scheme etc. and the Company announced the said scheme by somewhat detailed and colourable brochure therefor. IT is said that the complainant under the said scheme initially deposited Rs. 10,000/- as fixed deposit with respondent No.1 on 23.4.1990 through their Field Officer Balbir Singh at Morinda in District Rupar and he moved an application for advancing loan for the purchase of Maruti Car through the said Field Officer on 25.4.1991. IT is alleged that thereafter the complainant had deposited Rs. 7,000/- on 28.5.1990 and Rs. 9,000/- on 28.6.1990, as per instructions of respondent No. 2. The complainant''s case is that on 9.8.1990 he * was informed by respondent No. 2 that his case was sanctioned for Rs. 60,000/- and he was asked to deposit Rs. 17,229/- the balance amount of the price of the vehicle by 20.8.1990, alongwith 36 cheques, each amounting to Rs. 2,280/- in advance as monthly instalments in the name of the Company and as per advice of the Field Officer, he completed all the formalities on 25.9.1990. IT is alleged that respondent No. 2 had assured the complainant that the vehicle would be delivered to him within two months. According to the complainant, when he approached respondent No. 2 in the month of December, 1990, he was told that the vehicle had been booked for him on 15.12.1990 and he would get his car in the first week of April 1991. When he inquired about his car from the Pasco Automobiles Company, he was told by them that the vehicle had already been delivered to respondent No.2 in the month of March, 1991, IT was the case of the complainant that when he first approached respondent No.2 to inquire about his car, the price of the car was approximately Rs. 1,03,000/- which was escalated to Rs. 1,62,000/ when he again met him in the month of July, 1991. The grouse of the complainant is that respondent No.2 had violated the rules and regulations of respondent No.1 and caused harassment to the complainant with some ulterior motive and therefore, he was liable to damages. The complainant claimed that a direction be issued to the respondents to deliver him the car at the rate prevalent at the time he applied for it and to pay Rs. 15,000/- as damages. On notice being issued, the opposite parties took a firm preliminary objection that this Commission had no jurisdiction to try this complaint and on merits, controverted the allegations of the complainant.

Sh. I.S. Kapoor, learned Counsel for the opposite-parties has strenuously pressed the preliminary objection. In his argument based on principle and precedent, it was contended that the parties themselves elected Delhi jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. In support of this assertion, learned Counsel referred us to Clause 13 of the brochure, Annexure C2 where it is stated as under :- "Dispute if any shall be subject to arbitration and the jurisdiction of Delhi Courts only."

3.

IT is contended that the complainant is bound by all the terms of the brochure Annexure C2 especially since the complainant has relied upon the said document. Shri Kapoor has placed reliance on Barreilly Development Authority & Anr. v. Ajaipal Singh & Ors, case (supra). IT is submitted that the said case pertained to an application for a dwelling unit advertised by the Barreilly Development Authority on the basis of the terms and conditions contained in the brochure therefor. IT was held therein that the applicants were bound by the terms and conditions of the contract and could not wriggle out of the same. Shri Kapoor also contended that the complainant was well aware of condition No.13 of the brochure and in law the territorial jurisdiction could be confined to one place out of the two or more having concurrent jurisdiction. IT is also pointed out that the financing scheme of respondent No.1 being open to the applicants all over the country, it was well nigh impossible for the Company to defend litigation in far-flung places within the whole country and it was entitled to limit the jurisdiction to Delhi which undoubtedly had the primary and in any case the concurrent jurisdiction for all disputes arising in this contract. Shri N.S. Sitta, learned Counsel for the complainant, on the other hand, submitted that a part of action had jurisdiction in the District of Rupar and therefore, Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was attracted. No precedent was cited by the learned Counsel in support of this contention.

4.

THERE is merit in the impeccable submission of Shri Kapoor. It is not disputed that the brochure Annexure C2 filed by the complainant is the very sheet-anchor of his case. It has been clearly displayed in the brochure that all the disputes shall be subject to Delhi jurisdiction and Shri Sitta could barely controvert this factual and legal position. Once that is so, the ratio of the case aforesaid is attracted to cover the present case on all fours. An indentical question was raised in Shimla Development Authority, Kasumpati, Shimla-9 v. Shri Yash Pal Dass and Anil Mittal of Ambala Cantt., 1992 CPC 344 and it was held that S.11 of the Act permits the restriction of the territorial jurisdiction to one out of the two or more District Forums having concurrent jurisdiction for the trial of consumer dispute by an express agreement of the parties. Following the aforesaid decisions, it has to be held that the complainant would be bound by the terms and conditions of Annexure C2 to which admittedly he is a party. Consequently, it is held that the Forums in Delhi alone would have territorial jurisdiction in the present complaint and the complainant, if so advised, can resort only to the same. The preliminary objection is, therefore, upheld and the complaint is disposed of in the terms aforesaid. No costs. complaint disposed of.