Sant Singh vs Union Territory and Others

G.S. Singhvi, J.—This case was taken up yesterday and adjourned for today because no one had appeared for the petitioner. This shows that the petitioner is not interested in prosecuting the petition.

We have heard Shri Ashok Aggarwal, Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents and have perused the record.

The averments made in the writ petition and the written statement show that proceedings u/s 8-A of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 were initiated against the petitioner on the allegation of misuse of residential premises allotted to him. After hearing the petitioner and the Principal of the School which was in occupation of the residential premises, the Assistant Estate Officer, exercising the powers of the Estate Officer, Union Territory, Chandigarh, passed order dated 28.9.1990 for resumption of the site and forfeiture of 10% of the price plus interest. The appeal and the revision petition filed by the petitioner were dismissed by the Chief Administrator and the Advisor to the Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh, vide their orders dated 6.11.1990 and 26.6.1991. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer, exercising the powers of the Estate Officer, under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, ordered the petitioner''s ejectment from the premises in question. These orders were challenged by the petitioner in civil writ petition no. 12355 of 1991 which was dismissed by the Division Bench on 14.8.1991. That order reads as under:-

"Brief facts of the case are that petitioner No. 1 was allotted plot No. 42-C (517) in Sector 20-A Chandigarh, on which he constructed a 2-1/2 storied building in 1956. Since, 1975, the ground floor is being used as S.A.S. Model Middle School run by a registered society. The said school through its principal Shri Kanwal Jit Bhatia, is petitioner No. 2. The school is recognised by the Education Department of the Union Territory and about 200 students are studying therein. The Estate Officer passed an order of resumption, Annexure P5, on September 28, 1989, u/s 8-A of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952, against the petitioners. The appeal was dismissed by the Chief Administrator by order Annexure P7, dated November 6, 1990. The revision was dismissed by the Administrator, Union Territory of Chandigarh-cum-Chief Commissioner by order dated June 26, 1991, Annexure P9. A copy of the order was sent to the District Education Officer not to accord recognition to the school after April 1, 1991. The petitioners were given time upto July 31, 1991, to stop the misuser and it was further directed by the Chief Commissioner that if necessary the students studying in the school be admitted in the nearby government schools."

Following the order of resumption by the Estate Officer, proceedings were started under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and an order of eviction dated December 18, 1990, was passed. The petitioners preferred an appeal to the District Judge in which eviction has been stayed. The appeal is pending.

Further case of the petitioners is that the Chandigarh Administration had taken a decision in 1979 to allot alternative plot to the school as also several other similarly situated schools at the rate of Rs. 15/- per square yard. The actual offer was made in 1981 at the rate of Rs. 60/- per square yard, petitioner No. 2 applied for allotment. It was learnt that the Administration was thinking of allotting the land at the rate of Rs. 500/- per square yard. The petitioners seek a writ of certiorari for quashing the order of resumption, Annexure P5, as affirmed in Annexures P-9 and P-10. They further seek a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to act upon the impugned orders and instead allow petitioner No. 2 to run the school in the residential building in question till case for allotment of the school site is finally decided. It was contended by the learned counsel at the hearing that the petitioner, be allowed sufficient time to continue the school in the existing building till plot is allotted by the Administration and construction is made by the petitioner No. 2.

The refrain throughout the petition is that a large number of schools were being run in residential buildings. The Government itself was running offices in residential buildings and the order of resumption was rendered invalid because of invidious discrimination. Reliance was placed on certain observations of a Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Shri Ram Puri v. The Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh, and Ors. (1982)84 P.L.R. 388, reproduced in the petition itself. According to there observations, it was emphasized that resumption being a drastic remedy should be resorted to only as a last resort. When asked as to what other remedy was open to the Administration, learned counsel conceded that in the facts and circumstances, no other remedy was possible. We are not at all impressed by the facts that there are several other schools being run in residential premises. Action according to law for stoppage of misuser has to start somewhere. It is just not possible that all at once such an action may be initiated against all persons who have converted user of the premises from residential to non-residential. No infirmity could be pointed out in the order of resumption of the orders passed in appeal and revision. Admittedly, the misuser continues. It is a matter of policy which the government might take in due course in the interests of students to allot alternative sites. Learned counsel has not been able to show us that the petitioner has a statutory right to be allotted land and at a certain rate. For these reasons, we do not find any substance in the petition. It is dismissed in limine.

After dismissal of the writ petition by the Division Bench, the petitioner appears to have pursued an application for review filed before the revisional authority. That too was rejected on 13.11.1991. This order has been made basis for filing of the present writ petition on the old cause of action.

One of the objections raised by the respondent, which Shri Aggarwal has reiterated during the course of hearing, is that the writ petition is barred by the principle of res judicata. In our opinion, this objection must be upheld. The order dismissing the writ petition though in limine, is a detailed speaking order rejecting various contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner to challenge the legality of the order of resumption as well as the orders passed by the appellate and the revisional authorities. The petitioner was free to challenge that order by filing petition for Special Leave to Appeal before the Supreme Court. Since, that was not done by him, the order dated 14.8.1991, passed by this Court dismissing civil writ petition no. 12355 of 1991 must be treated as final and the petitioner cannot be permitted to again invoke writ jurisdiction of the High Court for invalidation of this order in the garb of challenging the order passed by the revisional authority on 13.11.1991. In support of this view, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Labh Chand 1993(4) S.L.R. 391, and a recent decision of this Court dated 4.8.1998 in Civil Writ Petition No. 12084 of 1998 Karan Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors. In the latter case, this court has held that even withdrawal of the writ petition without liberty to file fresh petition is sufficient for not entertaining second petition filed for grant of similar relief.

For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. The interim stay order passed in favour of the petitioner stands automatically vacated.