Santokh Singh and Another vs M/s. Satpal Jayanti Parshad

D.S. Tewatia, J.—The landlord-Petitioners (husband and wife) sought the eviction of respondent-tenant, M/s. Satpal Jayanti Prashad, from the rented land in dispute, inter-alia on the ground that they need it for personal necessity and for running their own business thereon. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment of the tenant. On appeal at the irstance of the tenant, the case came to be remanded to the Rent Controller for the purpose of pleading three requisite ingredients envisaged in section 13(3)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act''). After the requisite amendment in the application, the Rent Controller received evidence afresh to prove the ingredients of clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act. On consideration of material brought on the record, the Rent Controller again ordered ejectment of the tenant. On appeal, the Appellate Authority leversed the judgment of the Rent Controller and dismissed the application holding that the landlords had failed to establish an element of need for the rented land and a mere wish on their part to get the rented land was not sufficient Hence this revision petition by the landlords.

Mr. Sarin, learned counsel for the respondent, has raised a preliminary objection that the revision petition against the finding that the rented land was not needed by the landlords for their own use, being a finding of fact, could not be challenged in revision petition and'' sought support for his submission from a decision of the Supreme Court in Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Others Vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar, . He drew pointed attention to the following observations therein:-

A concurrent finding based on evidence, that the landlord did not bona fide require the premises for his own use and occupation is not in our view a finding which can be touched by the High Court exercising jurisdiction u/s 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.

It was canvassed by Mr. Sarin that the provision of section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969, (hereinafter referred to as the ''Madras Act'') is not only in parie materia with, but in fact couched in somewhat wider terms than, sub-section (5) of section 15 of the Act and, therefore, the ratio of M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Work''s case (supra) would completely cover the present situation.

It appears that their lordships were, in that judgment, dealing with peculiar facts of that case. There the finding of fact was concurrent and they had before them the ratio of Dattonpant Gopalvaro v. Vithalrao Marutirao AIR 975 SC 1111 again dealing with the provision of section 25 of the Madras Act, wherein it was held that the provision was not wider enough as to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal, but the view taken by their lordships, while interpreting the provisions of sec. 15(5) of the Act, does not run in consonance with the view taken in M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dveing Work''s case (supra), would be clear from the decision in Nanak Chand v. Inderjit 1966 R.C.R. 887. In this case a larger Bench of three Judges clearly held that the revisional power conferred on the High Court u/s 15(5) of the Act was wider than that conferred by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that u/s 15(5) of the Act, the High Court had jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision and that would clearly justify the examination of the finding by the authorities about the requirement of the landlord u/s 13(3)(a)(i). In view of the decision in Nanak Chanel''s case (supra) which is direct on the point apart from the being rendered by a larger Bench and the law being that, in case of conflict, the view enunciated by a larger Bench has to be given precedence, it ha to be held that this Court has the jurisdiction of examining the finding of fact in exercise of powers conferred u/s 15(5) of the Act.

The question that now falls for consideration is as to whether the finding of fact rendered by the Appellate Authority carries a touch of unreasonableness in that the Court adopted incorrect approach in appreciating the evidence or the requirement of law.

Before dealing with this aspect of the case, it deserves high lighting that the application for ejectment was joint one by the husband and wife. The Rent Controller found the fact, basing himself not only on the testimony of Santokh Singh, Petitioner-landlrrd, but also on the testimony of RW 1, tenant''s witness, that one of the landlords, namely, Parkash Kaur, had been permanently residing at Phagwara in India. It has also not been disputed that about the time application for ejectment was filed, the landlords'' son has completed his studies and was of 20-21 years of age (statement of Santokh Singh to this effect remained unchallenged in cross examination) It is also not in dispute that Santokh Singh ran business in Bahrain. He in this statement had mentioned that he was running business of furniture in Bahrain and wished to start a similar business on the rented land and wanted to put his son in that business and that, in his absence, his son and wife would look after the business. When the case was remanded and Santokh Singh again appeared as his own witness at this stage he further de-posted that conditions in Bahrain for Indians had become unsettled and that he desired to close his business at Bahrain and cone back to India Between his two statements, an interval of 1 1/2 years had elapsed.

It is no doubt true that the Court is not to order ejectment of a tenant on the expression of a mere wish of his landlord. The wish must be backed up by an element of need and if certain amount of element of need is missing the case would not fall within the provisions of section 13(3)(1)(i) in the case of residential building, and section 13(3)(ii) of the Act in the case of rented land. In the application the landlords had expressed that they needed the rented land for their own u e for running of business thereon. In judging as to whether it was a mere wish of the landlords or there was an element of need, one has to see, firstly, as to whether the landlords were in a position to run a business and that they had necessary resources for running their business and secondly, whether they have the capacity to run the business.

Having regard to the fact that the landlord Santokh Singh was running a business at Bahrain of a kind that he mentioned in his evidence to start in the rented land and had the necessary funds to start that business, there can be no doubt that the petitioner landlord had the necessary wherevithal to start the business. The next question that would require answering is as to whether he needed to start business and was in a position to run it on the rented land For a moment, keeping out of consideration the element of urgency imparted to his need by the unsettled conditions in Bahrain for Indians, as deposed to in his latter statement, there can be no two opinions that the necessity of putting his son in a business in the case of a business could not be considered a mere wish, mush less a fanciful one. It definitely has an element of need. His son has completed his studies and, therefore, was required to be settled Obviously, a businessman desires that his son is settled in business (A question arises whether the son should be settled in business.)

It is no doubt true that Santokh Singh landlord was running a business in Bahrain but it is significant to note, as he mentioned in his evidence, that he did not acquired citizenship of that country. Every Indian abroad in his position would not only like to have but, in fact, would need a foot hold in his own country. So, it cannot be justifiably argued that he could have inducted his son in his business in Bahrain. It was then urged on behalf of the respondent-tenant that the requirement of son was not pleaded in the application for ejectment and that his requirement cannot be considered to be the requirement of the landlords themselves. In my opinion, the requirement of the landlords to settle their son is the requirement of landlords themselves and once the landlords had pleaded their own requirement for using the rented land for running a business, it was not necessary that they should have additionally pleaded that they desired their son to be settled in that business.

The business that Santokh Singh, one of the landlords, wanted to start was his own business One of the landlords, namely, his wife, who had been permanently living at Phagwara, had also expressed her own need in the application for doing business along with Santokh Singh, her husband. The Appellate Authority ruled out her necessity by merely observing that if she were to look after the business, then the petitioners could have started that business much earlier. That is neither here nor there May be, prior thereto she alone might not have been in a position to look after the business but when the application for ejectment was filed, her son had become major and completed his studies and with his help and presence she could be able not only to start the business but also look after that business.

The Court should not take either too liberal or too lestricted view of the need of the landlord. The following observations of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Baga Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan 1979 (1) R.C.R. 170, are instructive in this regard:-

The distinction between desire and need should doubtlessly be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term ''need'' or ''requirement'' should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, prevalent in other States in the country.

The learned counsel, however, urged that the facts disclosing need were not pleaded and, therefore, no evidence could be led to prove such facts, as indicated, that the landlords needed the rented land. The argument, in my opinion, appears to be misconceived. The landlords had pleaded the necessary facts that they needed the rented land for running business and nothing more was required to be pleaded.

For the reasons aforementioned, this revision petition is allowed and the order of the Appellate Authority is set aside and that of the Rent Controller is restored. The parties will bear their own costs.

The learned counsel for the respondent-tenant undertakes to vacate the premises in dispute on or before 29th April, 1981, and hand over vacant possession thereof to the landlords on or before 29th April, 1981, and pay arrears of rent, if any, and the future rent with n one month from today subject to his right to special leave to the Supreme Court and orders of the Supreme Court.

In view of this undertaking, the eviction of the petitioner in pursuance of the ejectment order, is stayed till 29th April, 1981.