Santokh Singh vs State of Punjab

V.S. Aggarwal, J.

This is a petition filed by Santokh Singh, proprietor of Shivalik Hotel and Restaurant, Balachaur, Distt. Hoshiarpur seeking quashing of the complaint and the proceedings thereof pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Garhshanker, District Hoshiarpur under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

The relevant facts are that a complaint was filed against the petitioner and another. It had been alleged that on 14.7.1987 at 4.00 P.M. under the supervision of Dr. H.P. Bhatia, DHO Hoshiarpur, premises of Shivalik Hotel and Restaurant were inspected. Santokh Singh is the proprietor. His serviceman Sukhvinder Singh was present. There was 10 Kilogram of unindicated milk for sale for human consumption. The identity was disclosed by the Food Inspector. The customers who were present refused to be witnesses. Notice was served upon Sukhvinder Singh under form VI. He refused to receive it. The notice was pasted on the wall of the hotel. 750 Ml. milk was purchased for Rs. 4.50 p. The milk was put into 3 dry clean bottles in equal parts. 20 drops of 40% formalise were added in each bottle. The bottles were labeled and wrapped in thick paper. A paper silk under the signature of L.H.A. Hoshiarpur was pasted on the wrapper of each bottle. The bottles were then secured with a thread and sealed. One sealed parcel of the bottle was sent to the Public Analyst at Chandigarh. It was found to be adulterated. After obtaining the written consent under Section 20 of the Act, the complaint was filed.

Petitioner seeks quashing of the complaint and the subsequent proceedings and the sole ground pressed has been that the Food Inspector was not competent to file the complaint and consequently, the proceedings as such requires to be quashed. At the time of arguments, the same plea was reiterated.

Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon certain precedents from this Court to urge that there is no proper consent contemplated under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in the case of Ajay Pal v. State of Punjab, 1987(1) RCR 1. In the said case it was noted that the State Government has not authorised the Food Inspector to institute the prosecution. He had filed the impugned complaint on the basis of the authority delegated to him by the Director, Health Services and Family Planning, Punjab. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A.K. Roy and another v. State of Punjab and others, 1986(2) RCR 569 the learned Single Judge of this Court quashed the complaint and the proceedings. Same view prevailed in the case of Prem Nath v. State of Punjab, 1987(1) Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases 43. Therein also the Food Inspector had filed the complaint on basis of the authority delegated to him by the Director Health and Family Welfare, Punjab. The complaint and the subsequent proceedings were quashed. Similarly in the case of Tilak Raj v. State of Punjab, 1993(2) RCR 414 the subsequent proceedings and the complaint were quashed because the powers were noted to have been delegated by the Director, Health and Family Planning, Punjab to certain Food Inspectors.

All these decisions are based on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A.K. Roy (supra). It becomes necessary consequently to consider the decision in the case of A.K. Roy (supra). The Supreme Court noted that once the powers have been delegated to the Director, Health and Family Welfare, he cannot further delegate the said powers and the complaint on basis of such an authorisation deserves to be quashed. In paragraph 9 the Court held :

The first part of Section 20(1) of the Act lays down the manner of launching prosecutions for an offence under the Act, not being an offence under Section 14 or Section 14A. The second part provides for delegation of powers by the Central Government or the State Government. It enables that prosecutions for an offence under the Act can also be instituted with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or by a person authorised in that behalf, by a general or special order issued by the Central Government or the State Government. The use of the words ''in this behalf'' in Section 20(1) of the Act shows that the delegation of such power by the Central Government or the State Government by general or special order must be for a specific purpose, to authorise a designated person to institute such prosecutions on their behalf. The terms of Section 20(1) of the Act do not postulate further delegation by the person so authorised; he can only give his consent in writing when he is satisfied that a prima facie case exists in the facts of the particular case and records his reasons for the launching of such prosecution in the public interest."

That being the position, it has to be seen as to whether in the present case such a power has been delegated and further delegated to the Food Inspector or not. Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act runs as under :

"20(1). No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under Section 14 or Section 14A, shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, (the Central Government or the State Government) or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government:

Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser (or recognised consumer association) referred to in Section 12, if he (or it) produces in court a copy of the report of the public analyst alongwith the complaint."

Perusal of subsection (1) of Section 20 reveals that it is the requirement of law that consent to prosecute has to be obtained. The legislature specifically did not use the word that sanction has to be obtained. The consent is confined to prosecution. There is no controversy that if the requirements of a statute which prescribes the manner in which something is to be done are expressed in negative language, that is to say, if the statute enacts that it shall be done in such a manner then it must be done in that manner. The requirement would be absolute. Neglect to attend the same will invalidate the proceedings.

In the present case, perusal of the trial court file reveals that consent was given by the Director Health and Family WelfarecumFood Health Authority, Punjab and the same reads :

"I, Dr. Pirthipal Singh, Director Health and Family Welfare, Punjab being the Food (Health) Authority of the State of Punjab has gone through all the documents attached with the case of (i) Sh. Sukhwinder Singh (ii) Santokh Singh slip No. 33266 code No. JN/97/87 of unindicated milk and after applying my mind consider the same to be fit case for launching prosecution. Accordingly, in exercise of powers conferred upon me by Section 20 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act No. 37 of 1954) read with Punjab Govt. Notification No. 5575/2HBII/68/29659 dated 10th October, 1968, I hereby give my written consent to Sh. Dhani Ram, Government Food Inspector, Hoshiarpur to institute prosecution in the court of law under Section 16 of the P.F.A. Act, 1954 in the above referred case."

The said consent order leaves no doubt that the Director, Health and Family Welfare himself had applied his mind and given the consent. He had not delegated the powers to any Food Inspector. Same question came up before the Supreme Court in the case Food Inspector, Health Dept., U.T. Chandigarh v. M/s. Krishna Dhaba, 1994 Cri.L.J. 624. The Supreme Court while relying on the decision in the case of A.K. Roy (supra) held :

"A complaint under Section 20 thus cold be instituted apart from Central or State Government, by a person authorised in that behalf. Such a person who is authorised to institute complaint could "give his written consent for the prosecution by the Food Inspector", A.K. Roy (supra). Chief Medical Officer, Chandigarh undisputedly, and as is clear from Notification No. 5210UTF4/67/9461 issued on 29th April, 1967 by the Chandigarh Administration in exercise of powers conferred by subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Act, was a person authorised to institute a complaint. Therefore he could give his consent as well for launching of prosecution. In doing so he was neither delegating his power nor acting contrary to Section 20. He was acting within the scope of authority as a peson authorised to institute complaint under Section 20(1) of the Act has been placed at par with other authorities designated in the subsection for purposes of granting consent."

The said findings of the Supreme Court clinches the matter in favour of the respondent. All that was required was that the concerned authority had to give his consent for launching of the prosecution. The same has been done. In fact perusal of the file in the cited case (Food Inspector, Health Deptt., U.T. Chandigarh v. M/s. Krishna Dhaba) reveals that therein also the sanction order by and large was identical with the present case. The Supreme Court held that it was valid. Therefore, the conclusion is obvious that the consent given in the present case was valid and there was no further delegation with respect to the consent. The above said other decisions quoted above are distinguishable on facts.

For these reasons, the petition being without merit fails and is dismissed.