Tribunals and CommissionsDivision Bench

Santosh Kumar Dwivedi vs Securities And Exchange Board Of India

Securities Appellate Tribunal Mumbai · Decided on 27 November 2020 · Citation: (2020) 11 SEBI CK 0134

HON’BLE JUDGES
Tarun Agarwala, Presiding Officer · M.T. Joshi, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Miscellaneous Application No. 464 Of 2020, Appeal No. 419 Of 2020
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Judgment

39 paragraphs · 852 words

Tarun Agarwala, Presiding Officer

1.

The present appeal has been filed against the order dated July 9, 2018 passed by the Whole Time Member (hereinafter referred to as “WTMâ€)

of Securities and Exchange Board of India (hereinafter referred to as “SEBIâ€) directing the appellant alongwith the company and the other

directors to refund the money so collected and further restrained the appellant from accessing the securities market for a period of four years. There

is an inordinate delay of 806 days in the filing of the appeal. Accordingly, an application for condoning the delay has been filed.

2.

Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant, we find that the ground urged is, that the appellant was the director in the company and had

resigned on August 2, 2010. Subsequently, he found that the resignation was not filed before the Registrar of Companies and consequently submitted

another resignation letter dated November 30, 2010 which was filed and was duly intimated to the Registrar of Companies. It was contended that

since he was not connected with the company he told the company and the directors to represent him and that the company and the directors had

assured him that they would take care of his interest. It was also urged that the appellantâ€​s father was suffering from cancer who also died. Thus, on

account of these reasons when he found that the company had not taken any interest nor filed any appeal on his behalf he filed the present appeal

alongwith an application for condonation of delay. It was contended that there was no undue laches on the part of the appellant and that for the

reasons stated aforesaid, it was beyond his control and, therefore, the delay should be condoned.

3.

Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant, we find that no sufficient cause or legal grounds have been made out for condoning the delay.

The appellant being a director is expected to know the law and if he is not following the proceedings then the fault is entirely upon him. The contention

that he had directed the company to look after his interest or to file an appeal cannot be taken as cogent reasons to condone the delay. In the light of

the aforesaid, we do not find any cogent reasons to condone this inordinate delay of 806 days. We also find that father of the appellant had expired on

April 3, 2017 prior to the passing of the impugned order. Thus, such grounds are clearly an afterthought which is neither legal nor sufficient to condone

the inordinate delay.

4.

In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81] the Supreme Court held that the discretion to condone the delay

has to be exercised judicially based on facts and circumstances of each case and that sufficient cause cannot be given a liberal interpretation if lack of

bonafide is attributed to a party. The Supreme Court further held that delay cannot be condoned on equitable ground beyond the limits permitted

expressly by statute.

5.

The Supreme Court in Ram Nath Sao and Ors. (supra) held that the expression “sufficient cause†should receive a liberal construction so as to

advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafide is imputable to a party. The same view was reiterated by the Supreme

Court in Madanlal vs. Shyamlal, [(2002) 1 SCC 535].

6.

In Balwant Singh (Dead) vs Jagdish Singh & Ors, [(2010) 8 SCC 685, ]Supreme Court held that the expression “sufficient cause†means the

presence of legal and adequate reasons. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are of no avail and, in any case, not applicable in

the present circumstance of the case.

7.

This Tribunal is possessed with the exercise of judicial discretion in condoning the delay if sufficient or adequate reason is given. It is also a settled

proposition of law that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so

prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds as held by the Supreme Court in Basawaraj and Anr.

(supra). In the instant case we do find any legal or adequate reasons to condone the delay.

8.

For the reasons stated aforesaid, we do not find any cogent reasons to condone the inordinate delay. The application for condoning the delay is

rejected as a result of which the appeal is also dismissed with no order as to costs.

9.

The present matter was heard through video conference due to Covid-19 pandemic. At this stage it is not possible to sign a copy of this order nor a

certified copy of this order could be issued by the Registry. In these circumstances, this order will be digitally signed by the Presiding Officer on behalf

of the bench and all concerned parties are directed to act on the digitally signed copy of this order. Parties will act on production of a digitally signed

copy sent by fax and/or email.