High CourtsDivision Bench

Santosh Pathak vs Sarika Kumari

Jharkhand High Court · Decided on 15 January 2026 · Citation: (2026) 01 JH CK 1831

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sujit Narayan Prasad, J · Arun Kumar Rai, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Section 5, 5(i), 5(iv), 5(v), 12, 12(1)(c), 13, 13(1), 13B · Family Courts Act, 1984 — Section 19(1) · Contract Act, 1872 — Section 17
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
First Appeal No. 66 of 2021
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Judgment

161 paragraphs · 9,903 words

Sujit Narayan Prasad, J

Prayer:

1.

The instant  appeal  under  Section  19(1)  of  the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment dated 08.10.2021 and decree dated 20.10.2021 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Hazaribag in Original Suit No. 70 of 2014, whereby and whereunder, the suit filed by the plaintiff (appellant herein) seeking a decree of divorce against his wife (respondent herein), has been dismissed.

Factual Aspect:

2.

The brief facts of the case, leading to filing of the divorce petition by the appellant-petitioner, as taken note in  the  impugned  order  as  emanated  from  the  plaint,  needs to be referred herein, which reads as under:

3.

The marriage between the appellant and respondent was solemnized on 12.02.2013 at Katras according to Hindu Rites and Customs. After the marriage, both the petitioner and the respondent came to Hazaribag and live together as husband and wife. The  marriage  was registered on 18.02.2013 at District Sub-Registrar, Hazaribag. The couple has no children.

4.

It  is  further  stated  that  was  an  arrange  marriage.  The father of the respondent approached the parents of the petitioner through the maternal Uncle Swarup Trigunait @Tulla and gave the Photographs, Bio-data and Kundli of the respondent  for  marriage with the petitioner.  They also impressed  upon  the  petitioner  parents  that  the  respondent is  qualified  upto  MBA  from  FMS  Banaras  Hindu  University and was employed as Manager in Citi Bank at Mumbai.

5.

It is further stated that on 22.06.2012 parents of both the parties met at Dhanbad where the respondent was interviewed by the petitioner and his parents in presence of her parents and they all repeated that she did MBA from BHU and she is serving as Manager in Citi Bank at Mumbai. Further the respondent and her parents submitted that after the marriage she will get herself transferred  to  CITI  Bank,  Singapore  where  the  petitioner  is working.  In  August,  2012  on  the  day  of  Raksha  Bandhan, the  father  of  the  respondent  Nawal  Kishore  Trigunait  came to Hazaribag alongwith Sri Arup Trigunait @ Dablu and Swarup Trigunait @ Tulla for final settlement of marriage of respondent with the petitioner which after discussion settled for 12.02.2013 and the engagement of which was performed on 06.02.2013 and Tilak Ceremony on 07.02.2013 and accordingly the marriage was performed on 12.02.2013 at Rajasthani Dharamshala, Katras, District Dhanbad.

6.

It is further stated that at the time of registration of marriage at District Sub-Registrar, Hazaribag the respondent said that her Passport is lost somewhere. The petitioner  was  scheduled  to  go  to  his  work  in  Singapore  on 24.02.2013 and accordingly on 22.02.2013 the petitioner left for Mumbai and from there on 24.02.2013 he left for Singapore.  It  was arranged that  the petitioner  would send money  in  the  account  of  the  respondent  held  with  Bank  of India  and  she  will  hand  over  some  money  to  her  father-in- law to avoid unnecessary double transaction and cost, however,  she  never  transferred  any  money  to  her  father-in- law.

7.

It is alleged that on 07.03.2013 the respondent informed the petitioner through email that she has obtained the Passport  and she would get  the Employment Pass on Tuesday ie. 19.03.2013. But suddenly the respondent informed that she cannot go to Singapore before 13th May, 2013 as per the orders of her superior authority. On 11th May, 2013 she said that her authorities will not relieve her before 16th August, 2013. On 04.07.2013 the respondent asked some money from the petitioner  and gave her  account  number  of  Gaya Bank by email but she did not give her account number of CITI Bank where she was working. On 14.08.2013 she said that she had a very prospective project in her hand which she does  not  want  to  lose  since  it  will  build  her  career  and  she would be awarded Rs. 30,00,000/- (Rupees thirty lacs) only. She further informed that the project would be completed  by  25th  October.  On  24.10.2013  the  respondent informed the petitioner that she had purchased flight ticket for 10.11.2013 for herself and her husband for Singapore where she had to report for joining on 12.11.2013. On 25.10.2013 the respondent informed the petitioner that she has  been  asked  to  execute  a  Bond  for  three  years  and  only then the  tickets would be  handed over to her. By  this time, the petitioner got suspicion on her changing version from time to time

8.

On 26.10.2013 the petitioner/appellant returned to Mumbai and in the Airport his brother Raunak Pathak from Pune and the respondent were present. Petitioner expressed his desire to meet the immediate Boss of the respondent  to know why he was  putting  such blockage in the way of her going to Singapore. At 4.00 P.M. she took him to the Bank premises where she had been working but there was no Bank in function. In enquiry from the Security man, it revealed that there is no Bank there, but the respondent insisted that she had been attending her job every day in the Bank at the  same place. She  could not get to meet any of the Bank staff. They together reached Hazaribag on 27.10.2013. Father and brother of the respondent also reached Hazaribag on 30.10.2013. Respondent could  not  show  her employment ID. On  asking for email ID, she said that she did not remember her ID. About her salary she stated that presently she is getting Rs. 1.25 lacs per month which was previously Rs. 80,000/-. When  questioned,  she  said  that  she is  not  willing  to  go  to Singapore and will remain in Bombay where she has to build her career. When the petitioner asked her to show her education certificate and the appointment posting papers, she in the presence of her father  and brother went inside the  room  and  bolted  from  inside  and  consumed  Vermillion (Sindur)  in  her  mouth.  The  matter  was  reported  to  Female Police Station and she was admitted in the hospital after release from hospital, her father and brother took her to Gaya.

9.

It has further been stated that the father of the petitioner then called Panchayati two times in the village Malkera.  Neither  the  respondent  nor  her  parents  were  able to produce any documentary evidence of her educational qualification or appointment letter before the Panchayat.

10.

It has further been alleged that the respondent and her  parents  knowingly  and  deliberately  misrepresented  the fact about her qualification and appointment and impressed falsely to get married with the petitioner by playing fraud and thereby cheated the petitioner else he would  not  have  married  the  respondent.  She  has  also  been fraudulently befooling the petitioner about her going to Singapore and now finally refused to go with the petitioner. 11. The petitioner/appellant on the ground that the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty and deserted him from her company and also due to fraudulent conduct of the respondent it was not possible for the petitioner to live with the respondent and therefore has filed Matrimonial Title Suit before the Court of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Hazaribag which was registered as Matrimonial Title Suit No. 70 of 2014 with a prayer to annul or dissolve their marriage by a decree of divorce.

12.

Respondent  appeared  and  contested  the  suit  by  filing a written statement and stated that due to desertion and cruelty  by  husband  and  in-laws,  she  has  been  living  in  her parental home and all the allegations as levelled against the respondent are false, frivolous and baseless allegations. It is further submitted  that  she  had  filed one Complaint Case No. 1250/2014 u/s 498-A, 379, 323 & 504 of the I.P.C. and 3/4 of D.P. Act before the learned Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya (Bihar) and one Maintenance Case vide M. No. 80/2014 has also been filed by her.

13.

The issues were framed by the Family Court which are as follows:

(I) Whether  the  suit as  framed  is  maintainable in its present form?

(II) Whether the parties are legally married husband and wife?

(III) Whether the petitioner was treated with cruelty after marriage by the respondent?

(IV) Whether the respondent deserted the petitioner and left the matrimonial home voluntarily without any sufficient cause with an intention to abandon the relationship forever?

(V) Whether the petitioner is entitled for the relief  of  divorce as prayed for  on the grounds of cruelty and desertion as contained u/s 13(1-a) and (1-b) of the Hindu Marriage act, 1955?

(VI) Whether the respondent gave false information regarding her bio-data before her marriage?

(VII) Whether the opposite party after the marriage furnished false information to the petitioner for her transfer from Singapore to Mumbai?

(VIII) Whether the petitioner is entitled for any other relief/reliefs?

(IX) Whether the petitioner-husband is entitled for relief of annulment of marriage u/s 12(i) (c) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

14.

Accordingly,  evidences  were  adduced  on  behalf  of  the parties.

15.

The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, after appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf of parties, came to the conclusion that the petitioner-appellant has not been able to prove his case against the respondent even to the extent of preponderance of probabilities. Accordingly, find and hold that he is not entitled to get the decree of dissolution of  the marriage. Accordingly, the  suit for decree of  divorce  was  dismissed,  against  which  the  instant  appeal has been filed.

Submission on behalf of appellant-husband

16.

It  has  been  contended  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  that the factual aspect which was available before the learned family  court  supported  by  the  evidences  adduced  on  behalf of the appellant has not properly been considered and as such, the judgment impugned is perverse, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.

17.

Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  has  submitted  that there  is  sufficient  evidence  available  on  the  record  to  show that the respondent and her family members have deceived the appellant not only once but twice and thrice, first when the  father  of  the  respondent  approached  the  parents  of  the petitioner through the maternal uncle Swarup Trigunait and gave the photographs, Bio-Data and Kundli of the respondent for marriage with the petitioner and they also impressed upon the petitioner's parents that the respondent is qualified up to MBA from Banaras Hindu University and employed as Manager in CITI Bank at Mumbai and again on 22.06.2012 when the parents of both the parties met at Dhanbad and the respondent was interviewed by the petitioner and his parents and in presence  of  her  parents  they all  repeated  that she  did  MBA from BHU and serving as Manager in CITI Bank at Mumbai and  that  after  marriage  she  would  get  her  transfer  to  CITI Bank, Singapore where the petitioner is working and thirdly in August, 2012 when the father of the respondent came to Hazaribag along with his other relatives for final settlement of marriage of the respondent with the petitioner which after discussion settled for 12.02.2013 as the date of marriage and these all evidences although available on record to establish that the appellant was deceived at the hands of the respondent but not taken into consideration by the learned Family Court.

18.

It  has  further  been  contended  that  the  petitioner  and his family have been subjected to mental pain and suffering from  the  last  eight  years  due  to  which  it  is  not  possible  for the appellant to live with the respondent and in these circumstances, it was expedient and justified to have granted a decree of divorce.

19.

It is submitted that it is apparent from the evidence of both parties that the appellant and respondent are residing separately since the year 2013 and thereby deserting the appellant for more than eight years which is a valid ground for dissolution of their marriage.

20.

It has been contended that the learned Principal Judge only on the evidence of P.W.3 who have deposed that before marriage his family members did not put any condition precedent of educational qualification decided the entire suit against the appellant/petitioner, because had this  been  the  case  the  respondent and  her  family  members would have stated that the respondent has passed only Intermediate and is doing nothing, the marriage between the appellant and the respondent would not have taken place and the present marriage has taken place only on the oral version as well on the basis of bio-data of the respondent which the respondent's parent provided and this  entirely  proves  that  the  appellant  has  been  frauded  at the  hands  of  the  respondent  and  her  family  by  giving  false / misinformation regarding the educational qualification and  employment  of  the  respondent  and  thus  the  judgment and  decree  as  passed  against  the  appellant  is  fit  to  be  set aside.

21.

The learned Family Court has not appreciated the proceedings of the Panchayati taken place in village Malkera on 22.12.2013 and 05.01.2014 where relatives of both parties were present alongwith respected persons of the village and there also on demand of educational qualification and employment proof of the respondent, nothing was produced before the Panchayat.

22.

It has been contended that respondents have repeatedly made false statement to the appellant that she would be coming to Singapore right from 07.03.2013 and further on  24.10.2013  when  the  respondent informed  that she had purchased flight ticket for herself and her husband for Singapore and when the petitioner came to Mumbai and met with the respondent at the Airport itself and alongwith her went to meet her immediate boss to know why he was putting blockade in the way of her going to Singapore but there was no Bank in function and on enquiry  from  the  security  man  it  revealed  that  there is  no Bank in function and this type of making false statement one after another just to suppress the fact she is neither M.B.A. and not working in any CITI Bank at Mumbai, which led to lose of faith of the appellant in the respondent and therefore he had filed the suit for dissolution of his marriage.

23.

It has been submitted that the learned Principal Judge has failed to consider that the respondent and her parents  knowingly  and  deliberately  misrepresented  the  fact about her qualification and appointment and impressed falsely to get married to the appellant by playing fraud.

24.

The learned Principal Judge has failed to appreciate the fact which has been deposed by the prosecution witnesses that the respondent in front of her brother and father  when  asked  to  show  her educational  certificates  and appointment  letter  she  went  to  her  room  and  locked  inside and consumed "Sindoor" whereupon this case was immediately brought to the knowledge of Mahila Thana, Hazaribag  and  thereafter  she  was  taken  to  Sadar  Hospital, Hazaribag and from there she went to her parental house at Gaya from the hospital itself because had this been true that she administered chemical, the petitioner and his parents would have been arrested immediately and thus the finding arrived by the learned Principal Judge is not correct.

25.

It has further been submitted that the Matrimonial Title  Suit  No.70  of  2014  as  preferred  by  the appellant  was filed on 31.03.2014 and after much delay the two cases were filed by the respondent i.e Misc. Case No.80/14 and Complaint Case No.1250/2014 on dated 02.08.2014 and 24.07.2014 respectively. Thus, it has further been contended that learned Family Court has completely ignored the documentary evidence and has dismissed the case of the appellant on erroneous and extraneous consideration.

26.

It  has  been  submitted  that the  finding  of  the  learned Principal Judge that the husband-petitioner could not prove any kind of cruelty committed upon him by the respondent-wife  is  not  correct  because  the  respondent  and her relatives repeatedly given false information regarding educational qualification and working in CITI Bank at Mumbai and also leaving matrimonial house without any cogent reason and these all constituted mental cruelty to the petitioner since last eight years and thus on this ground the judgment and decree passed is bad and fit to be set aside.

27.

Learned counsel for the appellant, based on the aforesaid  grounds  has  submitted  that  the impugned  order is perverse and  is not sustainable under the  law as also on the facts of the case.

Submission on behalf of respondent-wife:

28.

Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that since the learned Family court after considering the entire material available on record and after due appreciation has passed the order, which requires no interference on the following ground.

29.

It has been contended that due to desertion and cruelty  by  husband  and  in-laws,  she  has  been  living  in  her parental home and in this regard, she had file one complaint case  No.  1250/2014  u/s  498-A,  379,  323  & 504 of I.P.C. and 3/4 of D.P.Act, pending before the learned court of C.J.M., Gaya (Bihar).

30.

It has further been submitted that the respondent/wife did not attempt to eat vermilion, rather she was administered chemical. She was treated at Sadar Hospital, Hazaribag and from Hospital she was taken back to her parental house at Gaya and her belongings remained at  her  matrimonial  house and  no  case  was  lodged  for  this incident and after one week, he informed the matter to police  who  did  not  lodge  a  case  and  asked  for  compromise, therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant  that  the  respondent  herself  put  vermillion  in  her mouth, is totally fallacious and not acceptable.

31.

It has further been contended that as per the testimony of R.W.2, no Bio-data was provided in this marriage,  therefore,  the contention  of  the  learned  counsel for the appellant that wrong information about the educational background of the respondent has been furnished  to  the  appellant  by  way  of  the  Bio-data  is  not  fit to be accepted.

32.

Learned counsel for the respondent, on the basis of aforesaid ground has submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the learned family court requires no interference by this Court.

Analysis:

33.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleading available on record as also the finding recorded by learned family court.

34.

Before  learned  family  court,  the  parties  have  adduced evidence, both oral and documentary, in support of their case.  Therefore,  this  Court  before  entering  into  the  legality and propriety of the impugned order needs to appreciate the evidence on behalf of parties.

35.

In  order  to prove and substantiate the petitioner  has produced and examined altogether four witnesses.

36.

P.W.1 Bhagwat Pathak: He is father-cum-Attorney Holder of the  petitioner. He  has deposed  that at the  time  of marriage talk,  maternal  uncle and aunt  of  the respondent Sarika Kumari had assured him that Sarika Kumari has passed  MBA  from  Banaras  University  and  presently  she  is working  in  Citi  Bank  at  Mumbai  and  this  information  has been ratified/confirmed by parents of respondent Sarika Kumari  on  22.06.2012  and  on  getting  such  assurance  that Sarika Kumari is qualified, the marriage between his son Santosh Pathak and Sarika Kumari was solemnized on 12.02.2013. He further deposed that after marriage both the couple went to Mumbai on 22.02.2013 and on 24.02.2013 his son went  to Singapore and Sarika Kumari did  not  accompany  him  on  the  plea  that  her  transfer  is  in process  and  she  will  join  him  at  Singapore  when  the  entire process of her transfer completes and on one pretext or other  she  went  on  fooling  and  refusing  to  go  to  Singapore. He further deposed that on 27.10.2013 his son brought her to Hazaribag and  on 30.10.2013 in presence of  her  father and brother  she explicitly stated that  she would not  go to Singapore as she is having bright career in Mumbai and on demand of educational certificates and appointment letter she  went inside  the  room  and eaten  Sindoor,  which  case  is immediately reported to Mahila Police Station, Hazaribag and thereupon she  was taken to Hospital and on discharge her father and brother taken her to Gaya (Bihar). This witness has further deposed that a Panchayati took place on 22.12.2013 and 05.01.2014 at his village Malkera where people from both sides were present and there her educational certificates and appointment letters were asked to  be  produced  but  the  relatives  of  Sarika  Kumari  failed  to produce any paper. He further deposed that the relatives and parents of Sarika Kumari have cheated the family of this witness by giving such misinformation that she has passed MBA and she is working in CITI Bank at Mumbai because  had they told the  real fact, the  marriage of his son and  Sarika  Kumari  would  not  have  taken  place.  He  further deposed that Sarika Kumari has given wrong information with regard to her age in the Bio-Data and the opposite parties have tortured his son.

37.

In his cross-examination he deposed that before marriage he had talk with bridal party and after their confirmation that the bride Sarika Kumar is MBA he agreed for the marriage of his son. The marriage talk continued for about eight months. At the time of first meeting even the bride had confirmed that she is MBA and is Manager in Citi Bank at Mumbai. He further deposed that on being satisfied with her Kundali and bio-data as well as the words of her father as her father is a respected family of the society he agreed for marriage of his son with his daughter. This  witness  has  further  asserted  that  although  the  bridal party has given her Bio-data but he could neither verify her bio-data  nor  he  could  verify  the  place  where  the  bride  was working  and  he  kept  on  believing  their  words  and  the  bio- data. Even after marriage, the bride had told this witness that there is a branch of Citi Bank in Singapore also and once she had been to Singapore and within one  month, she would get transfer and would go to Singapore.

38.

P.W.2 Santosh Pathak the petitioner/appellant - husband himself In his deposition, he has reiterated the entire statements what he has written in his Matrimonial Suit for decree of divorce. In para 4 of his deposition, he has  reiterated  that  on  being  assured  from  the  words  of  her parents and relatives as well as from her bio-data that bride Sarika Kumari is an Engineering Graduate and did her M.B.A. from BHU, this marriage was solemnized and this information was ratified on 20.06.2012 also by her parents and on being asked by this witness she had assured that she would come to Singapore after transfer from Citi Bank where she had already visited twice. On 24.02.2013 when this witness was going to Singapore for joining  his  duty,  it  was  fixed  that  he  would  transfer  money to the account of Sarika Kumari held with Bank of India and Sarika Kumari in turn would give the money to his father, but she never transfer any money to the father of the petitioner. On 07.03.2012 he was informed by Sarika Kumari  through  email  that  she  has  obtained  Passport  and on 14.03.2013 she informed that she would get the employment  pass  on  next  Tuesday  but  all  of  a  sudden  she informed  that as  per  the  orders  of  her  higher  authority  she would now go to Singapore on 13.05.2013 and thereafter on  one  ground  or  other  she  continued  to  pretend  for  going to Singapore. This witness returned to Mumbai and met Sarika Kumari and shown his interest to meet her boss and she took him to the premises where she is working but there was no Bank functioning in the said premises. On 27.10.2013 this witness and Sarika Kumari came to Hazaribag where her father and brother also came and in their presence she flatly denied to go to Singapore as she has bright career in Mumbai itself. On demand of educational certificates and appointment letter she consumed Sindoor and the said incident was immediately reported to Mahila Thana, Hazaribag and thereafter she was taken to hospital and from there she went to Gaya after discharge. This witness further deposed that on 22.02.2013 and 05.01.2014 Panchayati took place in his village Malkera where besides respected members of the village both parties including her father were present and there also on demand of educational certificates and appointment letter nothing was produced. He further deposed  that in  order  to  prove  that he  has  been  cheated  at the hands of the opposite parties, he recorded some talk between Sarika Kumari and her father/ brother on 26.10.2013  and  30.10.2013  which  he  has  produced  in  the Court  and  which  will  prove  that  on  one  hand  she  tells  that she  is  working  in  Citi  Bank  whereas  in  Case  No.  80/14  as filed by Sarika Kumar, her father stated before the Court that she is neither Graduate nor she is working in Citi Bank. On 21.11.2013 when this witness had telephonic conversation with Sarika Kumar, she had threatened him with dire consequences. Due to her  deceitful behaviour,  it is very difficult for him to live with her and as such he filed the present case for dissolution of their marriage. In his cross-examination, he deposed that when the marriage talk was going on, he  was in Singapore and that her family had sent her Kundali and Bio-data to his home address at Hazaribag which was emailed to him by his brother and when he met the girl at Dhanbad he enquired about her education and employment and neither he nor his father had put any condition before her that unless educational certificate and appointment letter are put before him, he would  not  agree  for  marriage,  rather  they  believed  the  oral version of the girl and her parents. There is one dowry-cruelty  case  as  well  as  Maintenance  Case  against  him  and his family members. If the respondent thinks to resume conjugal life, he would not agree. It is absolutely absurd that  there  was  any  demand  of  dowry  from  his  side  and  the allegation  of  torture  for  demand  of  dowry  and  filing  of  this case is absolutely false and concocted.

39.

P.W.3 Raunak Pathak - brother of the petitioner - This witness has also stated the same version what is written in the matrimonial suit.  In cross-examination also he corroborated the statement what he has stated in his deposition. He has stated that before marriage his family members did not put any condition precedent of educational qualification. He has stated that the bio-data given by the parents of Sarika Kumari has never been verified by his family as her maternal uncle and aunt are their neighbors and as such they believed on their oral version.  There  is  a  498A  case  as  well  as  maintenance  case against them. The petitioner and his family members did attempt to bring back the respondent but she never agreed. No case for restitution of conjugal right was lodged.

40.

P.W.4  Ajit  Kumar  Pathak  - Cousin  of  the  petitioner  - He has stated that applicant's family was cheated on the false and fraudulent information that Sarika Kumari is educationally  qualified and is a working lady and  had the bride party told the truth about Sarika's educational qualification and job, this marriage would not have taken place. A Panchayati took place on 22.12.2013 and 05.01.2014 at village Malkera, District Dhanbad where both groom party and bride party were present consisting of almost 30-40 members and along with respected members of the village and proceedings were prepared where  all  the  members  present  in  the  panchayat  signed  on both  days.  In  cross-examination  he  stated  that  at  the  time of  seeing  the  girl  there  was  no  demand  of  any  educational certificates  and  the  groom  party  did  not  put  any  condition precedent of educational qualification, rather the bride party themselves have stated about the educational qualification of the bride.

41.

The following documents were exhibited as evidence on the part of the petitioner:

(a) Ext.1 is Power of Attorney executed by the petitioner in favour of his father - P.W.1. It was duly attested by the High Commission of India at Singapore. Said attorney -the PW1-signed the main petition, affidavit etc. for the petitioner, but the husband as P.W.2 did come in the Court  to  support  his  case.  Nothing  wrong is found.

(b) Ext.2 is in four sheets. It is Bio-data containing academic background and work experience of the bride.

(c) Ext.3 is Kundli of bride. Both are either computer printed documents or photo copies.

(d) Ext-5  & 5/1  are  two  signatures  over  one panchayati document.

(e) Ext 4, 6 series are audio and video transcripts  & their  certificates  as  per  65A Evidence Act.

42.

R.W.1 Nawal Kishore Trigunait father of respondent Sarika Kumari. In his cross-examination he deposed that his daughter is I.S.C. pass but could not complete bachelor degree. The respondent was working in a packaging company on contract basis. After marriage she did not pursue any job. She did not work in CITI  Bank at Mumbai. Daughter never went to Singapore. At the instance of the petitioner, the respondent obtained her passport. The respondent did not eat vermillion, rather she was administered  chemical.  She  was  treated  at  Sadar  Hospital, Hazaribag and from hospital she was taken back to her parental house at Gaya and her belongings remained at her matrimonial house. No case was lodged for this incident and after one week, he informed the matter to Police who did  not  lodge  a  case  and  asked  for  compromise  and  efforts for reconciliation took place.

43.

R.W.2 Abhishek Trigunait brother of respondent Sarika Kumari. In his cross-examination he deposed that he was negotiator of this marriage and no bio-data was provided.  She did  not  get  educated  from  Mumbai.  Prior  to marriage, she was working in an educational packaging work at Mumbai and after marriage she left the job. The respondent never worked in CITI Bank at Mumbai. The respondent lived at her matrimonial house for only 15 days.

44.

R.W.3 Sarika Parthak Respondent herself, in her cross-examination she deposed that she could not complete her graduation. She worked in Mumbai as material developer for some time. She was living as a paying guest at Mumbai.  She  left  Mumbai  after  marriage.  Her  brother  and sister were negotiators of this marriage. Bio-data and Kundli  were  not  provided  to  petitioner  party  at  the  time  of marriage.  She  went  to  her  matrimonial  house  at  Hazaribag after  marriage.  Since  she  was  not  having  passport,  she  did not  go  to  Singapore.  She was  paid  with  Rs.  1,40,000/-  by the petitioner but it was not meant to her. She went to Mahila Aayog twice and lodged a written complaint also.

45.

R.W.4-Subham Trigunait another brother of the respondent - In his cross-examination he deposed that  he was  not  a  participant  in  the  marriage  talk  and  he  was  not present on 04.11.2013 at matrimonial house of the respondent  at  the  time  of  assault.  He  heard  about  demand of dowry.

46.

The  documents were  also exhibited on the  respondent side  i.e.  Ext.1  is  C.C.  of  125  of  Cr.P.C.  application  filed  by respondent Sarika Pathak against Santosh Pathak, before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Gaya while Ext.A/1 is C.C.  of  complaint  petition  of  Complaint  Case  No.  1250/14 filed before the Court of C.J.M., Gaya.

47.

The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has argued that the evidence laid by him has not properly been considered and as such, the judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.

48.

While on the other hand, argument has been advanced on behalf of the respondent-defendant that the judgment is well considered.

49.

This Court while appreciating the argument advanced on  behalf  of  the  parties  on  the  issue  of  perversity  needs  to refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that  there  is  no  evidence  or  erroneous  consideration  of  the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented  by the  Public  Prosecutor]  and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while  elaborately  discussing  the  word perverse  has  held that it  is,  no  doubt,  true  that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material  or  by  taking  into  consideration  irrelevant  material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:

“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the  expression  “perverse”  means  that  the  findings  of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's  (Calcutta)  Employees'  Union v. Parry  & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that“perverse  finding”  means  a finding  which  is  not  only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not  a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.

26.

In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant  58]  the  Court  observed  that  any  order  made  in conscious  violation  of  pleading  and  law is  a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.

27.

The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:

1.

Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn.

“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”

2.

Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn.

Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.

3.

The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.

4.

The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe EncyclopedicEdn.)

Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.

5.

Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.

“Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined  as  one  that  is  not  only  against  the  weight  of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.””

50.

In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect seminal question arises for consideration herein is that whether the appellant/husband has made out a case for an order for dissolution of marriage under the Act, 1955.

51.

Therefore, this Court before proceeding to deal with the respective submissions of the counsel as also before appreciating  the  evidence  adduced  on  behalf  of  the  parties, as taken note of above, deems it appropriate to have a glance  to  the  relevant  provisions  which  may  assume  some importance  in  addressing  the  issue.  Section  5 of  the  Hindu Marriage  Act  contains  the  conditions  for  the  valid  marriage solemnized between any two Hindus. The said section is reproduced hereunder:

“5.Conditions  for  a Hindu  Marriage.- A marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:

(i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage;

(ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party-

(a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or

(b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or

(c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insantity

(iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of twenty-one years and the bride, the age of eighteen years at the time of the marriage;

(iv) the parties are not within the degree of prohibited relationship, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two;

(v) the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two;”

52.

Thus, the Section 5 of the Act 1955 provides that a marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus if the conditions  specified  in  the section  are fulfilled. On  a  plain reading of the said provision, it is manifest that the conditions prescribed in that section, if established, disentitles the party to a valid marriage. Such conditions in the very nature of things call for strict standard of proof.

53.

It needs to refer herein that the Section 7 of the Act relates to the ceremonies for the Hindu Marriage to be performed with Customary Rites of either party including Saptapadi i.e. taking of seven steps by bridegroom and bride jointly before the sacred fire to complete the marriage. The  marriage  shall  be  declared  null  and  void  at  the  option of either of the parties if it contravenes any of the provisions specified in Clause (i), (iv) & (v) of Section 5 of the said Act. Section 12 of the Act, which is pertinent in the present case, can be resorted to either of the parties for annulling the marriage as the grounds set fourth therein are satisfied. Section 12 of the Act is quoted below:

“12. Voidable marriages. - (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement  of  this  Act,  shall  be  voidable  and may  be  annulled  by  a decree  of  nullity  on  any  of the following grounds, namely:

(a) that the marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotence of the respondent; or

(b) that the marriage is in contravention of the condition specified in clause (ii) of section 5; or

(c) that the consent of the petitioner, or where the consent of the guardian in marriage of the petitioner was  required  under  section  5 as  it  stood immediately before the commencement of the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act 1978 (2 of 1978), the consent of  such  guardian  was  obtained  by force  or  by fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or as to any material fact or circumstance concerning the respondent; or

(d) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner.

(2) Notwithstanding any thing contained in sub-section (1), no petition for annulling a marriage:

(a)  on  the  ground  specified  in  clause  (c)  of  sub-section (1) shall be entertained if:

(i) the petition is presented more than one year after the force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered; or

(ii) the petitioner has, with his or her full consent, lived with the other party to the marriage as husband or wife after the force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered;

(b) On  the  ground specified  in clause  (d)  of  sub-section (1) shall be entertained unless the Court is satisfied:

(i) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage ignorant of the facts alleged;

(ii) that proceedings have been instituted in the case of a marriage solemnised before the commencement of this Act within one year of such commencement and in the case of marriages solemnised after such commencement within one year from the date of the marriage; and

(iii) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the said ground.”

54.

Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act embodies grounds on which a marriage can be declared void and annulled by a decree of nullity. Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of  the  said  section  provides  for  such  annulment,  when  the consent of the petitioner is obtained by force or fraud under circumstances mentioned in the said Clause. It is settled position  of  law  that  Section  12(1)(c)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage Act does not deal with fraud in a general way, nor deals with  every  misrepresentation  or  concealment,  the  object  of which may be fraudulent.

55.

Further it requires to refer herein the purport of the Section 13 of the Act 1955 contains the provision under which  the  marriage  can  be  dissolved  by  a  decree  of  divorce provided  the  ground  enumerated  therein  are  proved  before the Court of competence jurisdiction.

56.

Under the Hindu Law, a marriage is not a contract but sacrament.  The  Hindu Marriage  Act  has  no  doubt made  an inroad into the close preserve of the ancient Hindu Law strongly suggesting the marriage as sacrament and not contract which still goes strong. The fraud contemplated by Section  12  of  the  said  Act  is  not  required  to  be  interpreted in tune with the definition engrafted under Section 17 of the Contract Act. Both the Hindu Marriage Act and Contract  Act  are  not  pari  materia  as  the  former  deals  with marriages and the other deals with contract and commerce. Therefore,  the  definition  of  fraud  given  under  the  Contract Act cannot be brought with lock, stock and barrel to a marriage which is sacrament.

57.

There are still strong reasons to  hold that  the Hindu Marriage is not a contract but sacrament, as the contract can at the will of the parties be dissolved but the parties who contract a marriage cannot except,  of  course, divorce by mutual consent as provided under Section 13B of the said Act.

58.

It needs to refer herein that Marriage should not be allowed to be dissolved on grounds of less educational qualification of the either of the spouse.

59.

Now this court is adverting to the issue of cruelty. The learned Family Judge has decided the said issue against the petitioner/appellant.

60.

It needs to refer herein that the “cruelty” has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastana, (1975) 2 SCC 326 wherein it has been laid down that the Court has to enquire,  as  to  whether,  the  conduct  charge  as cruelty, is  of such a  character, as to  cause  in the  mind of the  petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent.

61.

This Court deems it fit and proper to take into consideration  the  meaning  of  ‘cruelty’  as  has  been  held  by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi,  (1988)1  SCC  105  wherein  the  wife  alleged  that  the husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition.

62.

According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the“conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional. For example, unintentionally  waking your spouse up in the middle  of  the  night  may  be  mental  cruelty;  intention  is  not an essential element of cruelty but it may be present. Physical  cruelty  is  less  ambiguous  and  more“aquestion  of fact and degree.”

63.

The Hon’ble Apex  Court  has  further  observed  therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty it is important  for  the  court  to  not  search  for  a  standard  in  life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case.  What  must  be  considered  include  the  kind  of  life  the parties  are  used  to,  “their  economic  and  social  conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which they attach importance.”

64.

The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse  in the  written  statement  filed  before  the court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute cruelty.

65.

In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337, the  wife  alleged  in  her  written  statement  that  her  husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid disorder”. The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of“lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family while he was conducting a cross-examination. The Hon’ble Apex Court held these allegations against the husband  to  constitute “cruelty”.

66.

In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed by taking into consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute“cruelty” itself.

67.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021)  3 SCC  742,  has  been pleased  to  observe  that  while  judging  whether  the  conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct,  which  is  sustained  over  a  period  of  time,  renders the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable  to  make  one  live  with  the  other.  The  conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be “grave” and“weighty” and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would  not constitute mental cruelty as  a ground for divorce.

68.

Further in the case of Vishwanath  Agrawal  v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows:—

“22. The expression “cruelty” has an inseparable nexus  with  human  conduct or  human  behaviour.  It is always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that have been conditioned by their social status.

25.

After so stating, this Court observed in Shobha Rani case about the marked change in life in modern times and the sea change in matrimonial duties  and responsibilities.  It has been observed  that : (SCC p. 108, para 5)

“5.… when a spouse makes a complaint about the treatment of  cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance.”

26.

Their Lordships in Shobha Rani case referred to the observations made in Sheldon v. Sheldon wherein Lord Denning stated, “the categories of cruelty are not closed”. Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to  state thus: (Shobha Rani case, SCC  p. 109, paras 5-6)

“5.…Each  case  may  be  different.  We  deal with  the conduct of human beings who are not generally similar.  Among  the  human  beings  there  is  no  limit  to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type  of  cruelty  may  crop  up  in  any  case depending upon the human behaviour, capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such is the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty.

1.

These preliminary observations are intended to emphasise that the court in matrimonial cases is not concerned with ideals in family life. The court has only  to  understand  the  spouses  concerned  as  nature made them, and consider their particular grievance. As Lord Reid observed in Gollins v. Gollins : (All ER p. 972 G-H)

‘… In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing with objective standards, it is not a matrimonial offence to fall below the standard of  the reasonable man (or the reasonable  woman). We  are dealing  with  this  man or this woman.’”

69.

In the case of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511 it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court as follows:—

99.

Human mind is extremely complex and human behaviour is equally complicated. Similarly human ingenuity has no bound, therefore, to assimilate the entire human behaviour in one definition is almost impossible. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in other case. The concept of cruelty differs from person to person depending upon his upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family and cultural background, financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs, human values and their value system.

100.

Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty cannot remain static; it is bound to change with the passage of time, impact of modern culture through print and electronic media and value system, etc. What may be mental cruelty now may not remain a mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice versa. There  can  never  be any  straitjacket  formula  or  fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances while taking aforementioned factors in consideration.

70.

Thus,  from  the  aforesaid  settled  position  of  law  it  is evident that “Cruelty” under matrimonial law consists of conduct so grave and weighty as to lead one to the conclusion that one of the spouse cannot reasonably be expected to live with the other spouse. It must be more serious than the ordinary wear and tear of married life.

71.

Cruelty must be of such a type which will satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between the parties has deteriorated to such an extent that it has become  impossible  for them to live together without mental agony.  The  cruelty  practiced  may  be  in  many  forms  and  it must  be  productive  of  an  apprehension  in  the  mind  of  the other spouse that it is dangerous to live with the erring party.  Simple  trivialities  which  can  truly  be  described  as  a reasonable  wear  and  tear  of  married  life  cannot  amount  to cruelty. In many marriages each party can, if it so wills, discover many a cause for complaint but such grievances arise mostly from temperamental disharmony. Such disharmony or incompatibility is not cruelty and will not furnish a cause for the dissolution of marriage.

72.

Since the appellant husband has also contended the issue of desertion therefore, it would be apt to discuss herein the element of “desertion”. It needs to refer herein that  the word  ‘desertion’  has  been  given  in  Explanation  to Section 13 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 wherein it has been stated that “the expression desertion means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.”

73.

It is pertinent to note that the word ‘desertion’, as has been defined in Explanation part of Section 13 of the Act, 1955, means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wishes of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other  party  to  the  marriage,  and  its  grammatical  variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.

74.

Rayden on Divorce, which is a standard work on the  subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.), has summarised  the case- law on the subject in these terms:

“Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure  by  one  spouse  does  not  necessarily make that spouse the deserting party.”

75.

The  legal  position  has  been  admirably  summarised  in paras-453 and 454  at pp.  241 to  243  of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:

“In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of  marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases.”

76.

Desertion  is not  the  withdrawal from  a  place but  from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge  of  the  common obligations  of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, ‘the home’. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually  withdraws  from  cohabitation  is  not  necessarily  the deserting party.

77.

The  offence  of  desertion  is  a  course  of  conduct  which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer.

78.

Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted, desertion is a continuing offence.

79.

It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning  of  desertion  that the  quality  of  permanence  is one of  the  essential  elements  which  differentiate  desertion  from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end.

80.

Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and  (2)  absence  of  conduct  giving  reasonable cause to  the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary intention aforesaid.

81.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs. Kakumoni  Kataky,  (2022)  5 SCC  459  has considered  the definition of ‘desertion’ on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman Utamchand  Kirpalani  v.  Meena,  AIR  1964  SC  40  which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court.

82.

The  law  consistently  has  been  laid  down  by  the  Court that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove  that  there  is  a factum  of  separation  and  there is  an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should  not  give  a  reasonable  cause  to  the  deserting  spouse to leave the matrimonial home.

83.

Thus, from the aforesaid settled position of law, it is evident from the interpretation of the word “cruelty” that daily tear and wear is not construed  to be  the  cruelty while on the other hand desertion means parting away one spouse from the other, but while deciding the issue of desertion the factum of parting away is to be seen as to whether  the  parting  away  is  due  to  compulsion  or  with  her volition.

84.

Bearing  in  mind  the  principles,  which  flow  from  a  fair reading of the statutory provisions as noted above, we proceed to examine whether the appellant has succeeded in establishing his  case  for dissolution  of  marriage  and  for coming out such conclusion we again delve into the testimonies of the witnesses as also the exhibits available on record as also submissions advanced on behalf of parties.

85.

The case of husband-petitioner/appellant is that at the time of marriage the wife-respondent and her family members furnished false information that the wife-respondent is an MBA and was working in CITI Bank at Mumbai. It was false information and had she be not an MBA and working in CITI Bank, he could not have married. 86. The wife-respondent has denied this case of husband- petitioner and as per testimony of the respondent witnesses it is evident that respondent and her relations also categorically admitted that she could not complete graduation and she was never working in CITI Bank.

87.

It is pertinent to mention here that from the testimony of  P.W.3  it  is  evident  that  the  educational  qualification  for bride  was  not  a condition  precedent  of  marriage.  Further  it has come on record that the talk of the marriage negotiation continued for about eight months, therefore certainly the groom party had got opportunity to cross check and verify the claim.

88.

Thus,  on  the  basis  of  the  aforesaid factual  aspect  it is evident that claim of husband-petitioner that the wife- respondent suppressed / misled her educational qualification  is  not  fit  to  be  accepted,  therefore  no  element of Section 12(1) (c) is available herein.

89.

The learned Family Court taking into the consideration  the  aforesaid  factual  aspect  has  categorically observed  that  the husband-petitioner  could  not  prove that there was fraud as to material fact or circumstance.

90.

Further case of the appellant/husband is that the wife-respondent  deliberately did not join him at Singapore and was lying every now and then regarding her transfer from Mumbai to Singapore.

91.

Herein he respondent-wife herself and her other R.Ws. in  clear  terms  admitted  that  respondent-wife  never  worked with CITI Bank.

92.

Admittedly the suit for dissolution of marriage filed by the  husband-petitioner  as  such  as  per  the  settled  position of  law  it  is  his  burden  to  prove  his  case/claim,  however,  in this regard the husband-petitioner/appellant only made oral claim and no cogent evidence has been laid by him.

93.

It is evident from impugned order that the learned Family Court has put specific question to the appellant that did he ever arrange the air-ticket of wife-respondent and still she did not go? But the said question has not been answered by him. mere oral claim of husband-petitioner that the wife-respondent was lying regarding her transfer to Singapore, won't suffice.

94.

Further there is admitted Dowry/cruelty criminal case lodged by wife-respondent which is still sub-judice and There  is  no  concrete  proof  that  the  respondent-wife  left  the matrimonial house without any cogent reason.

95.

Further case of the husband-petitioner is that there was cruelty upon him by the wife-respondent which the wife-respondent denied claimed contrary. After due appreciation of  all the evidences the learned Family Court has  specifically  opined  that  the  husband-petitioner  did  not specify what cruelty was practiced upon him by the respondent-wife.

96.

This Court, based  upon the  aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the appellant/petitioner has failed to establish the element of perversity in the impugned judgment as per the discussion made hereinabove, as such, this Court do not find any merit in the appeal.

97.

Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.

98.

Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.