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95 paragraphs · 2,069 wordsFacts of the case are these. The father of the petitioner, Late S. Iqbal Singh was a Deputy Superintendent of Police and died in harness. After
the death of his father petitioner applied for appointment on compassionate ground. The Government appointed him Head Constable in the Police
Department by order dated 1.8.1995. However petitioner was not satisfied with this offer because according to him respondents have acted
arbitrarily in the matter of compassionate appointments in as mush as while respondents 4 and 5 were appointed Inspectothers, respondent No.6
was appointed Assistant SubInspector, although they were also similarly placed with the petitioner. The case of the petitioner is that he possesses
similar qualifications as were possessed by respondents 4 and 6 at the time of their appointment. There was thus no justification for appointing him
as Head Constable and is a discrimination between the similarly situated persons thereby offending Article 14 of the constitution. He therefore,
claims that respondents be directed to appoint him atleast Assistant SubInspector of Police if it is not permissible to adjust him on any higher post.
In the objections filed on behalf of official respondents it is stated that petitioner is not similarly situated with the private respondents because his
father died a natural death whereas those of private respondents were killed while fighting militancy in Kashmir.
Mr. Singh appearing for the petitioner argued that respondents have by offering the post of Head Constable humiliated the petitioner so that he
does not join the post. The offer according to him is against the status of the post held by his father at the time of his death. The family background
of the petitioner it is argued does not permit him to accept the offer because his mother, who also died in a bus accident, was a teacher and he is
expected to maintain the same level of standard in the family. He also pointed out that the government cannot discriminate in the matter of
compassionate appointments between similarly situated persons. However according to him it is a wothersed case of discrimination where private
respondents have been appointed on higher post even though at the time of death their father s were also holding the same position as the father of
the petitioner.
Mr.Kapoor appearing for the respondents argued that petitioner has not brought on record the facts indicating how and in what circumstances
private respondents were appointed Assistant SubInspector and Inspectothers of Police after the death of their fathers, in the absence of which it
cannot be said that he has been discriminated. However as a matter of fact respondent No.4 was appointed as Inspector because his father, Late
Shri Nazir Ahmad was killed by the militants while on duty as S.P. Security, New Secretariat, Srinagar. The father of respondent No.5 was also
killed in similar circumstances. The State was thus justified in differentiating between persons, who died while fighting militancy in the Valley and
those who died a natural death, while making appointments of their wards on compassionate grounds. However the letter written by respondent
No.3 to respondent No.2 on 9293 states the facts as under:
The applicant in this office and stated that apart from the death of his father, his mother also died in a Bus accident near Kaluchak during the
floods and he has been left alone. He has got 4 sisters who are married and reside in their in laws.
It is therefore requested that his case may be considered on compassionate ground. The application of the candidates is enclosed for favour of
further necessary action.
As per averments made in the petitioner, mother of the petitioner, who was a teacher died in the year 1990 and his father died soon thereafter.
Whether the petitioner, who has no dependent as all his sisters are married and settled, was entitled to compassionate appointment is a matter
which the respondents did not consider. However it is necessary to point out that object of compassionate appointment is to give succour to family
to tide over sudden financial crisis on account of untimely demise of earning family member as observed in ""Haryana State Electricity Board and
another Vs. Hakim Singh"", AIR 1997 SC 3887, holding that:
If the family members of the deceased employee can manage for fourteen years after his death one of his legal heirs cannot put forward a claim as
though it is a line of succession by virtue of a right of inheritance. The object it is to give succour to the family to tide over the sudden financial crisis
befallen the dependents on account of the untimely demise of its sole earning member.
It is therefore not to maintain a particular level of standard as claimed by the petitioner that he had to be provided employment but only to
provide succour to tide over the financial crises. There is not even a whisper in the petition that the family was plunged into economic crises
because of the death of his father. He in fact claims appointment at the rank of ASI of Police or above as a matter of right and not tiding over the
financial difficulties. In this case the petitioner does not disclose when he applied for appointment on compassionate ground though it appears to
have been processed during 199293, but the fact that he did not accept the offer of appointment made vide order dated 1.8.1995 shows that he is
not in economic distress, the removal of which is the only purpose of such appointments as observed in ""Haryan State Electricity Board Vs.
Naresh Tanwar and another."" (1996) 8
SCC2'3, holding that:
It has been indicated in the decision of Umesh Kumar Nagpal that compassionate appointment cannot be granted after a long lapse of
reasonable period and the very purpose of compassionate appointment, as an exception to the general rule o open recruitment, is intended to meet
the immediate financial problem being suffered by the members of the family of the deceased employee. In the other decision of this court in
Jagdish Prasad case, it has been also indicated that the very object of appointment of dependent of deceased employee who died in harness is to
relieve immediate hardship and distress caused to the family by sudden demise of the earning members of the family and such consideration cannot
be kept binding for years.
The question that a person seeking compassionate appointment has no right to particular post, is no longer resintegra as laid down in state of
Bihar Vs. Samsuz Zoha (AIR 1996 SC1991) Holding that
It is not dispute that there is no right vested in the candidates for particular appointment on compassionate grounds.
Similarly, in Umesh Kumar Nagpal Vs. State of Haryana and others ( (1994) 4 SCC 138), it has been held that
2.....What is further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the Public
authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of
employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. The posts in classes III and
IV are the lowest posts in nonmanual and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on compassionate grounds, the object being to
relieve the family, of the financial destitution and to help if get over the emergency. The provision of employment in such dependent of the deceased
employee in such dependent of the deceased employee in such posts has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz, relief against
destitution. No other posts are expected to required to be given by the public authorities for the purpose. It must be remembered in this connection
that as against the destitute family of the deceased there are millions of other families which are equally, if not more destitute. The exception to the
rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the services rendered by him and the legitimate expectations, and
the change in the status and affairs, of the family engendered by die erstwhile employment which are suddenly upturned.
It was next argued that the appointment of the petitioner as Head Constable is humiliating as his status being the son who was a gazetted officer
and mother, a respected teacher has been ignored. If it is true that post has been offered to him ignoring his status which includes financial status,
he is not entitled to compassionate appointment. In view of the law laid down in Nagpal's case (1994) 4 SCC 138). Rejecting a similar argument in
Nagpal's case (supra) that the appointment offered was humiliating and below the status. Their Lordships further held that;
It is obvious from the above observations that the High Court endotherses the policy of the State Government to make compassionate
appointment in posts equivalent to the posts held by the deceased employees and above Classes III and IV. It is unnecessary to reiterate that these
observations are contrary to law. If the dependent of the deceased employee finds it below his dignity to accept the post offered, he is free not to
do so. The post is not offered to cater to his status but to see the family through the economic calamity.
So, die petitioner cannot seek compassionate appointment to maintain his status. Moreover, the petitioner has been appointed Head Constable
which is higher than Class III post and the law of the land is that only posts in Class III and IV can be offered on compassionate grounds that too
after examining the financial condition as held in Nagpal's case(Supra) which reads as under:
Unmindful of this legal position, some Governments and public authorities have been offering compassionate employment a sometimes as a
matter of course irrespective of the financial condition of the family of the deceased and sometimes even in posts above Classes III and Iv. That is
legally impermissible.
Since the petitioner has no vested right to be appointed on compassionate ground, he cannot ask for a particular post. Further, it is wrong to
suggest that such appointments should be made without considering the financial condition and the antecedents of the candidate seeking
appointment because it is only a person in distress who has to be shown compassion and not a person who seeks appointment to gain an official
status. Moreover, the petitioner has not pleaded the circumstances in which the private respondent were appointed against higher post on
compassionate grounds, in the absence of which it is not possible to make a comparison.
However, as noticed above, any appointment to a post higher than Class III post is illegal because it offends Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution as laid down in Nagpal's case(Supra), but since their appointments have not been challenged and instead similar treatment is being
claimed, therefore, it is not necessary to decide the circumstances in which they appointed. However, if the private respondents have been wrongly
appointed and their appointments have not been challenged, that will not be a ground to commit another wrong as laid down in M/S Fandabad Ct.
Scan centre V.D.G. Health Services and others (AIR 1997 SC 3801) which reads as under:
We fail to see how Art. 14 can be attracted in cases where wrong order are issued in favour of others. Wrong orders cannot be perpetuated
with the help of Art. 14 on the basis that such wrong orders. Were earlier passed in favour of some other persons and, therefore, there will be
discrimination against others if correct orders are passed against them. In fact, in the case of Union of India (Railway Board) and others V.J.V.
Subhaiah 1996(2)SCC 258: (1996 AIR SCW 705) the same learned Judge in his Judgment has observed in para 21 that the principle of equality
enshrined under Art. 14 does not apply when the order relied upon is unsustainable in law and is illegal. Such an order cannot form the basis for
holding that the other employees are discriminated against under Art. 14.....
In view of the above, there is thus no merit in this petition. It is dismissed accordingly.
