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Judgment
Heard learned Counsel for the parties. Rule. Rule taken up for hearing forthwith.
This petition raises a question as to whether a coÂoperative housing society can be arraigned as an industry in a complaint of unfair labour practice
under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971.  This Court, in its recent judgment
delivered in the case of ShantivanÂII Co.Op.Hsg. Society vs. Manjula Govind Mahida, has held that a coÂoperative housing society which is an
association of apartment or flat owners and renders services to these owners is not an 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The fact that the cooperative housing society carries on a commercial activity of letting out its premises or earning out of the use
of the premises by itself does not change the character of the coÂoperative housing society and make it an industry, if such commercial activity is a
mere adjunct of the principal or main activities performed by the coÂoperative society. What the court has to consider in all these cases is the
predominant nature of the activities carried on by the society. The ratio of ShantivanÂII Co.Op.Hsg. Society's case squarely applies to the facts of the
present case. Here the commercial activity ascribed to the society is letting out of its community hall to members and nonÂmembers for functions.Â
It certainly cannot be described as the principal or main activity of the society or an activity of a predominant nature within the meaning of the test laid
down in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa1978 (ii) SCC 213 . The activity is a mere adjunct of the principal and main
services or activities of the petitioner society.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent employee relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of Pralhad Vithalrao Pawar vs. Kannaded
Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd1999 (1) Bom. C.R. 840.   Relying on paragraphs 16 and 18 of of that judgment, learned Counsel submits that no
contract of personal service can be enforced except in the cases of (i) a public servant who is dismissed in contravention of Article 311 of the
Constitution, (ii) an employee covered by a labour statute applying to an industrial adjudicator under that statute and (iii) a statutory body acting in
breach of obligations imposed by the statute in the matter of service of the employee. Â Relying on paragraph 13 of the judgment, learned Counsel
submits that a claim of an employee cannot be entertained by a civil court under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, it cannot even be entertained
under Section 91 of the CoÂoperative Societies Act. Learned Counsel submits that if disputes between terminated employees of a cooperative
society on the one hand and the society on the other or about any of the service conditions of such employees cannot be entertained as industrial
disputes, the employees would be rendered completely remedyless. That is no reason for entertaining a complaint of an employee of a coÂoperative
society under the MRTU & PULP Act or the Industrial Disputes Act, if the society cannot be termed as an 'industry' covered by these Acts.Â
Absent such status, the society is like any other employer, whose contracts with his employees are to be dealt with in accordance with the ordinary
law and not labour and industrial statutes. The judgment in Kannaded Sakhar Karkhana's case, does not require us to take any different view of the
matter.
Rule is accordingly made absolute and the petition is allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned order of the Labour Court at Mumbai and
the revisional order of the Industrial Court, dismissing Complaint (ULP) No.111 of 2009.
Since the complaint is rejected only on the ground of want of jurisdiction on the part of the Labour Court to entertain the complaint, all rights and
contentions of the parties on merits are kept open. It is open for the Respondent to agitate his grievances before any appropriate forum available to
him in law.
At the request of learned Counsel for the Respondent, the society is directed not to take any coercive steps against the Respondent in pursuance of
the present order for a period of four weeks from today.