High CourtsDivision Bench

Saraswathi and Others vs Munsiff, Chowghat and Others

High Court Of Kerala · Decided on 2 November 1966 · Citation: (1967) KLJ 427

HON’BLE JUDGES
M.S. Menon, C.J · S. Velu Pillai, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 — Section 73 · Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 83
CASE NUMBER
O.P. No. 2135 and C.R.P. No. 722 of 1965
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Judgment

3 paragraphs · 356 words

Velu Pillai, J.—As these petitions raise the question as to the scope and ambit of Section 73 of Act 1 of 1964, they have been referred to a Division Bench. Mr. Justice P.T. Raman Nayar has held in Krishna Menon v. Kasiviswanotha Varma Raja 1966 KLT 873, that

the depositee court has only to receive the deposit under sub-section (1) of the section (S.73) and give notice thereof to the landlord under sub-section (3). In cases where the rent is payable in kind and there is a deficiency owing to a bona fide error in computing the amount that has to be deposited in accordance with sub-section (4) it can, tinder sub-section (5), give reasonable time for making good the deficiency.

The learned Judge has expressed a similar view in C.R.P 1256 of 1963 and C.R.P. 811 of 1963 both decided under the corresponding provision of Act 7 of 1963. We cannot add usefully to the reasons adduced in these decisions and are in agreement with the conclusion of the learned Judge. We find it only necessary to observe, that the enquiry contemplated by sub-section (5) of Section 73 is upon a motion by the tenant for reasonable time being allowed to him, to make good the deficiency in the amount of the deposit, as having resulted from a bona fide error in the computation of the amount when the rent is payable in kind; upon such a motion for allowing reasonable time, the court has to come to the conclusion that the deficiency was due to a bona fide error of the above description. This has nothing to do with the adjudication of the sufficiency or otherwise of the deposit made by the tenant u/s 73. We also feel that for coming to our conclusion, it is not necessary to draw on the analogy with Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act. Accordingly we quash Ex. P.4 and P.4 (a), the orders impugned in O.P. 2135 of 1965 and set aside the order sought to be revised in C.R.P. 722 of 1965. The O.P. and the C.R.P. are disposed of as above. No costs.