High CourtsSingle Bench

Sardara Singh and Another vs The State of Punjab

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 3 November 1969 · Citation: (1971) 2 ILR (P&H) 117

HON’BLE JUDGES
D.K. Mahajan, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Section 18, 20, 31, 31(2)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Regular First Appeal No. 311 of 1960
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Judgment

16 paragraphs · 753 words

D.K. Mahajan, J.—This order will dispose of Regular First Appeal No. 311 of 1960. This appeal is by the claimant, whose lands were acquired for the purposes of Sirhand Feeder Canal under a notification dated the 18th of December. 1957.

2.

The Land Acquisition Collector awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,300 per acre. This compensation was accepted by the claimant and later on, he made an application u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for a reference to the District Judge. His case was referred to the District Judge in spite of the provisions of Section 31(2)--Second Proviso, which reads thus:

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Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application u/s 18:

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3.

In fact, the reference application of this person should have been rejected. In any event, when the matter came up before the learned District Judge, the learned Judge was of the view that this claimant had failed to show that he had accepted the amount of compensation under protest after the award was made; and, therefore, could not object to the compensation awarded by the Collector. The learned Judge repelled the argument of the State that he had no jurisdiction to hear the reference relying upon the decision of this Court in Hari Krishan Khosla Vs. State of Pepsu, . Against this decision, an appeal has been preferred to this Court.

4.

The short contention advanced by the learned Advocate-General is that there is no merit in this appeal because the claimant accepted the compensation after the award without protest; and if he does so, he had no right to seek a reference u/s 18 of the Act in view of the provisions of Section 31(2)--Second Proviso; and, in any event, if a reference is made, it is open to the Court not to give him relief in view of his having accepted the compensation without protest--in other words, having accepted the award as a good award. Reference is also made to Section 20, Clause (b) of the Act.

5.

The contention of the learned Counsel for the claimant-Appellant, on the other hand, is that moment an order of reference is made u/s 18, the Court is bound to decide the reference irrespective of the fact, whether the provisions of Section 31(2)-- Second Proviso or Section 20(b) stand in the way; and in support c his contention, he relies upon the following decisions:

(1) Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad and another AIR l929 All. 769.

(2) AIR 1941 268 (Lahore) .

(3) Kantimahanti Ramamurthi and Another Vs. Special Deputy Collector, Harbour Acquisition, .

(4) Lila Mahton Vs. Sheo Govind Singh, .

And (5) Hari Krishan Khosla Vs. State of Pepsu, .

6.

After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the contention of the learned Advocate-General is sound and must prevail. The learned Advocate-General does not contend that the reference before the District Judge was without jurisdiction and could not be entertained. He admits that there was a valid reference to the District Judge. But it is another matter, if a person is precluded by the Statute from contesting the award; and the reason for that is that u/s 31(2)--Second Proviso read with Section 20(b), there is a clear indication that a person, who accepts the award without protest, cannot question it. Moreover, there is no estoppel against a Statute. There is no provision regarding limitation in Section 31. That is a matter which was solely within the jurisdiction of the Collector while determining the question, whether a reference should or should not be made. But there is a positive bar to a reference if the amount has been accepted without protest, u/s 31(2)--Second Proviso, and, in any event, even if a reference is made in ignorance of that provision, as it appears from the present case, Section 20(b) clearly gives jurisdiction to the Court to non-suit the claimant if he has accepted the award without protest, that is, he has accepted the amount awarded without protest. I see no escape from this conclusion. The view, I have taken of the matter, finds support from the observations of the Calcutta High Court in Suresh Chandra Roy Vs. The Land Acquisition Collector, Chinsurah, .

7.

For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and is dismissed; but there will be no order as to costs.