AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
A common question of law involved in these petitions is whether the last of receipt of applications or date of interview determines the eligibility
of a candidate for the post for which applications have been invited for recruitment. The question has arisen because in OWP No. 767/1998,
Department of Telecommunication, J&K, Circle invited applications by advertisement Notice No. 83117/96SRT/27 for the post of Junior
Engineers who have obtained diploma in Civil, Electrical or Mechanical Engineering after a full time course of three years from a recognised
Institute/Board or University. The last date for receipt of applications from the eligible candidates was 3071998. However, the petitioner was
issued original certificate by the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar only on 1281998 and as such could not apply before the said date.
In the other two petitions. State Service Selection Board has invited applications as per Advertisement Notice No. 3 of 1998dated 1881998 for
the post of Junior Agriculture Assistants for which the prescribed qualification is B.Sc Agriculture and the last date for receipt of applications was
1091998. The case of both the petitioners is that although they have already appeared in the Final B. Sc Agriculture examination but the results are
still awaited. Since they are not in possession of the qualification certificates in terms of the advertisement notice, respondents, according to them
have refused to acknowledge their applications.
The question of cut of date for determining eligibility is no longer resintegra in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in a catena of
authorities. In Rekha Chaturvedi Vs University of Rajes than and others {1993 Supp (3) SCC 168), it was held that:
In the absence of a fixed date indicated in the advertisement/notification inviting applications with reference to which the requisite qualifications
should be judged, the only certain dates for scrutiny of the qualifications will be the last date for making the applications.
Similarly, in U.P Public Service Commission U. P, Allahabad and Another Vs Alpana (1994) 2 SCC 723) where a candidate was interviewed
on the directions of High Court, their lordships held that:
6 The facts of this case reveal that the respondent was not qualified to apply since the last date fixed for receipt of applications was August
20,1988. No rule or practice is shown to have existed which permitted entertainment of her application. The Public Service Commission was,
therefore, right in refusing to can her for interview. The High Court in Writ Petition No. 1898 of 1991 mandated the Public Service Commission to
interview her but directed to withhold the result until further orders. In obedience to the directive of the High Court the Public Service Commission
interviewed her but her result was kept in abeyance. Thereafter, the High Court while disposing of the matter finally directed the Public Service
Commission to declare her result and, if successful, to forward her name for appointment. The High Court even went to the length of ordering the
creation of a supernumerary post to accommodate her. This approach of the High Court cannot be supported on any rule or prevalent practice nor
can it be supported on equitable considerations. In fact there was no occasion for the High Court to interfere with the refusal of the Public Service
Commission to interview her in the absence of any specific rule in that behalf. We find it difficult to give recognition to such an approach of the High
Court as that would open up a flood of litigation. Many candidates superior to the respondent in merit may not have applied as the result of the
examination was not declared before the last date for receipt of applications. If once such an approach is recognised there would be several
applications received from such candidates not eligible to apply and that would not only increase avoidable work of the selecting authorities but
would also increase the pressure on such authorities to withhold interviews till the result are declared, Thereby causing avoidable administrative
difficulties. This would also leave vacancies unfilled for long spells of time. We, therefore, find it difficult to uphold the view of the High Court
impugned in this appeal.
This principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma and Others Vs. Chander Shakher and Another ((1997) 4
SCC18) holding that:
..We heard the learned counsel for the review petitioners, for the State of Jammu and Kashmir and for the 33 respondents. So far as the first
issue referred to in our dated 191995 is concerned, we are the respectful opinion that majority Judgement (rendered by Dr. T. K. Thomsom and
V. Ramaswami, JJ) is unsustainable in law. The Proposition that where applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date for
filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a wellestablished
one. A person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. An advertisement or
notification issued/published calling for applications constitutes a re presentation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such
representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One person behind this proposition is that if it were known that persons who obtained the qualifications
after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed persons could also
have applied. Just because some of the persons had applied notwithstanding that they had acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed
date, they could not have been treated on a preferential basis. Their applications ought to have been rejected at the inception itself. This
proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disputed hi the majority Judgement. This is also the proposition affirmed in Rekha
Chaturvedi V. University of Rajesthan ((1993) Supp (3) SCC 168). The reasoning in the majority opinion that by allowing the 33 respondents to
appear for the interview, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talent available and that such course was in furtherance of public interest
is, with respect, an impermissible justification. It is, in our considered opinion, a dear error of law and an error apparent on the face of the record.
In our opinion, R. M. Sahai, J (and the Division Bench of the High Court) was right in holding that the 33 respondents could have been allowed to
appear for the interview.
So the proposition propounded in the case (1993 Supp (2) SCC 611) was reviewed by their Lordships and stands expressly overruled. The
minority opinion of R. M. Sahai, J which their Lordships accepted, reads as under:
19 In legal terminology where something is required to be done and the consequences of failure to do so are also provided then ft is known as
mandatory. The mandatory character of possessing the requirements as provided in the first part of the notification stands further strengthened from
the third and last part of the notification, which prohibited the candidates from applying if they did not possess the requisite qualifications. In view of
these clear and specific conditions laid down in the advertisement those candidates who were not possessed of the B. E. qualifications were not
eligible for applying nor their applications were liable to be entertained nor could they be called for interview. Eligibility for the post mentioned in
the notification depends on possessing the qualification noted against each post. The expression, 'shall be possessed of such qualifications, is
indicative of both the mandatory character of the requirement and its operation in present. That is a candidate must not only have been qualified but
he should have been possessed of it on the date of application was made.
So, the law as declared under Article 141 of the Constitution of India is that an applicant to be eligible for the post must possess qualification,
certificate on the last date of receipt of applications fixed in the advertisement notice and a person who acquires qualification subsequent to such
prescribed date cannot be considered eligible at all. In other words the candidate must not only have been qualified but he should be possessed of
it on the last date of receipt of applications.
This being the law declared by the Apex Court, any interim direction to the contrary in a pending case cannot be a guide for entertaining these
petitions because judicial discipline is best maintained by following the law of the land and not by ignoring it.
Hence, these petitions are dismissed because none of the petitioners possess qualification for the post on the last date of receipt of applications.