High CourtsSingle Bench

Sarita Devi and Others vs State of Jharkhand and Another

Jharkhand High Court · Decided on 19 May 2006 · Citation: (2008) 1 DMC 276

HON’BLE JUDGES
D.K. Sinha, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 177, 178, 482 · Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Section 4 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 498A
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

16 paragraphs · 1,273 words

D.K. Sinha, J.—The petitioners herein 7 in number have preferred the petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the complaint petition arising out of C.P. Case No. 547 of 2005 along with the order taking cognizance dated 29.8.2005 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad.

2.

The brief fact of the case, as contained in Complaint Case No. 547 of 2005 (Annexure 1), is that complainant-opposite party No. 2 Mrs. Nisha Sahu was married to the petitioner No. 3 herein Kumar Prasant on 6.5.2001 according to Hindu rituals and on the eve of marriage, Rs. 10 lakh in cash and one Maruti car was given. The bidai was executed only after assurance against demand to pay Rs. 5 lakh more in cash within one month and only thereafter she was taken to her matrimonial home. When the demand of Rs. 5 lakh could not be fulfilled within the stipulated period of one month, she was assaulted by the accused persons including the petitioners and was brought to Dhanbad by her husband petitioner No. 3 to her parental home with the threatening that he would not take her away back to Nalanda or Begusarai where he was posted, failing to pay the promised amount. In the meantime, she conceived but the accused persons though wanted to abort her but could not succeed. Again they started perpetrating torture to her by assaulting with fists and blows and her hair was cut shorten and she was threatened to be burnt alive. Observing the miseries of her torture, the father of the complainant came and took her away with him to Dhanbad where she delivered a male child. With the intervention of respectable persons and after great persuasion, husband-petitioner No. 3 took the opposite party No. 2 with her son to Nalanda and from there to Begusarai. She was variously tortured by the accused persons from November, 2004 to December, 2004 at Barauni by binding her hands and legs, as a result of which, she lost her senses. On receiving such information, her father came to Barauni and brought the complainant-opposite party No. 2 to Ranchi, got her admitted in the Institute of Neuro-psychiatry at Ranchi where she remained admitted from 28.12.2004 to 17.1.2005. On the advice of the Doctor, she was brought to Dhanbad. It is further alleged that on 29.3.2005 petitioner-husband came to Dhanbad, behaved brutally and attempted to assault opposite party No. 2 in presence of her parents by threatening that he would divorce her and shall marry to another girl with whom he had already settled his marriage, hence the case. The complaint case aforesaid was filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad.

3.

Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the complaint petition consists of the illegal demand of dowry and extending torture to the opposite party No. 2 which took place either in the District of Nalanda or in Barauni and it is nowhere mentioned that either cruelty or demand of illegal dowry had been met out with the complainant in the District of Dhanbad. Therefore, cognizance taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad is without jurisdiction.

4.

Reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Apex Court. In Y. Abraham Ajith and Others Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another, , the Apex Court held as under:

In Halsbury''s Laws of England (4th Edn.) it has been stated as follows:

''Cause of action'' has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. ''Cause of action'' has also been taken to mean that a particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action.

When the aforesaid legal principles are applied, to the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint petition, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai and, therefore, the Magistrate concerned had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The proceedings are quashed. The complaint be returned to respondent No. 2, who if she so chooses, may file the same in the appropriate Court to be dealt with in accordance with law. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

5.

In the present case the allegation is against the husband-petitioner No. 3 that he came to Dhanbad on 29.3.2005 and behaved brutally and attempted to assault the complainant in presence of her parents and told that he would divorce her and would marry another girl with whom he had already settled his marriage on the background the of persistent demand of dowry.

6.

There is substance in the argument of Learned Counsel for the petitioners that other petitioners, vide petitioner No. 1 Sarita Devi (mother-in-law), petitioner No. 2 Surendra Prasad (father-in-law), petitioner No. 4 Himalaya Kumar, petitioner No. 5 Suraj Kumar, petitioner No. 6, Shakti Kumar all brothers of the husband of the opposite party No. 2 had not in any manner participated in attributing cruelty or demanding dowry in cash to the tune of Rs. 5 lakh within the jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad and, therefore, the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate has got no jurisdiction to take cognizance against the remaining petitioners except the husband-petitioner No. 3 herein.

7.

Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealt with the ordinary place of inquiry and trial which reads as follows:

Every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Similarly, the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and alleged to have been constituted the crime. But there are certain exceptions to such rule as contained in Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which speaks as under:

(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or

(b) Where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) Where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

(d) Where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be enquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.

8.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds that since no overt act has been attributed by the remaining petitioners except the petitioner No. 3 husband for perpertrating torture to the compatnant opposite party No. 2. the cognizance taken against them for the offence u/s 498A of the Indian Penal Code as well as u/s 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 by Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad is not sustainable since barred by jurisdiction. Therefore, cognizance taken against them by order dated 29.8.1995 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad in C.P. Case No. 547 of 2005 including the entire criminal prosecution is quashed. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, for the reasons discussed hereinabove, cognizance taken against the husband petitioner No. 2 only u/s 498A is maintainable as no sanction has been obtained under ''Bihar Amendment'' for cognizance u/s 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Accordingly, this petition is allowed in part.