Sarup Singh and another vs State of Punjab and others

Gurdev Singh, J.—For election to the Market Committee, Makhu, four candidates put in their nomination papers, two being the petitioners, Sarup Singh and Mehar Singh, and the other two were Dr. Ranjit Singh and Avtar Singh respondents 3 and 4. On the date of scrutiny, 6th October, 1987, the nomination papers of both the petitioners were rejected by the Returning Officer vide his orders marked C and D, which are in identical terms and reproduced in extenso read as under:

The certificate issued by Bahadur Singh President is not complete as it does not give the address of the candidate. Hence the papers are not valid and are rejected.

Subsequently, Avtar Singh respondent having withdrawn from the contest, Dr. Ranjit Singh was declared elected unopposed. There being admittedly no provision for any election petition, the; two petitioners approached this Court on 19th October, 1937, with this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution questioning the validity of the order of the Returning Officer rejecting their nomination papers.

It is urged that the defect in the nomination papers, on the basis of which the petitioners had been excluded from contesting the election, was of no consequence and the nomination papers furnished by the petitioners were perfectly in order as the certificate issued by Bahadur Singh, which was found to be defective, was not required to be appended to or endorsed on the nomination papers. Reference in this connection is made to rule 27 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (Election to Market Committee) Rules 1961, and form Prescribed under those rules.

No one has appeared to contest the petition, but Mr. K.S. Nehra, appearing for respondents 3 and 4, besides defending the order of the Returning Officer as valid, has urged by way of preliminary objections that the joint petition by the two petitioners who had individual rights and who had put in separate nomination papers, was not competent, and the writ petition should not have been entertained as under rule 35 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (Election to Market Committee) Rules, 1961, in case of dispute regarding the interpretation of these rules the Deputy Commissioner is the final authority. So far as the latter objection is concerned, it is clearly untenable. Rule 35 on which he relies cannot affect the powers of this Court to interpret the rules, and since it is not disputed that there is no provision for an election petition and none could thus be preferred by the petitioners, the petitioners are justified in contending in this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution that there his been no non-compliance or breach of the relevant rule.

In Support of the preliminary objection that the joint petition is misconceived and does not lie, Mr. Nehra has relied upon Vinod Kumar v. Municipal Committee Pathankot (1967) 69 P.L.R. 909, where on review of the relevant authorities, including the Division Bench decision of this Court in Jiwan Singh and others v. The Consolidation Officer (1962) 64 P.L R. 568, I observed as follows :

It now appears to be well-settled that the mere fact that a common question arises for consideration is not enough to justify the making of a joint petition. Similar orders may be passed in dealing with cases of different individuals, but that does not justify the making of a single writ petition when the orders relate to individual rights of different persons. I am, accordingly, of the opinion that the present petition on behalf of all the five petitioners is not competent.

Admittedly, in the instant case, the two petitioners had put in separate nomination papers, which were dealt with individually by the Returning Officer, and he passed separate orders rejecting the same, though for identical reasons. By this order, the individual rights of the petitioners were affected, and there was no right common to them, which was denied or taken away by the impugned orders of the Returning Officer. In these circumstances, the joint petition is not maintainable. Mr. Dhabi does not contest this, but he prays that in exercise of the discretion vesting in this Court, this petition be treated as having been made only on behalf of Sarup Singh. Such a course was suggested to the Division Bench in Revenue Patwiri Union, Punjab, v. The State of Punjab (1961) 63 P.L.R. 530, but the learned Judges refused to accede to it. There is how ever, no absolute bar in adopting such a course, and whether or not a joint petition should be allowed to be converted into a petition on behalf of only one of the petitioners, will depend upon the facts of each case. I think, in view of the glaring injustice that has been done to the petitioners, as will be indicated hereafter, it is a fit case in which the request of Mr. Doabia should be accepted, and I, accordingly, treat this petition as having been made by Sirup Singh along.

Turning to the merits of the case, I find that Mr. Doabia''s contention that the defect in the certificate of the President of the Co-operative Society is of no consequence as such a certificate is not prescribed in the form ''P'' is untenable. This argument is based upon from ''P'', as originally prescribed, but since then this form has been amended by the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (Election to Market Committee) (First Amendment) Rules, 1966, and now every nomination paper must bear a certificate of the President or Chairman of the Co-operative Society concerned or the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies of the District in the following form :

I do hereby certify that Shri------of (address)----is a member of Cooperative Society------which is a licensee of Market Committee----under the Act.

Signature of President/Chairman, Co-operative Society/Assistant Registrar, Co operative Societies of the district.

There is no doubt that the certificate appearing on the nomination paper of the petitioner Sarup Singh is defective in as much as it does not give his address. But, I agree with Mr. Doabia that this omission does not invalidate the nomination paper. The proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 28, which relates to scrutiny of nomination papers, clearly lays down :

The nomination of a candidate shall not be rejected merely on the ground of an incorrect description of his name or of the name of his proposer or secondary, or of any other particulars if the identity of the candidate, proposer or secondary, as the case may be, can other-wise be established beyond reasonable doubt.

In the nomination paper filed by Sarup Singh, all his particulars including his parentage, address and the fact that he was a member of the Makhu Zamindara Co-operative Marketing-cum Processing Society, Makhu, were given by his proposer Thus, there could be no difficulty in a certaining the identity if Sarup Singh in respect of whom this certificate, to which objection is taken, was issued by the President of the Makhu Zamindara Co operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society, Makhu. In fact, at the time of the scrutiny there was no objection that the certificate did not relate to the petitioner or that he was not a member of the Makhu Zamindara Co-operative Marketing-cum Processing Society, Makhu, whose President had signed this certificate.

Apart from this, the omission of the petitioner''s address in the certificate did not constitute a defect of a substantial character so as to entail the rejection of his nomination paper. In Rangi Lal Choudhury v. Dahu Sao and others 1961 1. DEC 100 a nomination paper in which the name of the Assembly Constituency was entered as "Bihar Assembly Constituency" instead of "Dhanbad Assembly Constituency" was declared to be valid by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, with these observations:

That was undoubtedly a defect in the form as filled in by the proposer. The question, however, is whether in these circumstances it can be called a defect of a substantial character, which would justify the rejection of the nomination paper It seems to us that the defect appeared partly because of the mistake in the printing of the Hindi form which was supplied to the candidates for the purposes of the nomination to this bye election. The form, however, as put in clearly shows in the heading the particular assembly constituency for which the election was being held then follows the part which has to be filled on by the proposer and there the proposer made a mistake in filling the word "Bihar" instead of the word "Dhanbad" in the blank space, relating to the constituency- Considering, however, that the name of the constituency was already there in the heading, it would in our opinion be not improper in the circumstances of ''this case to say that the proposer was nominating the candidate for the constituency which was already mentioned in the heading.

Applying the ratio of that case, it is abundantly clear that the nomination paper contained all the necessary particulars about the candidate and did not suffer from any substantial defect. The defect pointed out by the Returning Officer is merely of a technical character and thus of no consequence The rejection of the nomination paper of the petitioner Sarup Singh being without any authority, he could not be prevented from contesting the election The election of respondent No. 3 is consequently void and is set aside. The petition is accepted and the respondent No. 1 is directed to hold fresh elections for the seat vacated by Dr. Ranjit Singh, respondent No. 3, in the Market Committee, Makhu, District Ferozepore. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.