Sarwan Singh vs Ajmer Singh

N.C. Jain, J.—In order to appreciate the short question involved in this Regular Second Appeal, it is necessary to have a look at the facts of the case.

The plaintiff agreed to purchase the land in dispute belonging to defendant No. 1 Kishan Lal as per the agreement of sale dated 24.3.1969. Defendant No. 1 refused to execute the sale deed giving rise to the filing of a suit for possession by way of specific performance of the agreement of sale. The suit against defendant No. 1 was decreed by the trial Court on 27.8.1973 and the aforesaid decree by the trial Court on 27.8.1973 and the aforesaid decree became final upon the dismissal of the appeal on 3.2.1979. In execution of the decree for specific performance of the agreement of sale, the sale deed was actually registered on 27.5.1981 and this is how the plaintiff became the owner of the land. It may also be noticed that partition took place between the owners and the plaintiff was held entitled to the disputed land. It has also remained and undisputed fact before the Courts below that the defendantappellants were inducted on the land in dispute as tenants, admittedly, on 6.10.1973 by the aforesaid Krishan Lal defendant No. 1 after the passing of the decree by the trial Court on 27.8.1973. Report Roznamcha Exhibit P.5 evidences the factum of handing over of possession to the defendantappellants. The present suit was filed by the plaintiffrespondent impleading Krishan Lal the previous owner of the disputed land, as well as persons who were alleged to have been inducted as tenants after the grant of the decree by the trial Court. The plaintiff claimed a decree for mesne profits in the instant suit from the socalled tenants for a sum of Rs. 2250/ for use and occupation of land in dispute.

The counsel for the appellant, without going into the disputed findings of the fact, has argued that the Courts below have decided the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court entirely on wrong premises. It has been argued that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The Courts below while deciding the question whether the civil Court had the jurisdiction to try the instant suit placed reliance upon two decided cases reported as Faqir Singh v. Gurbachan Singh and another, AIR 1971 Punjab and Haryana 399 and Ajit Singh v. The Financial Commissioner (Revenue), Punjab, Chandigarh, 1983(1) LLR 426 in order to hold that civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit.

Mr. C.B. Goel, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted before this Court that the view taken by the Single Bench in Faqir Singh''s case (supra) does not hold the field inasmuch as the aforesaid ruling has been specifically overruled by a Division Bench of this Court in Pritam Singh v. Mehal Singh, 1986 (2) PLR 357 : 1986 R.R.R. 574.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the argument of the counsel for the appellants has got force and deserves to be accepted. The Courts below have primarily relied upon the view of a Single Bench in Faqir Singh''s case (supra) which has been overruled in Pritam Singh''s case (supra) by a Division Bench of this court. While interpreting the provisions of section 77(3)(n) of the Punjab Tenancy Act it has been held that a suit for recovery of mesne profits by a landowner can be instituted only in the revenue Court and the jurisdiction of the civil Court is expressly barred. The following observations of the Division Bench in Pritam Singh''s case (Supra) can be quoted with advantage :

"From a bare reading of the provisions of Section 77(3) clause (n) of Third Group it is apparent that if a suit is covered by the provisions of Section 14, it can be instituted only in the Revenue Court and the jurisdiction of the civil Court is expressly barred. Though in Section 14 the word used is ''landlord'', but in the context in which it has been used, it has to be given the same meaning as that of a landowner. The word ''landlord'' according to Section 4 subSection (6) of the Act, means a person under whom a tenant holds land, and to whom the tenant is, or but for a special contract, liable to pay rent for that land. Section 14 deals with any person without the consent of the landlord. Such a person obviously cannot be tenant. So, the owner of the land cannot be the landlord qua that person as defined in Section 4 Subsection (6) of the Act and the word ''landlord'' in Section (6) of the Act and the word High Court ''landlord'' in Section (6) of the Act and the word ''landlord'' in Section 14 has to be understood only signifying the person who owns the land and not the landlord as defined in Section 4. A suit by an owner for mesne profits against a person who is in possession against his consent, therefore, would be covered by Section 14 of the Act and only triable by the Revenue Court. P.C. Pandit, J. in Faqir Singh''s case (supra) held that suit for mesne profits against a trespasser would not be covered by provisions of Section 14 on the ground that neither the plaintiff would be a landlord as defined in the Act nor the defendant a tenant. As discussed above the word ''landlord'' in Section 14 has to be understood to signify the term ''landowner'' and not the term ''landlord'' as defined in Section 4 of the Act. A Division Bench of the Pepsu High Court in Inder Singh v. Lal Singh and another, 1955 Indian Law Reports 115 and later on Mehar Singh, C.J. in Gordhan Dass''s case (supra) also took the view that a suit by a landowner against a person in wrongful possession of the land would be cognizable only by the Revenue Court, though on different reasons. We are, therefore, of the considered view that Faqir Singh''s case (supra) was not correctly decided and overrule the same."

The counsel for the plaintiffrespondent cannot derive any help from Ajit singh''s case (supra). In Ajit Singh''s case (supra) the dispute was between the landlord and the tenant and the suit was filed by the landlord in the civil Court against the tenant the who was denying the relationship of landlord and tenant. It was held that since the tenancy was denied the civil Court can take cognizance of the matter. J.M. Tandon, J. in Gurdwara Sahib Deh Aujla v. Inder Singh, 1984 PLJ 207 : 1984 R.R.R. 8 took the same view which was taken by the Division Bench in Pritam Singh''s case (supra) holding that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to grant decree for mesne profits was barred. It was further held that the claim of the landowner for recovering mesne profits from a person in occupation of the land for use of such land was covered by Section 77(3)(n) read with Section 14 of the Act. The ratio of law laid down by the Division Bench in Pritam Singh''s case (supra) and J.M. Tandon, j. in Gurdwara Sahib Deh Auja''s case (supra) is fully applicable to the facts of the instant case. There was no denial of relationship of landlord and tenant by the defendantappellants. On the other hand, they claimed to be tenants of Krishan Lal and therefore, took up the plea that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was barred. The plaintiffrespondent can only been described to be a landowner because he never inducted the defendantappellants.

Faced with this situation the counsel for the plaintiffrespondents has prayed before the Court that the plaint be returned to him for presentation before the Revenue Court. This request seems to be well founded. Even the Division Bench in Pritam Singh''s case (supra) directed the trial Court to return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the Revenue Court. J.C. Gupta, J. in kesar Dass v. Bachittar Singh, 1981 LLR 249, also ordered the return of the plaint while holding at civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

For the reasons recorded above, the appeal of the defendants is hereby allowed. The plaint filed by the plaintiff is ordered to be returned to him for presentation to the Revenue Court. The parties are left to bear their own costs.