Sat Pal Gupta and others vs The State of Haryana

D.K. Mahajan, J.—This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and is directed against the Haryana Rice Bran (Distribution and Price) Control Order, 1967. The Petitioner No. 1 is a firm and petitioner No. 2 is the partner of the said firm. This partnership is registered under the Indian Partnership Act.

The petitioner is a dealer in rice, paddy and rice bran and is a registered dealer under the Punjab Rice Dealers Licensing Order, 1964. The petitioners have also an associate rice milling and husking plant which is being run under the name and style of Jagdamba Rice Mills, Traori. The rice bran is a bye-product of the husking and milling process of paddy and consists of the layer which lies between the husk and the kernel. The normal use to which this bran is put is to feed poultry and sometimes cattle. It is also used to extract oil which is mainly used for making soaps. The sale of rice bran is controlled under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act No. 10 of 1955) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). A notification dated 27th December, 1967 has been issued and under this notification rice bran can only be sold under a permit and at a price fixed in the said notification. This notification has been issued u/s 3 of the Act in pursuance of an order passed in another notification which is Annexure ''A'' to the petition. This notification is dated 24th July, 1967, and has been issued by the Central Government u/s 5 of the Act. By this notification powers have been delegated to the State Government to issue orders u/s 3 of the said Act in relation to foodstuffs.

The contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is that rice bran is not a foodstuff and. therefore, the notification dated 27th December, 1967, is bad in law because only foodstuffs could be dealt with by this notification and rice bran not being a foodstuff could not be dealt with. The short-question that requires determination is whether rice bran is foodstuff or not?

Mr. Bhagirath Dass, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would like us to interpret foodstuff as one which is food for human beings and for this contention he relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Bombay Vs. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah, . The Supreme Court decision nowhere lays down that foodstuff necessarily means foodstuff which can be used as food for human beings. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were concerned with whether turmeric was a foodstuff and they came to the conclusion that it was. The dictionary meaning of foodstuff is ''substance used as food'' and of ''food'' is what one feeds on or ''whatever supports or promotes growth''. In fact, what sustains life is food and life is not restricted to human beings alone. Animals also have life and whatever they eat is food, though in a very narrow sense it is said ''food for animals'' whereas similarly, whatever human beings eat is said ''food for human beings'' but that does not mean that the expression ''foodstuff'' merely means that which is only consumed by human beings. In this view of the matter, we are constrained to hold that the Learned Counsel is not right in his contention that the expression foodstuff'' as used in the order dated 24th July, 1967, is merely restricted to human beings. We, therefore, repel the first contention.

The second contention of the Learned Counsel is that the notification dated 27th December, 1967, does not impose any control on the movement of rice bran. It merely controls its price and its disposal on permits, i.e. a permit is issued on the producer and he can only sell to the permit holder. So for as the State of Haryana is concerned, acting under the said notification, it has banned the export of rice bran. Now, this cannot be done because the notification does not confer that power on the State of Haryana. The contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner therefore, is unexceptionable. The Learned Counsel for the State has been unable to justify the control on the movement of rice bran. It is no doubt true that the rice bran can only be acquired from the producer on permit, but no restriction on its movement can be placed. The Learned Counsel states that in order to liquidate the surplus stocks the dealers have been authorised to dispose of the same without permit, but there being no market within the State of Haryana and the movement, being restricted outside the State of Haryana, the petitioner is handicapped in the disposal of the surplus stocks. It is true that the disposal has been permitted without a permit and to that extent the order refusing the movement of stocks outside Haryana would not be justified. Therefore, the second contention must succeed.

The Learned Counsel then has urged that in the working of the permit system great hardship is caused to the producer. His contention is that rice bran is a perishable commodity and if it is stored for a long time deterioration sets in the rice bran and by reason of certain conditions which are prevailing in the State of Haryana, as set out in paragraphs 12 to 18, stocks of rice bran are accumulating. This is a matter which the State Government can remedy and the proper course would be that the permit holders should be required to lift the stocks within a reasonable time and the stocks should not be allowed to accumulate. The Learned Counsel for the State frankly stated at the bar that he would ask the Department to remedy these defects and for that reason we say nothing further on this matter at this stage.

For the reasons recorded above, we allow this petition only to the extent that the embargo on the movement of rice bran is not justified under the notification dated 7th December, 1967. There will be no order as to costs.