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Judgment
24 paragraphs · 2,040 wordsJ.M. Tandon, J.
Satbir Singh petitioner has been detained under section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980, (hereinafter the Act, by District Magistrate, Ambala, vide order dated June 12, 1984, (P 1). He has been supplied the grounds of his detention dated June 16, 1984, (P.2) in terms of section 3(4) of the Act read with clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution. In the present Habeas Corpus Petition, the petitioner has prayed that P. 1 be quashed being illegal and void and that he be set at liberty.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that apart from grounds Nos. 1 and 3 being vague, the petitioner has only been supplied the grounds of detention (P 2) and not the material taken into consideration by the detaining authority on the basis of which the grounds have been framed. The omission on the part of the detaining authority to supply the material to the petitioner has rendered his detention illegal and void. Reliance has been placed on Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bangal and others, AIR 1975 SC 550 and Ibrahim Ahmad Batti v. State of Gujarat and others AIR 1982 SC 1500.
The grounds of detention of the petitioner (P.2) read :
"Subject: Grounds of detention You have been detained in pursuance of detention order dated 12.6 84 issued under section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980, as you have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, on the following grounds :
That as hard core Akali worker of the great standing you have been through words, deeds and actions, exhorting the Sikhs masses in Yamuna Nagar, district Ambala (Haryana State) to rise in revolt against Hindu Community and the Government established by law on account of (i) the Central Government having taken military action in the Golden Temple Complex (ii) death of Shri Jarnail Singh Bhinderwala and his associates inside the Golden Temple in the course of military action aforesaid.
That in the course, of your speeches made at special Diwans at Gurdawara Singh Sabha Yamuna Nagar on 7.6.1984, 8.6.1984 and 10.6.1984, you exhorted the Sikh congregation collected therein, on those three dates, to rise against the Hindus to avenge the death of Sikh extremists including Shri Jarnail Singh Bhinderanwala inside the Golden Temple in the course of Military action, avenge the alleged sacrilege of the Golden Temple by military forces and to avenge the selfstyled insult and humiliation of Sikh masses at the hands of Central Government through, military action aforesaid. On 10. 6. 1984 you also exhorted the Sikh to make a programme to hold Diwans in rural areas at Chhachhrauli, Chhapper, Bal Chhapper and other places to start Sikh movement against Hindu to avengo of humiliation of the Sikhs.
That though your actions aforesaid by the words spoken signs and visible representation in the course of speeches aforesaid, you promoted dish harmony, hatred, illwill and feelings of enmity between the Hindus and Sikhs and thereby acted in the manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the State.
In the written statement filed by the District Magistrate, Ambala, it has been averred that the reports of the security staff about the petitioner''s speeches made on June 7, 8 and 10, 1984, referred to in ground No. 2 will be produced before the High Court at the time of hearing of the case. It is thus evident that the District Magistrate, Ambala, while considering the case of the petitioner for his detention under the Act did take into consideration the reports made by the security staff about the petitioner''s speeches made on June 7, 8, and 10, 1984.
In Khudiram Das''s case (supra), their Lordships made the following observations regarding the supply of material alongwith the grounds of detention to the petitioner.
"The constitutional imperatives enacted in this Article are twofold :
(1) the detaining authority must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable after the detention, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and (2) the detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention................
What does the word ''grounds'' mean ? Does it mean only the final conclusions reached by the detaining authority on which alone the order of detention can be made, or does it include the basic facts and materials from which the conclusions justifying the order of detention are drawn by the detaining authority ? What is interrelation between the requirements of the first and the second safeguards ? Is the efficacy of the second safeguards violated by nonobservance of the requirement of the first safeguard? If all the ''grounds'' which weighed with the detaining authority are not communicated to the detenu, does it constitute merely a breach of the first safeguard or does it also involve the violation of the second ?...............
The answer to these questions does not present any serious difficulty if only we consider the reason why the grounds are required to be communicated to the detenu as soon as may be after the detention. Obviously, the reason is twofold In the first place requirement of communication of ground ''of detention acts as a check against arbitrary and capricious exercise of power The detaining authority cannot whisk away a person and put him behind bars at its own sweet will. It must have grounds for doing so and those grounds must be communicated to the detenu, so that, not only the detenu may know what are the facts and materials before the detaining authority on the basis of which he is being deprived of his personal liberty, but he can also invoke the power of judicial review, however, limited and perpheral it may be. Secondly ''the detenu has to afforded an opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. But if the grounds of detention are not communicated to him, how can he make an effective representation ? The opportunity of making a representation would be rendered illusory. The communication of the grounds of detention is. therefore, also intended to subserve the purpose of enabling the detenu to make an effective representation. If this be the true reason for providing that the grounds on which the order of detention is made should be communicated to the detenu, it is obvious that the ''ground'' mean all the basic facts and materials which have been taken into account by the detaining authority in making the order of detention is based ... ...
It is, therefore, clear that nothing less than all the basic facts and materials which influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention must be communicated to the detenu."
In Ibrahim Ahmad Batti''s case (supra), their Lordships noted Khudi Ram''s case and further observed :
"Two more decisions of this Court in the context or obligation to supply documents, statements and other materials referred to in the grounds of detention may be noted. In Kamala Kanyalal Khushalani''s case (1981) 1 SSC 748 : (AIR 1981 SC 814) and Sunil Dutt''s case, AIR 1982 SC 53 this Court has taken the view that all the document, statements and other materials referred to or relied upon either in the order of detention or in the grounds of detention must be served upon the detenu along with the grounds. The Court has held that where the documents and materials in support of the grounds on the basis of which the detention order has been made, the same being exhypothesi in existence at the time of the issuance of the detention order and framing of the grounds, were not supplied to the detenu along with the grounds and consequently the detenu was prevented from making effective representation against his detention, the continued detention of the detenu would be illegal inasmuch as such nonsupply of documents, statements and materials alongwith the grounds of detention amounted to a violation of the safeguard available to the detenu under Article 22 (5)."
It is evident from the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reproduced above that under Article 22(5) of the Constitution read with section 3(2) of the Act it is incumbent for the detaining authority to supply material which has been taken into consideration while ordering the detention and on the basis of which the grounds have been framed, to the detenu, to enable him to make an effective representation against his detenion. The detaining authority had taken into consideration the reports made by the security staff about the speeches of the petitioner made on June 7, 8 and 10, 1984. It is also not disputed that the grounds of detention were framed on the basis of these reports The copies of the reports have not been supplied to the petitioner.
Mr. B.L. Bishnoi, learned Additional Advocate General, Haryana, has argued that ground No. 2 of the grounds of detention (P. 2) supplied to the petitioner contain the substance or gist of the speeches made by the petitioner on June 7, 8 and 10, 1984, and as such the detaining authority was not obliged to supply the copies of the reports made by the security staff about the petitioner''s speeches made on those days. Reliance has been placed on State of Punjab and others v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, 1984 Crl. L.J. 177. The omission on the part of the detaining authority to supply the copies of the reports of the security staff to the petitioner will, therefore, notvitiate his detention. The contention is without merit.
In Jagdev Singh Talwandi''s case (supra) the detenu had been supplied C.I.D. report about his speech alongwith the grounds of detention. The C.I.D. report did contain the details of speech but not the time, date and place of speech as also the number of people attending the gathering. The details about those were given in the grounds of detention The objection raised was that the material regarding time, date etc. has not been supplied and this omission has rendered the detention of the detenu illegal. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court repelled it and observed :
"The grounds mention everyone of the details which need have mentioned. The C.I.D. report was furnished to the detenu as forming the source of information leading to the conclusion oat he had made a speech which necessitated his detention in the interests of public order. In the circumstances, the grounds and the material furnished the detenu have to be read together as if the material in the form of the C.I.D. report was a continuation of the grounds of detention".
The ratio of Jagdev Singh Talwandi''s case (supra) cannot be pressed in support of the contention that the material which forms the source of information to the detaining authority and the basis of the grounds of detention need not be supplied to the detenu. It is significant that the grounds of detention by and large are inferences deduced by the detaining authority from the material supplied to and considered by him. It is, therefore, imperative that the detenu must have the material supplied to and considered by the detaining authority to assess whether the inferences arrived at and incorporated in the grounds by the detaining authority are justified and further to enable him to effectively exercise the right of making representation against his detention.
The grounds Nos. 1 and 3 of the grounds of detention (P. 2) supplied to the petitioner are vague. The material which was the source of information to the detaining authority and was considered by him while ordering the detention of the petitioner under section 3 (2) of the Act was not supplied to him alongwith the grounds of detention. The omission to supply the material to the petitioner is violative of the Article 22(5) of the Constitution and section 3 (2) of the Act. The continued detention of the petitioner is, therefore, illegal.
In the result, the petition is allowed and the impugned order (P.1) of detention of the petitioner quashed. The petitioner be set at liberty, if not required in any other case.
