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Judgment
Gulab C. Gupta, J.—The petitioner has been ordered to be in prison under a preventive detention order dated 17-8-93 passed by the
second respondent and has preferred this writ petition from jail challenging the legal and constitutional validity thereof.
From the grounds of detention supplied to the petitioner and filed along with this petition, it appears that the information was received by police
authorities from one Veeramani that the petitioner was selling I.D. Arrack containing poisonous substance. The said report was recorded on 3-8-
93 and consequent thereupon, the police party visited the place and found the petitioner pouring I.D. Arrack on a glass tumbler to an unknown
person. On seeing the police party, he threw away the glass tumbler and ran away. The party, however, surrounded the petitioner and arrested him
with a 10 litre can containing about 8 litres of arrack and cash of Rs. 15. Two samples of the said Arrack were prepared and property sealed.
One of them was later sent for chemical examination which revealed that the Arrack contained Atropine equivalent to 3.2 mg. per cent in it. The
opinion was taken from the Assistant Professor, Forensic Medicine, Madurai Medical College, Madurai, about the condition of Veeramani and the
effect of Atropine contained in the Arrack. The material was allegedly placed before the second respondent, who recorded his satisfaction that the
petitioner was a ""bootlegger"" within the meaning of Act 14 of 1982 and his activities were causing widespread danger to public health. That is how
the petitioner was ordered to be detained.
The learned counsel for the petitioner impugned the aforesaid detention on the ground that the Detaining Authority has not applied his mind to
the material on record and has mechanically passed the said order. The counsel argued to point out that though the petitioner was arrested on 3-8-
93, the affidavit filed by the Inspector before the detaining authority indicates that he was in detention from 18-6-93 to 27-8-93. If this affidavit
was to be true, there would be no justification for any incident on 3-8-93. This, according to the learned counsel, needed attention of the Detaining
Authority and indicates that he has not seriously and carefully applied his mind to the facts on record. It was also submitted with reference to the
papers supplied to the petitioner that though the offence was committed on 3-8-93, the First Information Report in relation to that offence was sent
to the Magistrate on 3-7-93. This, according to the learned counsel, is a major discrepancy clearly indicating non-application of mind. It was
further submitted that though the petitioner was, on the date of the impugned order, in Sub-Jail, Sivaganga, the detention order mentions that he
was in Central Prison, Madurai. On these facts, it is submitted that the authority has not been cautious and careful in its approach and has not
applied its mind to the facts of the case, as required by law. The order is, therefore, said to be mechanical in nature, liable to be set aside by this
Court. The learned Public Prosecutor however submitted that the aforesaid discrepancies are not material misstatement of fact and therefore do
not affect the satisfaction which has been clearly and specifically recorded by the detaining authority. Reliance has been placed by him on the
Supreme Court decision in Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan (1987 S.C.C. (Crl.) 526).
Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties as aforesaid, we are clearly of the opinion that it is a case where the
Detaining Authority has not been careful and cautious in dealing with the matter. It is a case where casualness is writ large almost at every stage. It
is not only the Inspector of Police, who has given wrong affidavit containing misstatement about the remand of the petitioner but there was
casualness even at the stage of investigation of the alleged crime. The discrepancies mentioned above may not be material if considered separately
and individually. But their cumulative effect is bound to be substantial. These discrepancies are, however, sufficient to infer that the Detaining
Authority has not taken any interest in the matter and signed the impugned order on the dotted line. We have, therefore, thought it proper to peruse
the original order and the case file and feel satisfied that it is a case where the order has been signed by the detaining authority even without reading
it. The grounds do not contain the date on which the document is recorded. Then the signatures of the Detaining Authority are in red ink and seem
to have been put on the last page only and without reading the order We infer this from the fact that corrections in the document are carried out in
green and blue inks and have not been initialed or countersigned by the Detaining Authority. It is, therefore, possible to infer that these corrections
did not exist when the order was signed by the Detaining Authority and the Detaining Authority having signed the order, left it to be corrected by
some of his subordinates. If these corrections had been made before obtaining the signatures of the Detaining Authority, they would has surely
been initialed or counter-signed by him. Then, we also notice that several uninitialed insertions have been made, which are material to the
satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. If the facts so inserted did not exist at the time the authority signed this order, it would destroy the very basis
of the detention. Then, paragraph 6 of the typed order has been scored out, but it is not clear as to who scored it out. In any case, it is clear to us
that it was not scored out by the Detaining Authority. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the Detaining Authority had not read this paragraph.
Nay, it is possible to hold that the Detaining Authority has not read the entire order. If the authority had really read the order, it would not have
missed the fact that contents of paragraphs 5 and 6 are the same and only one has to be contained in the order. In that case, he would himself have
scored out one of the paragraphs. Since, this has not been done, it is apparent that the order has not been passed with requisite care and caution.
We are, therefore, inclined to accept the submission that there has not been any application of mind by the Detaining Authority to the facts of the
case and the order has been passed mechanically.;
In this connection, we would like to recall the decision of this Court in Reetha v. The Government of Tamil Nadu (H.C.P.No. 1591 of 1993
dated 24-2-1994) wherein a Division Bench of this Court has regretted the prevalent practice of detaining authorities not taking the matter
seriously and mechanically signing the order. The Division Bench has taken pains to outline the proper course to be followed in such cases. The
minimum that we would expect from the Detaining Authority is to pass the order in a manner so as to indicate that he has applied his mind to the
facts and circumstance of the case and recorded his satisfaction as contained therein. This approach is a careful and cautions approach to be
adopted in the context of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. It must be regretted that the
Detaining Authority, in the present case, has not been as careful and cautious as expected of him and has adopted a casual and careless approach
in dealing with a matter involving constitutionally guaranteed liberty of a citizen. We are therefore, satisfied that it is a fit case for issue of a writ of
Habeas Corpus to quash the impugned order of detention.
The petition succeeds and is allowed by quashing the impugned order of detention. The petitioner is directed to be set at liberty if not required in
connection with any other case, in accordance with law.