Satish Kumar Sood vs Gayatri Devi

Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.—This appeal has been preferred against the award of Rs. 1.5 lacs to the respondentwife for performing the marriage of the daughter of the parties.

Marriage between the parties took place in the year 1973 and a female child, namely, Manju was born on 22.4.1975 out of this wedlock. The respondentwife filed a petition under Section 3(b)(ii) and under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 read with Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for grant of expenses for performing marriage of the daughter alleging, inter alia, that she was getting a salary of Rs. 7300/ per month and the daughter was studying at Delhi and expenses were required for study of the daughter as well as for performing her marriage. It was stated that the husband was employed as Junior Auditor and getting a salary of Rs. 15,000/ per month and he also owned a 12Marla house in Sector 10, Panchkula valuing Rs. 39 lacs in his name beside the ancestral property at Morinda. The appellanthusband contested the petition stating, inter alia, that the daughter has since got employment in the Punjab State Technical Education Board and is getting a salary of Rs. 5000/ per month and, therefore, she did not require any expenses.

The trial Court held that for performing the marriage of the daughter, a sum of Rs. three lacs will be required which should be shared by the husband and the wife in equal proportion The husband was, therefore, directed to pay a sum of Rs. 1.5 lacs as already noticed above.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that petition under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 was not maintainable before the District Judge while the expenses for marriage were not payable under Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the petition under the Hindu Marriage Act was maintainable before the District Judge. Mr. Mittal further submitted that the appellant is prepared to pay a sum of Rs. 75,000/ towards the expenses for performing marriage of the daughter, by way of compromise. Mr. Mittal relied upon the decisions rendered in Kartar Chand Dalliram Jain v. Smt. Taravati Kartar Chand Jain, A.I.R. 1982 Bombay 15 and Shri Krishan Lal v. Smt. Sudershan Kumari and others, 1978 P.L.R. 147 in support of the above proposition.

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that no such objection was raised before the trial Court and in view of the decision rendered in Koopilan Uneen''s daughter Pathumma and others v. Koopilan Uneen''s son Kuntalan Kutty dead by L.Rs and others, A.I.R. 1981 SC 1683, objection to the place of suing has to be taken in the first instance and though the objection considered by the Supreme Court was regarding territorial jurisdiction, the same principle will apply to the present case. Counsel also submitted that in view of this decision of the Supreme Court, the objection raised by the appellant cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in this appeal.

There is an application for condonation of delay on the ground that the appellant was not knowing that the limitation for filing appeal was thirty days and he was under the impression that it was three months. Counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no ground for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal.

Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, I am of the view that no interference is called for with the view taken by the trial Court. In view of the fact that no objection, which is being taken now, was raised in the trial Court, I am not inclined to permit the appellant to raise this objection for the first time in the appeal. If the said objection had been raised in the trial Court, it would have been open to the respondentwife to take necessary steps and since now the clock cannot be reversed, the respondentwife will be put to a great difficulty if the appellant is allowed to raise this objection at this stage.

In view of the fact that the appeal is being dismissed on merits, I condone the delay without going into the question, whether sufficient ground is made out or not. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.