Satnarain Lal vs Emperor

Satnarain Lal stands convicted of the murder of Ajodhya Sao of Malsalami on 30th December 1934; he has been sentenced to death. The matter comes before this Court by way of reference and also by way of appeal by the accused.

The most important fact in this case is the charge itself. It would appear that the enquiring Magistrate committed the accused for trial for an, offence punishable under S. 304, Penal Code, that is to say, for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The learned Sessions Judge, it is clear from the record of the case, intended to alter the charge to one of murder under S. 302, but unfortunately, although the charge has been altered so far as regards the section itself, the substance of the charge remains the same. The charge, as framed by the Sessions Judge, was in these words:

That you, on or about 30th December 1934 at Karaike Sarai, police station Malsalami, committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder by causing the death of one Ajodhya Sao Sonar and thereby committed an offence punishable udder S. 302, I.P.C.

We have no hesitation in saying that from the commencement everybody concerned in the case excepting the accused, that is to say, the Judge himself, the jury and the advocates appearing on both sides assumed that the charge was one of murder punishable under S. 302 and that the trial proceeded on that ground. It is clear that the jury must have been under that impression as the learned Judge had at the end of his summing up stated that Satnarain has been charged under S. 302, but it was open to the jury to return a verdict under S. 304, the lesser offence; but we are not so much concerned with that. What the advocates or the jury or the Judge thought in this case or for what offence the accused was being tried was one thing but what the accused thought may be and we must assume was another thing. We cannot help observing that both the advocate for the prosecution and the advocate for the defence were negligent, to say the least of it, in not pointing out this serious error to the Court. The fact that the mistake in the charge was made inadvertently does not clear the matter. We leave that matter for the moment to consider the case that has been made out against the accused. The only argument which has been addressed to us by the learned Advocate on behalf of the accused is one based on the contention that the accused had no intention of causing such injury to the deceased as was likely to cause death. To put it in the words of the learned Advocate, the intention of the accused was merely to free himself in circumstances to which we shall refer, and that therefore no such intention as must be proved either by implication or otherwise in a charge of murder was present the facts being these.

The deceased Ajodhya Sao was in the habit of going to the gola or shop of one Rash Behari Lal who has been called as one of the witnesses for the prosecution. He had been in the habit of going to this shop for twenty years according to the evidence and that on the 29th December in accordance with the custom he went to the shop and took with him a small suit case and two empty sacks; he spent the night there and locked up the small suit case which contained a certain amount of money in the almirah. The accused Satnarain also spent the night at the shop and in the morning at about half past eight Ajodhya Sao went off to have a bath in the Ganges. When he returned he found that the almirah had been tampered with that the suit case containing the money was gone, and in consequence he immediately set up an alarm. With the assistance of Jaggu, a labourer who is the fifth witness for the prosecution they went off in search of the accused, found him at the railway station and caught hold of him t here. They found the money which had been in the suit case tied round the accused''s waist in a cloth. They then proceeded to take him towards the police station and it appears that on the way there was some discussion during which the accused agreed to give up the money. According to the evidence of Jaggu the deceased hired a taxi and went to the gola and told Satnarain that he was going to take him to his master. They appear to have set out for the thana after that and the attack by the accused person on the deceased took place as they were walking along towards the thana which was about 200 yards from mahalla Sarai. The accused attacked the deceased with the knife striking him on the back of the ribs and causing an external wound as well as an internal wound in the lungs and liver according to the medical evidence. The deceased ultimately died however from tetanus.

An argument has been addressed to us based on the fact that tetanus was the cause of the death of the deceased and that the wound was not the immediate cause of death; but the medical evidence is clear on this point that the wound itself was a fatal one. It is impossible in our judgment to base any argument on the fact that tetanus was the immediate cause of the death of the deceased.

The only witnesses who saw the attack on the accused were the labourer Jaggu, Rash Behari and the deceased himself. The deceased''s dying declaration was taken in which, he stated that the accused strutk him with a knife. His statement in Ms own words were:

Satnarain Bania struck me with a knife. I caught Satnarain at Bankipore. Satnarain was running away with my Money. My money is with the police.

On that evidence, as we have stated the jury convicted the accused person. But now we come to the first point to which we referred in the beginning of our observations, that is the very serious question of the charge. The learned Assistant Government Advocate on behalf of the Crown has contended in this case that throughout the trial every one connected with it had understood that the charge was one of murder. So far as the record is concerned, it seems to us that that contention is supported, although, unless the knowledge of the accused can be imputed to his advocate, it is impossible to say what the accused himself thought was the charge which was made against him. The purport of this argument is that the accused has not been prejudiced in fact according to S. 537, Criminal P.C. That section puts the matter beyond doubt. "Unless such error, omission, irregularity or misdirection has in fact occasioned a failure of justice". The mere argument that there might have been a failure of justice or that the accused might have been prejudiced is quite clearly not sufficient. In order to come within the purview of S. 537, it has to be established that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned. If this were a question of an irregularity, it would seem to us that the argument on behalf of the accused would be bound to fail; but when the question is put, it seems to us that there is only one answer and the question to which we refer is this. Was this a mere irregularity or was it an illegality? The question can be put in another form. Can a person be charged with the lesser offence and convicted of a greater offence? There is only one possible answer to that and the question of prejudice or the question of miscarriage of justice hardly comes into a case of that kind. It is impossible, if we may use the expression, to get round the charge itself. The substance of the charge is stated in words and the matter is not cured by the mention of S. 302. The accused himself cannot be supposed to know what S. 302, provides, or indeed means; but what he is clearly charged with, according to the plain statement in the charge, is culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In these circumstances it seems to us quite impossible to uphold the conviction of murder punishable under S. 302, Penal Code.

In the circumstances having regard to the charge, we think that there should be a conviction under S. 304, and accordingly sentence the accused to 10 years'' rigorous imprisonment.