Satpal Singh Bhupinder Singh vs Punjab and Sind Bank

Sat Pal, J.—This petition has been directed against the order dated 21.8.1997 passed by the Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Fatehgarh Sahib. By this order, the learned trial Court has rejected the preliminary issues raised by the petitioner-debtor with regard to maintainability of the execution application. The learned trial Court has further held that the execution application was not time barred. Notice of this petition was issued to the respondents.

Mr. Bedi the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends that the limitation of 12 years mentioned under Articles 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would start when the decree become enforceable and the period during which the execution remained stayed or decree was declared to be unenforceable could be excluded. I support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Bharat Nidhi Ltd. v. Sehgal Brothers and Ors. (1979)81 P.L.R. 317.

Mr. Chopra learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, submits that under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the limitation would start from the date of the judgment of appeal, in case the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was challenged before the learned lower appellate Court. He, therefore, contends that since in the present case the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court was challenged before the appellate Court and the appellate Court decided the appeal vie his judgment dated 11.11.1982 the limitation would start from 11.11.1982. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of Patna High Court in Jokhan Rai v. Vakhunth Singh, AIR 1987 Patna 133 and a judgment of this Court in S. Kharak Singh v. Harbachan Singh (1978)80 P.L.R. 634.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the impugned order, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the well reasoned order passed by the learned trial Court. Admittedly, in the present case judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court was challenged before the First Appellate Court which dismissed the appeal vide judgment dated 11. 11.1982. It is well settled law that the judgment of the trial Court merges in the judgment of the appellate Court and as such the terminus a quo for computing the limitation of 12 years under Article 136 is the date of appellate decree, in the event of appeal and not that of original decree. The view I have taken finds full support from the Full Bench judgment of the Patna High Court in the case of Jokhan Rai (supra) and judgment of this Court in S. Kharak Singh (supra). As regards the case of Bharat Nidhi relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find that case was decided on its. own facts as in that case by an order passed by the trial court itself, the decree was not enforceable for a particular period. In any case. I agree with the law as enunciated by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Jokhan Rai (supra) and the decision of this Court in the case of S. Kharal Singh (supra), Needless to add that other points, if any raised by the petitioner before the learned Executing Court, will be decided by the learned Executing Court on merits.

For the reasons recorded above, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.