High CourtsDivision Bench

Satya Bhama Devi vs State Of Uttarakhand And Others

Uttarakhand High Court · Decided on 14 May 2019 · Citation: (2019) 05 UK CK 0151

HON’BLE JUDGES
Ramesh Ranganathan, CJ · N.S. Dhanik, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Special Appeal No. 334 Of 2019, Delay Condonation Application No. 4884 Of 2019
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Judgment

10 paragraphs · 662 words

Ramesh Ranganathan, CJ

1.

The Application to condone the delay in preferring the appeal is not opposed and the delay is, therefore, condoned. Delay Condonation Application stands disposed of.

2.

Heard Sri Shailendra Nauriyal, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri S.S. Chaudhary, learned Brief Holder appearing on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand and Mrs. Beena Pandey, learned Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. and, with their consent, the Special Appeal is disposed of at the stage of admission.

3.

The appellant herein filed WPSB No. 240 of 2007 seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to fix her family pension and pay the same along with arrears w.e.f. 26.12.1991 with 18% interest.

4.

Facts, to the limited extent necessary, are that the petitioner's husband retired, on attaining the age of superannuation, from the post of Head Master, Jr. High School, Tawakhal on 30.06.1981. He was paid pension w.e.f. 01.07.1981 till he died on 26.12.1991. The petitioner claims to have approached the authorities by way of several representations, seeking continuance of payment of family pension. On the ground that, despite the recommendations of the Additional Director of Education vide his letter dated 30.06.2002, she was not paid the family pension, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court contending that non-payment of the said amount is arbitrary and illegal.

5.

In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge observed that the petitioner's husband was getting pension under the Triple Pension Scheme introduced by the State Government vide Government order dated 17.12.1965; as per Rule 24 of the Family Pension Scheme, family pension should in no case extend beyond a period of five years from the date on which the deceased employee would had attained the age of superannuation; the petitioner's husband had retired from service on 30.06.1981 after attaining the age of superannuation; he continued to draw pension till he died in the year 1991; and, in light of the restriction that the family pension can be extended only for a period upto five years from the date of the employee's superannuation, the petitioner is not entitled for grant of family pension benefits after her husband's death in the year 1981.

6.

It is not in dispute that, in terms of the Triple Pension Scheme, an employee, who attains the age of superannuation, is extended pensionary benefits during his life time. His spouse, however, is entitled for family pension only for a period of five years from the date on which the employee retires from service on attaining the age of superannuation.

7.

While the very same contentions, urged before the learned Single Judge, are now urged before us, it is not in dispute that the petitioner's husband retired from service in the year 1981, but remained alive for nearly a decade thereafter till he died in the year 1991. Family pension benefits are extended to the widow of the deceased Government Servant subject to the restriction that such entitlement is only for maximum period of five years from the date on which the employee retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation. Since the petitioner's husband died in the year 1991, more than nine years after attaining the age of superannuation, Rule 24 would bar extension of family pension benefits to the petitioner as her claim for grant of family pension is for the period from 1991, far beyond five years from the date on which her husband retired from service, on attaining the age of superannuation, in the year 1981.

8.

Interference in an intra-Court appeal would be justified only if the order under appeal suffers from a patent illegality. We find no such infirmity in the order under appeal. The appeal fails and, is accordingly, dismissed. No costs.

9.

Since the main appeal was itself heard and is now dismissed, we see no reason to defer hearing of the Special Appeal to enable the appellant to rectify the deficiency pointed out by the Registry.