Satya Pal Anand vs Registrar General, High Court of M.P. and Another

A.K. Patnaik, C.J.

This is a petition for review of the order of the Full Bench dated 31.7.2008 in W.P. No. 5806/2006.

The background facts briefly are that Writ Petition No. 988/1999 was filed as a Public Interest Litigation (for short ''PIL'') in this Court challenging the grant and payment of pension to Ex-Legislators of the State of Madhya Pradesh as well as the vires of the M.P. Vidhan Sabha Sadasya Vetan Tatha Bhatta Tatha Pension Adhiniyam. A Division Bench of this Court hearing the PIL found that the issue raised in the PIL had already been settled by another Division Bench of this Court in Raghu Thakur Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, and the grant and payment of pension to Ex-Legislators had been held as intra vires the Constitution and while disposing of the writ petition by order dated 9.9.1999 issued some directions for regulating filing of PIL in this Court. Thereafter, the petitioner filed W.P. No. 5806/2006 contending that the order dated 9.9.1999 of the Division Bench in W.P. No. 988/1999 was a nullity inasmuch as it laid down the rules relating to practice and procedure in relation to filing of PILs under Article 226 of the Constitution, but the power to lay down rules relating to practice and procedure of the High Court vested in the Full Court of the High Court u/s 54 of the State Re-organisation Act, 1956. The Division Bench hearing the writ petition referred several questions of law which arose for decision in W.P. No. 5806/2006 for opinion of a larger Bench and these substantial questions of law included the question whether the powers conferred u/s 54 of the State Re-organisation Act, 1956 on the High Court of Madhya Pradesh to make Rules and Orders relating to practice and procedure can be exercised by the Division Bench of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to lay down the practice and procedure of PIL and whether court fees are payable on a PIL ?

The substantial questions of law were referred to the Full Bench and the Full Bench in order dated 31.7.2008 held that under Article 225 of the Constitution and Section 54 of the State Re-organisation Act, 1956, the Chief Justice and all the Judges of the Madhya Pradesh High Court have powers to make Rules and Orders with regard to practice and procedure relating to PIL and the order dated 9.9.1999 of the Division Bench in W.P. No. 988/1999 in so far as it has laid down five conditions for filing of PIL is without jurisdiction. The Full Bench in the order dated 31.7.2008 also held that there is no provision in the Court Fees Act, 1870 enabling the High Court to exempt the petitioner from payment of court fees for filing the PIL and therefore court fee is payable on regular writ petitions filed as PIL under Article 226 of the Constitution, but no court fee is payable when any information in a letter or other document is registered as PIL under Article 226 of the Constitution with the direction of the Chief Justice or a Judge designate. The petitioner has filed this review petition against the opinion of the Full Bench that court fee is payable on regular writ petitions filed as PIL under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The petitioner who appeared in person submitted that the High Court has inherent powers to dispense with court fees payable on regular writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution to protect the fundamental rights of disadvantaged persons. In support of his contention, he cited the decision of Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta Vs. President of India and Others, in which P.N. Bhagwati, J. has held that the Court should readily respond even to a letter addressed by individual acting pro bono publico and unhesitatingly and without the slightest qualms of conscience cast aside the technical rules of procedure in exercise of its dispensing power and treat the letter of the public-minded individual as a writ petition and act upon it. (Para 17 at page 210 of the SCC). He also relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in People''s Union for Democratic Rights and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . He cited the decision of Supreme Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, in which it has been held relying on S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and Anr. (supra) that a member of a public acting bonafide may move the Court for enforcement of a fundamental right on behalf of a person or class of persons who on account of poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position cannot approach the Court for relief even by just writing a letter, because it would not be right or fair to expect a person acting pro bono publico to incur expenses out of his own pocket for going to a lawyer and preparing a regular writ petition for being filed in Court for enforcement of the fundamental right of the poor and deprived sections of the community. Finally, he cited the decision of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta and another Vs. Union of India and others, .

We have perused the decisions cited by the petitioner and in none of the decisions the Supreme Court has held that no court fee is payable on a PIL, although it has been held that a letter addressed by poor or disadvantaged person or by social activist group on their behalf can maintain as a public interest litigation on the directions of the Chief Justice. No provision of Act, Rule or any other law has been brought to the notice of this Court by the petitioner enabling the High Court to dispense with court fees on a regular writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed as a PIL. Hence, in our opinion, the view taken by the Full Bench in the order dated 31.7.2008 that court fees are payable on a PIL filed as a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution except where the Chief Justice or a Judge designate directs on the basis of information received in a letter or any other document and considers that it is a fit case for registering a case even though no court fee is paid on such letter or document is correct.

In the result, we do not find any merit in the review petition and we accordingly dismiss the same.