Satyanarayana vs State of Madras (now Andhra Pradesh) and Others

Umamaheswaram, J.—The simple question that arises for decision in this Writ petition is whether a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority can be Suspended by the Regional Transport Officer. A Bench of this Court in Amaravathi Motor Transport Co. Amaravathi v. State of Andhra, 1956 Andh LT 285 : AIR 1956 Andhra 232, held that the order of the Secretary suspending the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal. The learned Government Pleader Invited my attention to an unreported decision of the Madras High Court, D/- 11-8-1952 in Star Transport Ltd. Kiirnool v. Regional Transport'' Authority, Kurnool, W. P. No. 87 of 1951 (B), taking a contrary view and holding that the sots pension by the Regional Transport Officer is valid, The decision of the I&a&ras High Court -was not referred to in the-Judgment of this Court. It is surprising that such'' an important decision was not reported in either of the authorised or the unauthorised reports." In Subba Rayudu v. The State. 1955 Andfl LT Cr 53: AIR 1955 Andhra 87 (FB) (C), it had been held by a Full Bench of this Court that the decisions of the Madras High Court pronounced prior to 5-7-1954 are binding upon this Court.'' In Seshammav. Venkata Narasimharao, ILR 1940 Mad 454 : AIR 1940 Mad 356, ''Leach C. J. observed at p. 474 (of ILR Mad):, (at p''. 360 of AIR) in the following terms:

The Division Benches, the final Court oil appeal in an Indian High Court, unless the case is referred, to a Full Bench, and one Division Bench should regard, itself bound by the decision of another Division,. Bench on a question If as correct the decision on a question of law of; .another Division Bench, the only right and proper course to adopt is to refer the matter to a. Full Bench, for which the of this Court Provide It the Bench decision had been referred to the. Bench of this Court, it would have either followed it or if it felt that it required reconsideration, it would have referred the matter to a Full Bench. But, unfortunately, it was not placed before the Bench of this Court which took a different-view. As there are two conflicting judgments on the point, it is necessary that the question should be finally decided by a Full Bench. The principle laid down by Leach C. J. that if this course is not adopted, the Courts subordinate to the High Court would be left without guidance, will apply equally to this case.

The next question that has to be decided is whether I should refer the matter to a Bench for referring the. matter to a Full Bench or whether I should place the papers before the learned Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench. Rule 2 of the Appellate Side Rules provides that if both Judges constituting the Bench agree that'' the determination involves a question of law, they may order that the matter, or the question of law should be referred to a Full Bench. Rule 6 enacts that notwithstanding anything in the foregoing rules to the contrary, the Chief Justice may direct that any application, petition, suit, appeal or reference shall be heard by a Fun Bench as defined in these rules.

There is no provision in the Appellate Side Rules enabling a single Judge to refer the matter direct to a Full Bench. The practice obtaining on the Madras High Court is for a single Judge to place the papers he fore the Chief Justice for a reference to a Full Bench, if there are conflicting Bench decisions on the same point. Vide Bandi Veeraju and Others Vs. Bandi Narayanamma, and In re, Venkata Subrahamanyam, 1955 Andh LT (Civ) 69: AIR 1955 Andhra 74) (F). But in Dr. K.C. Nambiar Vs. State of Madras and Others, , Subba Rao J. (as he then was) held at p. 53 (of Mad LJ): (at p. 354 of AIR) that the following procedure should be followed:

If there is a conflict of Bench Decisions, he (i.e., a single Judge) should refer the case to a Bench of two Judges who may refer it to a Full Bench.

In M. Subbarayudu and Others Vs. The State, , the" learned Chief Justice quoted with approver his own observations in 1953-1 Mad LJ 49:AIR 1953 Mai 351) (G) and stated that the practice, obtaining, in the Madras High Court should be'' followed In this Court. Following his observations, I referred a Court-fee matter to a Bench in order that the matter might be placed before a Pull Bench. The matter was heard by the Learned Chief Justice and Satyanarayana Raju J. and they referred the Question to a Full Bench. That decision is reported in Kswaramma v. See-thamma, 1955 Andh LT (Civ) 444: ((S) ATR 1955 Andhra 221 At p. 447 (of Andh LT): (at p. 222 of AIR), Bhimasankaram J., delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, made the following observations'':

In accordance therefore with the practice that obtained in the Madras High Court and which is to obtain in this High Court also as laid; down by the Full Bench decision in 1965 Andh LT (Cri) 53: ((S) AIR 1955 Andhra 87 the learned Judge directed that this matter should go before a Bench in the first more, though strictly speaking in accordance " trie observations of Subba Rao, J. (as he was) in 1953-1 Mad LJ 49 : AIR 1953 Mad (G) he might have referred it to a Full himself.

The observations of Subba Rao J. (as he then was) and approved by the Full Bench in Sub-barayudu''s case (O), were, as already set out, as follows:

If there is a conflict of Bench decisions, ho (i.e., a Single Judge) should refer the case to a Bench of two Judges who may refer it to a Full Bench......

and not that single Judge should refer the matter to a Full Bench. It is not clear whether the later Full Bench decision in 1955 Andh LI 444: ((S) AIR 1955 Andhra 221 (H), is of be understood as overruling the observations in Subbarayudu''s case (C). and enabling a single Judge to refer the matter direct to the Full Bench. Though the practice obtaining in the Madras High Court is to direct the papers to be placed before the Chief Justice for a reference to a Full Bench, having regard to the fact that there ,;s no rule enabling a single Judge to refer the matter to/a Full Bench direct and the observations of Subbarao J, (as he then was) approved by the Full Bench in Subbarayudu''s case (C) are that I should refer the matter to a Bench in order to enable the Bench to post it before a Full Bench, I am directing this matter to be posted before a Bench under R. 1 of the Appellate Side Rules.

ORDER OF REFERENQE (Subba Rao C J. and Umamaheswaram J.) SUBBA RAO C. J.:

Umamaheswaram J. directed this matter to be posted before a Bench to enable the Bench, if necessary, to refer it to a Full Bench.

Before we state the facts, the rule of y procedure pointed out by our learned brother Umamaheswaram J. may be noticed. Umamaheswaram J. criticised the statement of Bhimasankaram J. in 1955 Andh LT (Civ.) 444: AIR 1955 Andhra 221, that a single Judge might refer the case to a Full Bench and observed that it was not supported by the Full Bench Decision in ILR 1955 Andhra 1: 1955 Andh LT (Cri) 53: ((S) AIR 1955 Andhra 87) (FB) (C). It is true that according to the Full Bench, a single Judge cannot directly, refer a matter to a Full Bench. We understand that Bhimasankaram J. made that observation on the basis of the practice obtaining in Madras High Court. Whatever may be; the practice in Madras, we should strictly follow the; rules of procedure laid down by the Full Bench of this Court.

The-question raised is whether by reason of Rule 134A of the Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles ''Act, . the Regional Transport Authority which issued the permit can delegate its power to cancel or suspend it to a Subordinate body, and if it did so, whether the order made by the Subordinate authority cancelling the permit would contravene the provisions of Section 60 (1) of the Act. A Division Bench of this Court 1956 Andh LT 285 : AIR 1956 AP 2�2 held that Section 60, being a special provision governing, suspension of a permit by an authority which issued it. overrides the general rule empowering the authority to cancel an order made by a Superior Officer.

In that view, the Division Bench held that an '' order'' of the -Secretary suspending a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal. The same ''question was raised before a Division Bench loathe Madras High Court GOT-sisting Of RaJamannar C. J. and Venkatar AyyaV''J.-lhWrit Petn. No. 87 of 1951 (B)Y'' though this particular point was''1 not'', the learned Judges held that the order and by the Regional Transport Officer canceling the permit issued by a superior officer was and under Rule 134A that power was validly lelegated to him by the Transport Authority. ''''" This judgment, though delivered in August, 952. was not reported either .in authorised or nauthorised journals. We do not know whether Judges who delivered the judgment did not vie permission for its being reported. Ordinarily, should think that unreported judgments of ;6ther High Courts should not be a basis for referring points finally decided by a Division Bench s$ of this Court to a Pull Bench. But this judgment as been brought to Our notice and wan already, considered by one of our learned brothers. We think it would be in the interests of the public -that the question is finally decided by a Pull . Bench of this Court. We accordingly refer the following question to a Pull Bench:

Whether, by reason of Rule 134A (xi) of the jjiviadras Motor Vehicles Rules, the Secretary, to home the power to cancel or suspend a permit Is delegated, can validly cancel or suspend the permit issued by the Transport Authority?

Order of the Full Nench Subba Rao C. J.

I have had the advantage of perusing, the judgments prepared by Ansari J. and Jagan-Amohan Reddy J, expressing conflicting views on ''the question referred to the Pull Bench. The ''judgments disclose that two views can reasonably ,-be taken on the question.

In''1956 Andh''LT 285 : AIR 1956 Andhra 232) (A), a Division Bench of this High Court, if which I was a member, expressed an opinion consistent with the view taken by Ansari J.

''After hearing the arguments of the Government ''Pleader more elaborately advanced than on the first occasion and after giving respectful attention to the reasons given by Jaganmohan Reddy J. in his judgment. I do not feel any justification for changing my view already expressed in the earlier judgment. I, therefore, agree with Ansari J. and answer the question in the negative. M. A, ANSARI J.:

The question referred to this Full Bench is:

Whether, by reason of Rule 134A (xi) of the . Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, the Secretary, to whom the power to cancel or suspend a permit is ; delegated, can validly cancel or suspend the permit issued by the Transport Authority.

The aforesaid reference has arisen in I a Writ Petition that seeks cancellation of three t orders passed against the Petitioner. He is the owner of the bus with a route permit between . Prayathipur and Elwinpet in Srikakula.m District. The "Sib-Inspector of Parvathipur had made a complaint that on March 30, 1953, the stage carriage M D v. 1959 was carrying 54 passengers as against its capacity of 33 passengers and was also being dangerously driven at a speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour while the authorised limit was only 25 miles.

The Regional Transport Officer, Srikakulam thereafter, called upon the Petitioner t" show cause ! why action should . not be taken against him u/s 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act, No. IV [Of 1939, and his permit suspended. The explanation offered denied any offence having been omitted,; stating that if an offence was committed the driver as well as the conductor would alone be responsible; and the owner could not be penalised.

The Officer rejected the explanation and suspended the permit for a. month and a half. On appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board, its Secretary reduced the permit of suspension for one month. The Government in exercise of its reversionary powers has refused to interfere. These orders are challenged in the Writ Petition as being illegal and unconstitutional. By an amendment two further grounds have been taken for vacating the orders.

The first of these is that the Regional Transport Officer has no jurisdiction under law to take action against the permit and that his proceedings are void, and of no avail.. The learned Judge hearing the Writ Petition referred it to a Division Bench, because of conflict of judicial views on the Secretary''s jurisdiction to suspend permits by Regional Transport Authority. As the Decisions are of Division Benches, the question already mentioned has been referred to this Full Bench.

It would facilitate a better appreciation of the two views if the relevant statutory provisions and the Rules framed there under are given at the Very beginning. They are contained in Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 42 requires owners to. use in public places their transport vehicles , in'' accordance with the conditions of permits granted or countersigned by the Regional or State Transport Authority. The State Government is empowered by Section 44 (1) to constitute a State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities for exercising and discharging the powers and functions conferred on them by the Chapter. Section 44 (5) is important and reads as follows:

The Provincial Transport Authority or any Regional Transport Authority, if authorised in this behalf by rules made u/s 68, may delegate such of Its powers and functions'' to such authority or person and subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the said rules. under Section45, every application for permit is to be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region or to one of the regions in which it is proposed to use the vehicle. Section 58 (1) provides the duration of a permit, other than one which is temporary,, to-be not less than three and not more ,than fiver years and the RegwnaJ Transport Authority may specify in the permit. Section 59 contains what conditions should attach to the permits.

It forbids transfer except with the permission of the Transport Authority which granted the permit. Sub-section (2) further enacts that the holder may with the permission of the Authority by which the permit was granted, replace his vehicle by another of the same nature, and capacity. The powers of cancellation and suspension of permit are given by Section 60, which nuns as follows.

"60. (1) The Transport Authority witch granted a permit Hay cancel the permit or. may ( suspend it for such period as it thinks fit

(a) on the breach of any condition specified in Sub-section (3) of Section 59, or of any condition contained in the permit, or, (b) if the holder of the permit uses or causes or allows a vehicle: to be, used in any manner not authorised by the permit, or (c) if the holder of the permit ceases to possess the vehicle or vehicles covered by the permit, "C (d) if the holder of the permit, has obtained the permit by fraud or misrepresentation;

Provided that no permit shall be cancelled ''unless an opportunity has been given to the holder of the permit- to submit his explanation.

Reference may also be made to Section 61 "which relates to transfer of permit on death of the holder and enables the person succeeding to ''the possession of the vehicle to use for three months, subject to such a person within thirty days of the death informing the transport authority which granted the permit. There remains only Section 68 which confers rule-making power "......it is dear that Rule 134A (xi) is a gene-on the State Government. Its relevant parts are ral provision, and Section 60 (1) is a special provision as follows:

(1)'' A Provincial Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of! the foregoing power, rules under this section may be made with respect to all or any of the following matters, namely:-

(za) any other matter which is to be or may toe prescribed.

Only Rule 134A need he mentioned out of the Rules framed in exercise of the power conferred by the Section. Its part., important for purposes of this reference is the following:

The Board may for prompt and convenient despatch of business by general or special resolution delegate to the Secretary the following functions:

XX XX XX (xi) power u/s 60 of the Act to suspend a permit and the power u/s 63 (3) read with Section 60 of the Act to suspend countersignatures of permits.

Now, there are two authorities of the Midras High Court that the Rule is not ultra Vires. The first of these is the judgment of the Learned Chief Justice and Venkatarama Ayyar JJ in (Writ Petn. No. 87 of 1951 (Mad) (B)). The Petitioner in the case was the Managing Director of a Company owning a bus running on the route Nandyal - Jammalamadugu under a stage carriage permit by the Regional Transport Authority. The Regional Transport Officer, as the Secretary of the granting authority passed an order suspending the permit for two weeks on the ground of the bus having been overloaded. An appeal was preferred which was dismissed. In the Writ Petition one of the grounds taken was that the (permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority could no}; be suspended by the Secretary.

It was argued that the power of delegation conferred by Section 44 (5) should be construed as subject to the qualification that only powers and functions which were not judicial or quasi-judicial could be delegated and as suspension of a permit was a judicial function it could not be delegated. The contention was not accepted on the ground that there was nothing in the Sub-section which restricted the power of delegation. The learned Judges observed:

"Once a function is among those prescribed by the rules, the delegation cannot be challenTie case in which a different view is taken ''6 Andhra LT 285 : AIR 1956 Andhra 232 v. There were three writ petitions. In one clonal Transport Officer, Guntur, had sus-

pended the bus permit for six weeks on account of an unauthorised extra trip. In the second Writ Petition the same officer having found the bus to have taken 36 passengers as against the seating capacity of 33,Tiad suspended the renewed permit for a month. In the third petition the permit was suspended also for overloading. It was held therein that the Secretary had no power to cancel the permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority, and his orders were without Jurisdiction. His Lordship the Chief Justice delivering the judgment had observed at pp. 290 and 291 (of Andhra LT): (at P. 234 of AIR)

Overlapping each other to some extent in respect of the same subject-matter. Both provide for suspending a permit already issued. While Rule 134A (xi) says that the Secretary can suspend a permit under certain circumstances, Section 60 enacts that the Secretary can suspend a permit only if he has granted it. Section 60 being a special provision governing suspension of a permit by an authority which issued it, overrides the general rule empowering the authority to cancel a permit issued even by a superior officer. By so construing, we must hold that the order of the Secretary suspending the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal."

This authority has not been followed in the decision of the Madras High Court in V. Dhanmull Sowcar Vs. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority at Vellore, North Arcot and Others, . la that case, the Petitioner held a permit by the; Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot District, and on a report by the Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector that the bus was overloaded the Regional Transport Officer, who was also the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, directed suspension of the permit for three months. The appeal was dismissed, but the period was reduced by the Government in exercise of revisional powers. The learned Judges held that the provision in Section 44 (5) of the Motor Vehicles Act for the delegation of powers of the Regional Transport Authority, does not. offend the well-recognised concept of jurisdiction that a Judicial Officer cannot delegate his functions to another. Rule 134A of the Rules was also held as not ultra vires of the rule-making authority. Rajagopalaa J., at p. 317 (of Mad LJ): (at pp. 389-390 of AIR) made the following observations concerning Section 60:

"Section 60 of the Act conferred the power to cancel or suspend a permit on the Transport Authority which granted that permit. That was obviously to specify with precision which among the Regional Transport Authorities that were" constituted by the State Government u/s 44 (1) of the Act, should exercise the power, for which Section 60 (1) of the Act made provision.

The learned Advocate-General was well-founded in his contention, that the qualifying phrase i" Section 60 (1) "which granted a permit" was not intended to make the power conferred by Section 61 (1) of the Act .0""t to be exercised by virtut officio that is, a right "personal" to the grantee, the Regional Transport Authority within the meaning of the principle laid down by Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell St. Tri. 1030 (J), "a trust that that grantee cannot delegate to another."

The-have already pointed out that the Act if made express provision for delegation in. To explain the scope of the infixing, phrase in Section 60 (1) the learned Advocate-General invited our attention to the "pinions of Sections 59 and 61 of the Act which rpyided for the transfer of a permit and vested at power, in the Regional Transport Authority on a similar qualifying phrase "by which the remit "was "granted" or "which granted the peril;,"'' "We have dealt with this aspect only to emphasize that the specific provisions made in Section 44 (5) for the delegation of powers of a Regional Transport Authority, inclusive of the power conferred by Section 60 (1) of the Act, does of offend any well-recognised concept of jurisprudence."

The difference between the two views Is obvious. One holds that because the power of suspension etc,, is vested u/s 60 in the Regional Transport Authority if can delegate such power u/s 44 (5). The other view that the statute having linked the power of suspension with the earlier exercise of the power of granting the permit, the State Government in framing the Rules under the Act cannot disregard the link. No rule can, therefore, be framed or construed under which the power of tsus-pensKri can be delegated to another who had not grafted the period With respect to the learned Judges who have taken the former view, I would follow 1956 Andh. XT 285 : AIR 1956 Andhra 232) (A). Obviously Sections 59 and 60 vest certain powers on certain authorities. Such an authority is indicated in (the Sections by the phrase "which granted the permit" or "by which the permit was granted." It follows that the .power of transference u/s 59 or suspension u/s 60 is exercisable only by the authorities which satisfy the qualifications. The proposition is not challenged. What is merged is that such an authority can u/s 44 (5) delegate the power. The argument, however, overlooks the circumscribed power of delegation conferred by the Act, Section 44 (5) expressly enacts that the jurisdiction delegated under the Section must be according to the rules framed under the Act and subject to restrictions, limitations and conditions that may be prescribed by these rules. The State (Government u/s 68 is directed to make rules for purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of the Chapter. If the Act insists, and I have come to the conclusion that it does, on linking the power of revocation or suspension with that of having granting the permit, the rule-framing authority cannot disregard the link. No useful purpose will be served in citing authorities in (support of the obvious propositions that if rules framed under the statute are in excess of the provisions of the statute they are ultra vires. it follows that any express rule conferring Power of suspension of permit on any authority that has not granted the permit earlier/would toe ultra vires. Notwithstanding such an express rule there can be no delegation of power u/s 60 on one that has not earlier granted the permit. If that cannot be done by an express Tupelo a fortiori it cannot be done by construing a jrulej. however, widely worded it may be. The Result is that Section 44 (5) cannot be invoked in support of the view mentioned earlier in the paragraph. The question is not where there is peroral trust conferred an the delegating authority, an point is that no Rule according to which a authority can delegate can be framed or construed so a3 to enable the authority to separate and confer the excelling power on one who had not granted the permit.

It is also not clear why. the phrase "which granted a permit" in Section 60 should be construed as indicating only Regional, Transport Authorities. The State Transport Authority u/s 44 (3) (b) can perform the duties of Regional Transport Authority where there is no such Authority, and obviously Section 60 would cover the case on such an authority where it is discharging the functions. So also Section 60 would cover the case of a person who is exercising the delegated power if the permit which is being suspended, has been granted by such delegation.: It is clear that the phrase "which granted a Permit" in Section 60 links up the power conferred by the section with the power of having granted the permit, whichever; be the authority that has granted the permit. That is the rational reading of the several Sections.

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the answer to the questions is in the negative.

Jaqanmohan Redby J.:

On a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules, Z have come to a different) consign.

The following question has been referred to us: (After stating the question, the judgment proceeds as under: A Division Bench of this Court presided over by the Hon''ble Chief Justice had in the case'' o� 1956 AP LT 285 : AIR 1956 AP 232 held that Section 60 being a special provision governing suspension of a permit by an authority which issued it, overrides the general Rule 134-A (xi) empowering the authority to cancel a permit issued even by a superior officer in certain circumstances. In consequently the order of the_ Secretary suspending the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority was held to be. illegal. In (W. P. 87 of 1951 (Mad) (B) ), 8 Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar O. J. and Venkatarama Ayyar J., in a judgment delivered on the 11th August 1952, considered the question raised before them, namely, that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to suspend the permit in his favour because u/s 60 (1) it is the Transport Authority which granted the permit that can cancel a permit or suspend it.

In that case it was the Regional Authority which granted the Petitioner a permit while the Secretary who was the Regional Transport Officer acting in exercise of the powers delegated u/s 44 (5) of the Act, passed orders suspending the permit in favour of the Petitioner for two weeks on the ground that the Petitioner had overloaded the bus. It was held that the Regional Transport Officer was acting well with the scope of the Act in passing the orders of suspension. The contentions raised either before the Bench in 1956 Andhra LT 285 : AIR 1956 Andhra 232, or before us do not appear to have been raised in that case. In order to appreciate the contentions urged before us, it is necessary to examine the several provisions of the Act and Rules. ;

(After quoting-the relevant provisions of Sections 44, 45, 59, 60, 61, 63, 68 and R. 134-A. His Lordship continued as follows:- ) (19) In 1956 Andhra LT 285 : AIR 1959 Andhra 232 (A), it was urged that Rule 134A, particularly Sub-rule (xi) is in excess of the rulemaking power of the Provincial Government. The argument was that Section 60 (1) does not apply as the rule is .not only not inserted to carry into effect the provisions of that Chapter, but is also Inconsistent with the provisions of Section 60 (1), that Clause (z-a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 68 has no bearing as no power is conferred on any authority to rules for delegating its functions. It was there held that Section 6(5 (1) authorises the Provincial Government to make. rules empowering the Regional Transport Authority to delegate its functions and Section 63 (2) (za) enables ;it]to make rules laying down conditions subject to which the said delegation can be made and that Rule 134A (xi) is certainly within the scope of the rule-making power of the Government.

The learned Chief Justice in the case of W. P. 87 of 1951'' (Mad) (B) observed that there was nothing in Section 44 (5) which restricts the power of delegation and that it does not offend the well-recognised principle that a Judicial or non-judicial officer cannot delegate his power to another; that the Sub-section expressly indicates that the authority concerned may delegate such of its powers and once a function is among those prescribed by the rules, the delegation cannot be challenged. The question before us is not that the delegation cannot be made or is bad, but is whether the rule empower, the delegated authority to suspend a permit not granted by it.

In other words, has the delegation been circumscribed by preserving the power of revocation or suspension in the authority which granted the permit. His Lordship the Chief Justice in 1956 Andhra LT 285 : AIR 1956 Andhra 232 (A),," put it on the basis that both the R. 134-A (xi) the general provision and B. GO (1) the special provision overlap each other to some extent in respect of the same subject-matter. His Lordship observed at on. 290 and 291 (of Andh LT): (at p. 234 of AIR): "............... Both provide for suspending a permit, already issued. While Rule 134A (xi) says drat'' die Secretary can suspend a permit under certain circumstances, Section 60 enacts that the Secretary can suspend a permit only if he has granted it. Section 60 being a Special Provision governing suspension of permit by an authority which issued it, overrides the general rule empowering the authority to cancel a permit issued even by a superior officer. By so .constructing, we must hold that the order of the Secretary suspending the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal." Learned Government Pleader relies upon the recent decision of the Madras High Court in 1957-1 Mad LI 314:((S) AIR 1957 Mad 387: , which takes a contrary view. Rajagapulan J. at P. 320 (of Mad LJ): IR) after considering the wife of Amaravathi Motor Transport Co.,. (A), observed:

We are unable to discover any real basis for holding that Section 60 is a special provision and that Rule 134A (xi) should be construed, as a general, provision regulating the jurisdiction to cancel or suspend permits. Section 60 of the Act is the only provision in the Act itself, "Which provides for the exercise of the power to suspend or cancel a permit. It is that power that can be delegated u/s 44 (5) of the It was that power that was delegated to the Regional'' Transport Officer under Rule 134A (xi).

The validity of that delegation was upheld by the, learned Judges .and we have already held that Rule 134A including item (xi) thereof is Intra vires. The delegation u/s 44 (5) is subject to any limitations or conditions that can be imposed by the rule-making power. Rule 134A (xi) did not impose any conditions either expressly or by necessary intendment that the operation of that rule was confined only to a permit granted by the Regional Transport Officer himself; The authority to grant a permit was given to the Regional Transport Authority by the Act. Delegation of that power was permissible u/s 44 (5) .of the Act, and a limited power was delegated to the Regional Transport Officer by Rule 134. We have endeavored to explain the scope of the qualifying phrase "which granted a permit" in Section 60 (1) of the Act. In our opinion Section 60(1) is the only statutory provision for the power to punish by suspension. Exercise of that power is further regulated by Rule 134A (xi).

The delegation of the jurisdiction to exercise that power is valid. Still, what has been delegated is only the power conferred by Section 66 (1) of the Act. If the delegation is valid, it is that power, subject to the conditions and limitations imposed by Rule 134-A (xi) that vests in the Regional Transport Officer and that vesting is valid". The arguments submitted by the learned Government Pleader centres round the interpretation of the qualifying words "which granted the permit" in Section 60 (1) of the Act. The contention simply put is that these qualifying words do not vest the power conferred by Section 60 (1) of the Act in the Regional Transport Authority to be exercised virtue officio in order to justify the conclusion that the power of revocation or suspension has been linked with that of the authority granting the permit. It is necessary therefore, to examine the true meaning and ambit of the qualifying words ''which granted a permit'' occurring in Section 60 (1).

Are these words used merely to .refer to the particular transport authority granting the permit out of the several transport authorities functioning in different regions as words of description or have they been inserted with the object of confining the power of cancellation or suspension of the permit only to the authority which granted the permit; that is, are they words off limitation? I now propose to examine the relevant provisions of the'' Act given above in order to ascertain the true import of the qualifying words used In Section 60 (1).

Section 44'' specifies the transport authorities which the Government by notification in. the Official Gazette, shall constitute for the provinces (States) namely. Provincial Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities for each of the areas as may be specified in the notification. The functions of the Provincial Transport Authority are: shown in Sub-section (3) Clause (b) which empowers the Provincial Transport Authority to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no such authority and-if It thinks fit or if so required by a Regional Transport Authority to perform those duties to respect of any route common to two or more regions. u/s 45 every application for M, permit is to be mode to the Regional Transport Authority of the region or of one of the in which it is -''proposed to use the vehicle and if the applicant resides or has his principal of business in any one of those regions, to the Regional Transport Authority of that "region. The proviso authorises the State Government by notification in the Gazette to direct applications for such class of permits land"

Such region as may be specified in the notification shall be made. to the Provincial Transport Authority, It may be noticed that a person has been given the option to apply for a permit to one or other of the Regional Transport Authority of the Regions in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or to one or other of the Regional Transport Authorities where the applicant resides or any one of those regions. Apart from the several regional authorities which are empowered to grant a permit, in the case of an applicant who intends to use his vehicle in one or more regions, the Government can also by a notification direct the applicant to apply for permits to the Provincial Transport Authority.

Further u/s 44(3)(b) if the Regional Transport Authority is not functioning in any region or if so required the Provincial Transport Authority can perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority in respect of any route common to two or more regions. Prom the aforesaid provisions if appears to me that where there are more than one authority which are empowered to grant a permit to the applicant, the Qualifying words "which granted the permit" are used to identify the authority which actually granted the permit and naturally it can only be that authority which can cancel or suspend the permit and not any other authority which could have granted the permit.

It is significant to note that the words in Section 60 (1) are not Regional Transport Authority, but merely the Transport Authority. The marginal note to B. 44 uses the words Transport Authorities to denote both the Provincial Transport Authority as well as the Regional Transport Authorities. It appears to me, therefore, that , when in Section 60 (1) the words ''transport authority which granted a permit'' are used, they are only intended to specify out of the several transport authorities empowered to grant a permit, the particular authority which has actually granted the permit.

The authority which has actually granted: the permit must necessarily cancel or suspend the permit. No other authority can do so even though the other regional authorities could have .granted a permit to the applicant either on; account of his residence or place of business etc. In Section 59 also which restrict; transfer of I permit from one person to another the permission to be sought for such transfer is the transport authority "which granted the permit." In Sub-section (2) when dealing with the permission to be granted for replacing one vehicle by another of in the same nature; the permission is to be of the authority by which the permit was granted.'' Section 63 states that a permit granted by the. Regional Transport Authority of one region is not valid in any other region, unless the Peru Snit -is counter-signed by the transport authority the that region, Subject to such conditions which It bat regional authority, when counter-signing, lay attach in the same way as it would have granted the permit. Sub-see the� provisions in that Chapter radiating "to grant, revocation and suspension of he permits'''' to'' the counter-signatures of permits. The power to grant, revocation, and suspension-"of '' gaunter-signature under this Sub-section not quaffed by the words ''by the Transport Mhonty, .which counter-signed the permit. In may view this was not necessary because the Transport Authority counter-signing the per has been sufficiently identified as the trans-J authority'' of: the region where the permit to tie made valid/ One other significant matter to which I wish to refer is that in the provisions relating to the making of applications, procedure for considering these applications and the power of restricting the permits and imposing conditions etc., that is in Section 47, 48, 50, 51, 53 and 55, the indefinite article ''A'' has been pre-fixed to the Regional transport authority generally to denote any of the several regional authorities.

It is only after the stage of the grant of permit has passed that the words of description, "which granted a permit'' or ''by which the permit was granted'' or of that other region'' in Sections 59 (1) and (2), 60 (1), 61 (1) and 63 (1) have been used to specify the particular transport authority granting the permit or counter-signing the permit. It is true that the power to cancel or suspend. the permit is given " to the transport authority of the region granting the permit; but. that does not further, make that a right personal to the grantee. u/s 44 (3) (b) it may be-seen that the Provincial Transport Authority can perform the duties of a Regional Authority where there is no such authority.

If the argument that the right to cancel or suspend the permit is linked with the authority issuing the permit, is accepted that is, if it is a right personal to the grantee, then even after the regional authority for the area has been appointed, it cannot cancel or suspend the permits given by the Provincial Transport Authority. That could not have been intended to be'' the result, because after the Regional Transport Authority is appointed the Provincial Transport Authority can have no jurisdiction over the region except to the limited extent provided for u/s 44 if so the Regional Transport Authority which is actually functioning cannot regulate the Motor Transport plying in its region by either-cancelling a permit or suspending it.

Once it has been held that a delegation of the power can be validly made, and that is not question before us, the exercise of that power cannot be deemed to be personal to the Regional Authority granting the permit. On the other hand, as I have ventured to show, the various provisions of the Act point to a contrary view. Sub-section (5) of Section 44 authorises the delegation of any of the powers, that is, either the power to'' cancel or the power to suspend or both and once any or all of the powers are delegated the authority to which it is delegated becomes identified with the transport authority of the region granting the permit.

Further the Secretary under Rule 134A (xi) is only vested with, the power to suspend the permit or to suspend the counter-signatures of permits. For exercising that power no limitations have been imposed to restrict it only to cases in which the Secretary has granted the permit or counter-signed it. If a limitation of that nature was intended it would have implied the delegation of the power to the Secretary to grant the permit. Otherwise it would tantamount to saying that the delegation" of power of suspension alone would be invalid or at any rate otiose. '''' But it has been held in 1956 Andh LT 285 : AIR 1956 AP 23.), that Rule 134A (ad) is certainly within-''the scope of the rule-making-power of the Government and is therefore valid, and as observed by Rajamannar C. once a function''-is alone those prescribed by the rules, the delegation cannot be-challenged''. With great respect I agree, with the view. My answer, to the question, therefore is in the affirmative.1 D.R.R. Reference answered in the negative..