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Judgment
19 paragraphs · 1,823 wordsTejinder Singh Dhindsa, J.—The petitioner who is serving as a Deputy Superintendent of Police under the Department of Home, State of Haryana, has filed the instant writ petition assailing the action of the respondent-Department in having conducted departmental proceedings against him and which have culminated in the imposition of a major punishment of stoppage of two future annual increments with permanent effect. Brief facts are that the petitioner was appointed as probationer Assistant Sub-Inspector on 1.3.1994 and thereafter earned promotions to the rank of Sub-Inspector in the year 2000 and as Inspector on 22.5.2007. He remained posted as Inspector/SHO of Police Station City Narnaul from 16.10.2008 to 28.12.2009. A complaint regarding theft from the shop of Parveen son of Om Parkash situated on Narnaul-Rewari road, that is stated to have occurred on the intervening night of 23/24.12.2008, was received at Police Post, Mahavir Chowk, Narnaul which fell under the jurisdiction of Police Station City Narnaul. Apparently, cognizance of such complaint was not taken and FIR was not registered. The complainant approached the National Commission and only after receipt of notice dated 5.5.2009, FIR No. 146 dated 26.5.2009, under Section 457/ 380 of the Indian Penal Code, Police Station City Narnaul was registered. Against such backdrop, a regular departmental enquiry for dereliction in duty was initiated against the petitioner being the Inspector/SHO of the Police Station concerned at the relevant point of time as also against his subordinates, namely, woman/Sub Inspector Rajkala, Sub-Inspector Ved Parkash and Assistant Sub-Inspector Anand Parkash.
The Enquiry Officer i.e. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Narnaul returned the enquiry findings holding the present petitioner to be guilty and exonerating the other officials aforenoticed. Based on the enquiry findings, the Superintendent of Police, Mewat at Nuh issued show-cause notice dated 15.4.2011, Annexure P2, to the petitioner wherein a punishment of stoppage of three annual increments with permanent effect was contemplated. Petitioner furnished his reply to the show-cause notice on 6.6.2011. Vide order dated 5.7.2011 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Annexure P4, a punishment of stoppage of three future annual increments with permanent effect was imposed upon the petitioner. Insofar as the other subordinate police officials and who were exonerated by the Enquiry Officer, the Superintendent of Police by dis-agreeing with the findings also issued orders of punishment i.e. punishment of stoppage of four future annual increments with permanent effect on woman/Sub Inspector Rajkala and Assistant Sub Inspector Anand Parkash and punishment of deduction of 5% from the pension on Sub Inspector Ved Parkash.
The appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed vide order dated 22.3.2012, Annexure P6, passed by Inspector General of Police, South Range, Rewari. However, the appeals preferred by woman/Sub-Inspector Rajkala, Assistant Sub-Inspector Anand Parkash and Sub-Inspector Ved Parkash were accepted vide separate orders carrying even date i.e. 22.3.2012 passed by the Inspector General of Police and the punishment awarded to them was set aside.
The petitioner thereafter filed a revision petition before the Director General of Police, Haryana against the order rejecting his statutory appeal. Vide order dated 6.6.2013, Annexure P9, the revision petition of the petitioner has been partly accepted and the punishment of stoppage of three future annual increments with permanent effect has been modified and reduced to stoppage of two future annual increments with permanent effect.
Mr. Sat Narain Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised a twofold submission.
In the first instance, learned counsel would submit that at the relevant point of time i.e. on 5.7.2011 when the order of punishment of stoppage of three future annual increments with permanent effect had been passed by the Superintendent of Police, the petitioner was holding the post of Inspector. Accordingly, it has been contended that the Superintendent of Police is not the appointing authority of the police official of the rank of Inspector and as such, was not competent to award the punishment of stoppage of increments with permanent effect. The action of imposition of major punishment is contended to be without jurisdiction and in violation of Rule 16.1 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (for short ''1934 Rules'').
The second submission raised by the learned counsel is that the petitioner has been discriminated against and has been treated unfairly insofar as award of punishment. In this regard, it has been argued that a common regular departmental enquiry had been initiated against the petitioner as also the other police officials, namely, woman/Sub-Inspector Rajkala, Sub-Inspector Ved Parkash and Assistant Sub-Inspector Anand Parkash. Learned counsel argues that with respect to the other three officials, their appeals against the orders of punishment have been accepted by the Inspector General of Police and the punishment awarded has been set aside, whereas in the case of the petitioner, the Appellate Authority had rejected the appeal and even the revisional authority has only partly accepted the revision petition in terms of modifying and reducing the punishment to stoppage of two annual increments with permanent effect. It is contended that such action of adopting different yardsticks for awarding punishment in respect of delinquents who were otherwise similarly situated is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has been heard at length and the pleadings on record have been perused.
Chapter 16 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Vol. II relate to punishments to be imposed on police officials. Order 16.1 of the 1934 Rules as applicable to the State of Haryana reads in the following terms:
"16.1. Authorised punishment.--(1) No police officer shall be departmentally punished otherwise than as provided in these rules.
(2) The departmental punishments mentioned in the second column of the subjoined table may be inflicted on officers of the various ranks shown in the heading Nos. 3 to 6, by the officers named below each heading in each case, or by any officer of higher rank:--
A Deputy Inspector-General may prohibit by special order a Superintendent officiating in a vacancy of less than six months'' duration from carrying out an award made by him of dismissal, reduction, stoppage of increment, or forfeiture of approved service for increment unless and until such award has been confirmed by him.
(The (Superintendent of Police, Railways) or in charge of Railway Police Sub-Divisions and Officer-incharge, Constables Advanced Training Centre, shall exercise the full disciplinary powers of a Superintendent of Police in respect of the provisions of this Chapter, within the limits prescribes in the above table: Provided that in the case of a Government servant already appointed the punishment of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or stoppage of increment shall be imposed by the Authority who appointed him.
(3) For the purposes of these rules, the term ''major punishment'' shall mean the stoppage of increment, reduction in rank and dismissal and the term ''minor punishment'' shall mean all other authorized punishments.)"
The reliance placed by the learned counsel on the proviso to Rule 16.1(1) of the 1934 Rules wherein it has been stated that in the case of a Government servant already appointed, the punishment of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or stoppage of increment shall be imposed by the Authority who appointed him, is wholly mis-placed. Such proviso applies with regard to the Superintendent of Police, Railways or Incharge of Railway Police Sub Division and Officer, In-charge, Constables Advanced Training Centre having been vested with full discretionary powers of the Superintendent of Police in respect of the provisions of Chapter 16 within the limits prescribed in the above table. Such proviso would have no applicability to the facts of the present case. In the table re-produced hereinabove, it is crystal clear that punishment of stoppage of increments upon an Officer of the rank of Inspector can be imposed by the Superintendent of Police. As such, the order dated 5.7.2011 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Mewat at Nuh, Annexure P4, imposing the punishment of three annual future increments with permanent effect was within his competence in terms of Rule 16.1 of the 1934 Rules as applicable to the State of Haryana. Even otherwise, it would be apposite to take notice that such objection has been raised by the petitioner for the first time before the writ court. No such objection was taken either at the time of submission of reply to the show-cause notice dated 15.4.2011 while filing the appeal before the Inspector General of Police, South Range, Rewari or at the stage of filing the revision petition before the Director General of Police.
Even the plea with regard to discrimination raised by the learned counsel is without merit. The petitioner cannot claim parity with the other subordinate officials against whom a departmental enquiry on the same set of allegations had been initiated. The clear distinction would be that the Enquiry Officer duly appointed, had returned findings holding the petitioner guilty of the charge, whereas the other three officials had been exonerated. The Punishing Authority i.e. the Superintendent of Police had imposed punishment on the other three officials by disagreeing with the findings returned by the Enquiry Officer. That apart, the orders passed by the Inspector General of Police, Rewari of even date i.e. 22.3.2012 while accepting the appeals filed by the other three subordinate officials and placed on record at Annexure P7 (colly) would reveal that a view has been taken that no subordinate police official could have registered a case in the police station without the approval/ consent/knowledge of the SHO. It has further been observed that it was the duty of the SHO to have acted promptly on the complaint that had been lodged and to register an FIR. As such, the prayer of the petitioner to be treated at par with the other three officials as regards imposition of punishment cannot be accepted.
The Director General of Police, Haryana while dealing with the revision petition has passed the order dated 6.6.2013 at Annexure P9 and as such noticed that the departmental enquiry was conducted as per due procedure and does not suffer from any infirmity or procedural irregularity. At the same time, keeping in mind the clean record that the petitioner possessed, a lenient view has been taken and the punishment imposed had been modified and reduced to that of stoppage of two future annual increments with permanent effect. The Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, had clearly laid down that the High Court while exercising the power of judicial review would not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court does not find any basis that would warrant interference in the impugned order dated 6.6.2013 at Annexure P9 passed by the Director General of Police, Haryana.
No other point has been urged. For the reasons recorded, I find no merit in the instant writ petition and the same is dismissed.
