Satyavaan Singh vs State of Uttarakhand

Barin Ghosh, C.J.

(Delay Condonation Application No. 14129 of 2012)

There is some delay in preferring the appeal and, accordingly, an application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal has been filed. The same is not being objected by the learned Chief Standing Counsel.

We have also considered the averments made in the application for condonation of delay and being satisfied with the reasons furnished therein; condone the delay in preferring the appeal.

(Special Appeal No. 37 of 2012)

The father of the appellant, a government servant, died in harness on 17th March, 1995. At that time, the appellant was about 6 years old. On 9th March, 2000, wife of the deceased government employee and mother of the appellant made a representation that she is not mentally fit to be appointed on compassionate ground. At the same time, she held out that the appointment may be given to her minor son upon his attaining majority. The said state of affair clearly demonstrates that the mother of the appellant knew that within five years'' time, compassionate appointment is available. She held out that since she is not mentally fit, she is not insisting for compassionate appointment. The contention of the mother of the appellant, as contended in the said representation that compassionate appointment be given to the appellant upon his attaining majority, was a contention not contemplated in the Rules. In terms of the Rules governing the field, there is no dispute that right to be considered for an appointment on compassionate ground ceases upon expiry of five years from the date of the death of the deceased government employee. After the appellant became major and made a prayer for appointment on compassionate ground, this Court, on a writ petition, directed the said claim to be considered. Upon consideration, it was held that the claim for being considered for an appointment on compassionate ground is belated and, accordingly, the same is not entertain able. This decision was assailed by filing a subsequent writ petition, which has been dismissed by the judgment and order under appeal.

In the present appeal, it is the contention of the appellant that the State Government has power to relax the time fixed for making application for compassionate appointment and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the State Government ought to have had exercised its power to relax. Such power has been bestowed upon the State Government by proviso to Sub- Rule (1) of Rule 5 of the applicable Rules. The State Government can exercise power to relax only when there is undue hardship and, while doing so, is required to be just and equitable. Neither in the body of the petition nor in any other pleadings filed by the appellant upto this stage, the appellant has highlighted any undue hardship, except contending that within five years'' time, the appellant, the only son of the deceased Government employee could not attain majority. There is nothing to show why the right to be considered for appointment on compassionate ground was not exercised by the mother of the appellant, except that, in the representation made on 9th March, 2000 she had indicated that she is mentally unfit to do government service. She was otherwise mentally unfit to do government service has not attempted to be established. The logical conclusion, therefore, would be that mentally she was not prepared to do government service and, accordingly, had foregone her claim within the time by which an application could be made for appointment. Appellant was a minor at that time and, accordingly, he could not make an application for appointment. The appellant made an application after he became a major. By that time, almost 12 years had passed from the date of the death. If for 12 years, the appellant could survive without being employed, in law, there was no hardship on the basis whereof the State Government could exercise power of relaxation and thereby direct the application of the appellant to be dealt with.

We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the judgment and order under appeal and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.