Savitri vs Jasbir @ Sonu and others

This is the claimant''s appeal seeking enhancement of the award

dated 18.1.2014 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Panipat.

Monu, aged 21 years died in an accident which occurred on

4.7.2011. The Tribunal assessed the compensation by taking his income to

be that of a daily wager i.e. Rs. 4500/- per month and after making a

deduction of 50%, it applied the multiplier of 11 considering the age of the

mother to assess the loss at Rs. 2,97,000/-. A sum of Rs. 5,000/- was added

for funeral expenses. An award of Rs. 3,02,000/- was passed with interest

@ 7.5%.

The submission on behalf of the appellant is that future

prospects should have been added and the multiplier should have been 18

considering the age of the deceased and she was entitled to compensation

for loss of love and affection and also for loss to the estate and some more

amount for funeral expenses should be allowed. It was urged that minimum

wages stood at Rs. 4644/- per month in 2011 and the Tribunal had allowed

compensation taking the income to be Rs. 4500/- per month.

In the case Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan (2013) 9 SCC

65 the three Judge Bench of Supreme Court had reiterated the view taken in

Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 to the effect that in respect of a

person who was on a fixed salary without provision for annual increments

or who was self-employed, the actual income at the time of death should be

taken into account for determining the loss of income unless there are

extraordinary and exceptional circumstances.

Further, the divergence of opinion in Reshma Kumari & Ors.

v. Madan Mohan & Anr ., (2013) 9 SCC 65 and Rajesh & Ors. v. Rajbir

Singh & Ors ., (2013) 9 SCC 54 was noticed by the Supreme Court in

National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pushpa & Ors., CC No . 8058/2014,

decided on 02.07.2014 and the concluding paragraph while making

reference to the Larger Bench, it was observed as under:-

"Be it noted, though the decision in Reshma (supra) was rendered at

earlier point of time, as is clear, the same has not been noticed in

Rajesh (supra) and that is why divergent opinions have been

expressed. We are of the considered opinion that as regards the

manner of addition of income of future prospects there should be an

authoritative pronouncement. Therefore, we think it appropriate to

refer the matter to a larger Bench."

Para Nos. 27 and 28 of Union of India and another versus

Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRs. Etc. [(1989) 2 SCC 754], reproduced in

para No. 17 of Safiya Bee v. Mohd. Vajahath Hussain @ Fasi, (2011) 2

SCC 94 are relevant and are reproduced for ready reference:-

"27. What then should be the position in regard to the effect of

the law pronounced by a Division Bench in relation to a case

realising the same point subsequently before a Division Bench

of a smaller number of Judges? There is no constitutional or

statutory prescription in the matter, and the point is governed

entirely by the practice in India of the courts sanctified by

repeated affirmation over a century of time. It cannot be

doubted that in order to promote consistency and certainty in

the law laid down by a superior Court, the ideal condition

would be that the entire Court should sit in all cases to decide

questions of law, and for that reason the Supreme Court of the

United States does so. But having regard to the volume of work

demanding the attention of the Court, it has been found

necessary in India as a general rule of practice and

convenience that the Court should sit in Divisions, each

Division being constituted of Judges whose number may be

determined by the exigencies of judicial need, by the nature of

the case including any statutory mandate relative thereto, and

by such other considerations which the Chief Justice, in whom

such authority devolves by convention, may find most

appropriate. It is in order to guard against the possibility of

inconsistent decisions on points of law by different Division

Benches that the rule has been evolved, in order to promote

consistency and certainty in the development of the law and its

contemporary status, that the statement of the law by a

Division Bench is considered binding on a Division Bench of

the same or lesser number of Judges. This principle has been

followed in India by several generations of Judges. We may

refer to a few of the recent cases on the point. In John Martin

v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 836, a Division Bench of

three Judges found it right to follow the law declared in

Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 198,

decided by a Division Bench of five Judges, in preference to

Bhut Nath Mate v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 1 SCC 645

decided by a Division Bench of two Judges. Again in Indira

Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp. SCC 1, Beg J held

that the Constitution Bench of five Judges was bound by the

Constitution Bench of thirteen Judges in Kesavananda Bharati

v.State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225. In Ganapati Sitaram

Balvalkar v. Waman Shripad Mage, (1981) 4 SCC 143, this

Court expressly stated that the view taken on a point of law by

a Division Bench of four Judges of this Court was binding on a

Division Bench of three Judges of the Court. And in Mattulal v.

Radhe Lal, (1974) 2 SCC 365, this Court specifically observed

that where the view expressed by two different Division

Benches of this Court could not be reconciled, the

pronouncement of a Division Bench of a larger number of

Judges had to be preferred over the decision of a Division

Bench of a smaller number of Judges. This Court also laid

down in Acharya Maharajshri Narandraprasadji

Anandprasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 1 SCC 11

that even where the strength of two differing Division Benches

consisted of the same number of Judges, it was not open to one

Division Bench to decide the correctness or otherwise of the

views of the other. The principle was reaffirmed in Union of

India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd ., (1985) 4 SCC 369 which

noted that a Division Bench of two Judges of this Court in Jit

Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1981) 1 SCC 11 had

differed from the view taken by an earlier Division Bench of

two Judges in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P .,

(1979) 2 SCC 409 on the point whether the doctrine of

promissory estoppel could be defeated by invoking the defence

of executive necessity, and holding that to do so was wholly

unacceptable reference was made to the well accepted and

desirable practice of the later bench referring the case to a

larger Bench when the learned Judges found that the situation

called for such reference.

We are of opinion that a pronouncement of law by a

Division Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of

the same or a smaller number of Judges, and in order that such

decision be binding, it is not necessary that it should be a

decision rendered by the Full Court or a Constitution Bench of

the Court. ....."

In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr.

v. State of Maharashtra and Anr . [(2005) 2 SCC 673], (para

12), a Constitution Bench of this Court summed up the legal

position in the following terms :

"(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by

a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench

of lesser or co-equal strength.

(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from

the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case

of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite

the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter

being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than

the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It

will be open only for a Bench of co-equal strength to express

an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the

earlier Bench of co-equal strength, whereupon the matter may

be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum

larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying

down the law the correctness of which is doubted.

(3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions :

(i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the

Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster

and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for

hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and

(ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the

matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of

larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of

the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in

doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of

exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it

may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness

of the previous decision in question dispensing with the

need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice

constituting the Bench and such listing."

There are no exceptional or extraordinary circumstances in the

case and I do not propose to make any addition for future prospects. The

matter has been referred to the Larger Bench and it would not be possible

for the insurance company to make recoveries later.

The next question to be considered is the multiplier applicable

in this case. The submission made by learned counsel for the appellants was

that the multiplier has to be according to the age of the deceased as referred

to in the IInd Schedule as well in view of the latest decision of the Supreme

Court in Munnal Lal Jain Vs. Vipin Kumar Sharma, 2015 (6) Scale 522,

is liable to be rejected in view of the decision of Supreme Court in

UPSRTC Vs. Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362 which shall be a binding

precedent. The logic of taking the age of the deceased or the claimant as laid

down in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation vs.

Susamma Thomas 1994 (2) SCC 176 and Trilok Chandara (supra), was

not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court in Munna Lal Jain & Anr.

(supra). Otherwise also, in view of the judgment in Safiya Bee''s case (supra)

and Union of India and Ors. v. S.K. Kapoor, (2011) 4 SCC 589, the law

laid down in U.P.SRTC v. Trilok Chandara, (1996) 4 SCC 362 shall be

taken as a binding precedent.

The minimum wages stood at Rs. 4644/- in 2011, therefore, this

amount will have to be taken into consideration while calculating the loss.

The calculation will have to be made again. Taking the income

to be Rs. 4644/- and after deducting 50%, the amount available would be

Rs. 2322/- x 12 x 11 = 3,06,504/-. To this, a sum of Rs. 20,000/- more

should be added as funeral expenses, Rs. 1,00,000/- for loss of love and

affection to the mother and Rs. 25,000/- for loss of estate. The total of this

comes to Rs. 4,51,504/-. The Tribunal had awarded Rs. 3,02,000/- which

would be deducted and the balance would be paid at the same rate of

interest from April 2014 onwards till realization.

The appeal is partly allowed.