Seelam Lingamma vs Seelam Venkayya

Mockett, J.—The Appellant is a Hindu widow who applied to the lower Court for a succession certificate in respect of a sum of money due

to her deceased husband''s estate. The Respondent is her deceased husband''s brother. He objected to the grant of the certificate, alleging that he

was the deceased man''s undivided brother. The learned District Judge has directed the certificate to issue on condition that the Appellant should

furnish security. Accordingly a question under Sections 373(3) and 375 arose. Though it seems there was material before him, the learned Judge

did not think fit to decide this question of fact. He preferred to decide the rights of the widow to the succession certificate purely according to her

status and the terms of the will. He said also:

Prima facie the will gives the Petitioner only a life interest with remainder to reversioners specified.

The will gives the Petitioner a life interest in certain immovable properties with remainder to named persons. It also gives her an absolute estate

in certain immovable properties. This succession certificate however is concerned with money and the will is silent with regard to that.

In order to shorten the litigation in this case we propose to deal with the legal aspect of this matter. There are three decisions of the Allahabad

High Court directly in point. The first is Jai Dei v. Banwari Lal 35 (1913) All. 249 where Tudball and Muhammad Rafiq JJ. held that there might

be special circumstances for requiring a Hindu widow to give security. In Narain Dei v. Parmeshwari I.L.R (1917) AIL 81 Richards C.J. and

Banerji J. re-affirmed that security should not be taken from a Hindu widow of a separated Hindu asking for a certificate to enable her to collect

debts, in the absence of special circumstances rendering the taking of security necessary. The learned Judges point out that on an application by a

widow the only question which arises when she is admittedly entitled to a certificate is whether there are special circumstances making it expedient

that she should be directed to give security. More recently, in Kausilla Kuer Vs. Sukhdei and Others, Walsh and Ryoes JJ. dealt with the position

in very direct terms. They said:

In the ordinary way a Hindu widow ought not to be called upon to give security at all. No doubt there are many reversioners who are interested,

but it is not the business of the Court to go out of its way to look after the reversioners who have no vested interest and to assume everything

against the widow.

With that statement of the law the High Court of Patna has expressed its agreement in Badri Narain Sahu v. Lachminia AIR 1935 Pat. 10. The

learned Judges had before them exactly the point before us now and they approved in express terms the statement of the law which proceeded

from the Bench in Kausilla Kuer Vs. Sukhdei and Others, . We understand there is no direct authority in this High Court. We therefore think it

right to express our agreement with the view held by the Allahabad and Patna High Courts. It must be remembered that, as pointed out by the

Judicial Committee in Vasonji Morarji v. Chanda Bibi I.L.R.(1915) All. 369. at page 379, the estate taken by a Hindu widow is not to be

regarded as an ordinary life estate. Their Lordships approved the statement of Mr. Mayne in the eighth edition of his Hindu Law at page 870 to the

effect that a Hindu widow''s estate.

Is not a life estate, because, under certain circumstances she can give an absolute and complete title. Nor is it in any sense an estate held in trust for

the reversioners. Within the limits imposed upon her the female holder has the most absolute powers of enjoyment.

It may be that an order requiring a Hindu widow to give security for the realization of debts due to her husband''s estate would in many cases

virtually involve a prohibition on the money being collected at all and becoming barred by limitation. Accordingly, if in fact the deceased and the

Respondent became divided, then in the absence of special circumstances the widow is entitled to a succession certificate without security. But the

question as to whether they are or not divided has not been determined.

We remand the matter for rehearing to the learned District Judge, who, after he has decided the question of fact relating to the division or

otherwise, will deal with the question of the issue of a certificate in the light of the above observations. This is manifestly a case which the District

Judge should dispose of as early as possible. The Respondent does not appear. He will pay the Appellant''s costs of this civil miscellaneous appeal

in any event and of the proceedings before the learned Judge out of which this appeal arises.