High CourtsSingle Bench

Selvi J. Jayalalithaa vs State

Karnataka High Court · Decided on 10 March 2010 · Citation: (2010) 03 KAR CK 0158

HON’BLE JUDGES
K.N. Keshavanarayana, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 190 (1), 482 · Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13 (1) (e), 13 (2)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Petition No. 79 of 2010 and Miscellaneous Criminal 731 of 2010
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Judgment

54 paragraphs · 5,790 words

K.N. Keshavanarayana, J.—In this petition filed u/s 482 of Cr.P.C., the petitioner herein who has been arraigned as accused No. 1 in Special C.C. No. 208/2004 on the file of the XXXVI. Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore has sought for quashing the said criminal proceedings launched against her.

2.

The brief facts leading to the presentation of this petition are as under:

(i) During 1991 to 1996. the petitioner herein was the Chief Minister of Tamilz Nadu. However during the general election held to the State Legislature Assembly of Tamil Nadu, in 1996, the party headed by the petitioner, namely AIADMK was defeated and DMK party was voted to power. Thereafter_ several criminal cases were registered against the petitioner herein and others for various offences said to have been committed by her during her tenure as Chief Minister of the State. One such case was Special C.C. No. 7/97. The State Government constituted Special Court for the trial of the cases filed against the petitioner and others. Challenge by the petitioner herein to the constitution of Special Court came to be dismissed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court:

(ii) In Special C.C. No. 7/97, the petitioner herein along with three other accused persons arraigned as accused Nos. 2 to 4 were charge sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 120B of IPC r/w Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act [for short the PC Act]; independently for the offence punishable u/s 13(2) r/v., Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act and also for the offence punishable u/s 109 of IPC r/w Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. The petitioner herein alleged to have independently, committed the offence punishable under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act and along with accused Nos. 2 to 4, the petitioner is alleged to have committed offences punishable u/s 120-B of IPC r/w Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, while the other accused persons (accused Nos. 2 to 4) alleged to have committed the offence punishable tinder Section 109 of IPC Section 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.

(iii) On 5.6.1997 the Special Judge before whom the charge sheet came to be laid, in exercise of his powers u/s 190(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code'') took cognizance of the offences alleged and directed issue of summons to the petitioner herein as also to the other accused persons. Upon service of summons, the petitioner and the other accused persons appeared before the learned Special Judge. After hearing, the learned Special Judge framed charges for the offences punishable u/s 120-B of IPC r/w Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act against accused Nos. I to 4; for offence punishable u/s 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act against the petitioner herein (accused No. 1); and for the offence punishable u/s 109 IPC r/w Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act against accused Nos. 2 to 4. All the accused persons pleaded not guilty for the charges levelled against them and claimed to be tried. Thereafter the trial in Special C.C. No. 7/97 progressed and by April 2000, about 250 prosecution witnesses were examined leaving only about 10 more witnesses to be examined. However in the general election held in May 2001, the party headed by the petitioner herein secured an absolute majority in the State Legislative Assembly and the petitioner herein was unanimously chosen as the leader of the House by the elected members of the Legislative Assembly of that party and accordingly the petitioner was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State of Tamil Nadu. Appointment of the petitioner as Chief Minister came to be challenged before the Supreme Court and her appointment was nullified. However m the bye election held to Andipatti constituency, on 21.2.2002, the petitioner was declared elected and she was again sworn in as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. on 2.3.2002. Thereafter several developments took place in relation to the trial in Special C.C. No. 7/97 wherein 76 witnesses who had already been examined earlier were recalled for further cross examination and during the further cross examination, they appear to have resiled from their earlier evidence and in spite of the same there was no attempt on the part of the Public Prosecutor to declare them hostile and to cross examine those witnesses. in the light of those developments, petitions were filed before the Supreme Court u/s 406 of Code seeking transfer of Special C.CNc.7/97 and Special C.C. No. 2/2001 which were pending before the XI Additional Sessions Judge (Special Court No. 1), Chennai to a Court of equivalent and competent jurisdiction in any other State inter al a on the ground that free and fair trial is not going on and the process of justice is being subverted. The Supreme Court after hearing the parties to the paid transfer petition, by the judgment dated 18.11.2003, allowed the transfer petitions and ordered transfer of Special C.C. No. 7/97 and Special C.C. No. 2/2001, to the State of Karnataka with a further direction that the State of Karnataka in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka shall constitute a Special Court under the PC Act and to such Special Court Special. C.C. No. 7/97 and Special C.C. No. 2/2001 pending on the file of the XI Additional Sessions Judge (Special Court No. 1) Chennai were ordered to be transferred and the Special Court was directed to have its sitting in Bangalore.

3.

Pursuant to such direction, the Government of Karnataka constituted 36th Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge as Special Court for tying Special C.C. No. 7/97 and Special C.C. No. 2 /2001 against the petitioner herein and others and those cases were transferred to the Special Court. Upon such transfer, the case in. Special C.C. No.7/97 was re-numbered as Special C.C. No. 208/2004 and Special C.C. No. 2/2001 was :renumbered as Special C.C. No. 209/2004. Special C.C. No. 208/2004 is now pending before the Special Court for consideration. It appears certain orders passed by the Special Court were challenged before the Supreme Court in SLP No. 3829-3830/2005 and further proceedings in Special C.C. No. 208/2004 and Special C.C. No. 209/2004, came to be stayed by the Supreme Court on 5.8.2005 and on 24.4.2009, the stay order was modified. Subsequently, it appears, the Special Public Prosecutor was permitted to withdraw the prosecution in Special C.C. No. 209/2004. In the light of that, the trial in Special C.C. No. 208/2004- continued.

4.

It is at that stage, the petitioner has presented this petition seeking to quash the. criminal proceedings pending against her in Special C.C. No. 208/2004, inter alia on the grounds that she is innocent and has not committed any offences alleged against her and that the charge sheet filed did not. make out any case to take cognizance of the alleged offences; that the order dated 5.6.1997 passed by the Special Judge taking cognizance of the offence is passed routinely, mechanically and without application of judicious mind to the contents of the charge sheet and this is evident from the fact that in the order dated 5.6.1997, only the provisions relating to the criminal conspiracy and abatement read with provisions of Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act are mentioned; that since the offences punishable under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act independently against the petitioner, as stated in the charge sheet have not been mentioned in the order dated 5.6.1997, cognizance of the said offences has not been taken by the learned Special Judge as such the entire further proceedings taken thereon are illegal and without any basis and this conspicuous omission on the part of the learned Special Judge reveal non-application of judicious mind to the contents of the charge sheet, therefore, the entire proceedings is a nullity and is liable to be quashed.

5.

Along with this petition, the petitioner also filed an application Misc. Cvl. 731/2010 seeking stay of the further proceedings in Special C.C. No. 208/2004 pending disposal of this petition. Notice of this petition as well as the application for stay was served on the respondent State represented by the Senior Special Public Prosecutor.

6.

The Senior Special Public Prosecutor filed his objections to the application filed for stay inter alia contending that in the light of the provisions of Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Satya Narayan Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan, , this Court cannot pass order of stay, staying the further proceedings before the Special Court; that this petition filed seeking quashing of the order of taking cognizance passed by the Special Judge at Chennai is vexatious and is not maintainable and this petition filed about 13 years after the cognizance was taken by a Court at Chennai has been filed with a view to protract the proceedings as such it amounts to abuse of process of law; that quashing of the order dated 5.6.1997 or staying the proceedings would amount to disobedience of the direction of the Supreme Court; that there is no illegality or irregularity in the impugned order: that in any event the issue can be of no consequence ac the trial is almost concluded and it is not shown as to how the petitioner is prejudiced by the alleged irregularity; that the present petition is highly speculative one and the petitioner having unsuccessfully challenged the different orders including the order of granting sanction, has presented this petition only with a view to protract the proceedings. Therefore, the Senior Special Public Prosecutor sought for dismissal of the application for stay as well as the petition.

7.

Satya Narayan Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan, , the Apex Court, interpreting the provisions of Section 19(3) of the PC Act, has held that none of the provisions in the Code could be invoked for circumventing any one of the bans enumerated in Sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the PC Act, and this ban would apply even where a Court is exercising inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code. In the light the law laid down by the Apex Court, there is no scope for considering the application for stay or to grant an order of stay, staying further proceedings. Hence the application Misc. Crl. 731/2010 is dismissed.

8.

In the light of the fact that the matter pending before the Special Court is already more than 13 years old, by consent of learned Senior Counsel appearing on both sides, the matte, was heard on merits of the petition.

9.

Sri. L. Nageswara Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner reiterating the grounds urged in the petition contended that a cursory look at the order dated 5.6.1997 indicates that there is no application of judicious mind by the learned Special Judge to the voluminous materials produced by the investigating officer along with the charge sheet, though the settled law requires the Magistrate/Special Court empowered to take cognizance, to apply their judicious mind to the materials placed before them as., part of the final report filed u/s 173 of the Code to find out as to whether there is any case made out for taking. cognizance of the offence alleged and such application of judicious mind on the part of the learned Magistrate/Special Judge should be reflected in the order that may be passed regarding taking of cognizance. Of course the learned Senior Counsel fairly submitted that it is not necessary for the learned Magistrate/Special Judge at the stage of taking cognizance to pass a detailed order by referring to the materials placed before the Court but according to the learned Senior Counsel, there is a need for passing an order, may be a brief one, but even such a brief order should indicate or reflect the application of judicious mind on the part of the learned Magistrate/Special Judge to the materials placed before the Court and the existence of a prima facie case for taking cognizance of the offence alleged. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the order dated 5.6.1997 in so many words do not indicate that. the learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of the offences alleged and it also do not reflect that the learned Special Judge has applied his judicious mind before ordering taking of cognizance. It is the further submission of the learned Senior Counsel that though according to the contents of the charge sheet, offence punishable under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act has been independently alleged to have been committed by accused No. 1, the order dated 5.6.1997 do not even make a mention about the said offences independently and this is indicative of the fact that the learned Special Judge has not applied his judicious mind and therefore the order dated 5.6.1997 purported to take cognizance of some of the offences alleged therein is bad in law as such further proceedings pursuant thereto are all vitiated and therefore, the entire proceedings is liable to be quashed. Learned Senior Counsel in support of his submissions sought to place reliance on several decisions.

10.

Per contra, Sri. B.V. Acharya, learned Senior Special Public Prosecutor appointed for conducting the case before the Special Court, submitted as under:

That the petition is filed only with a view to protract the proceedings as Special Court is now considering the application filed by the prosecution to recall some of the witnesses as pet Knitted by the Supreme Court and to see that the proceedings are stalled; that there are no bona-fides on the part of the petitioner in filing this petition after 13 years of the order passed regarding taking of cognizance; that the petitioner on earlier occasions had challenged different orders including the order of granting sanction, before the Supreme Court and in none of those petitions, she I ad contended that the order dated 5.6.1997 taking cognizance of the offence is a nullity in the eye of law and that it is illegal and this circumstance would indicate that the present petition is filed only with malafide intention of protracting the proceedings and to stall the further trial of the case; that in the light of the directions issued by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the judgment passed in the Transfer.. Petition No. 77-78 of 2003, this Court cannot entertain this petition or quash the proceedings as it would result in disobedience of the directions of the Supreme Court; that in the order dated 5.6.1997 though the offence punishable under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act has not been independently mentioned, nevertheless there is reference to those offences in the said order and the direction contained in the said order regarding issue of summons to the accused would indicate that the learned Special Judge has applied his judicious mind to the materials placed before him and was satisfied about the existence of prima facie case to take cognizance of the offences alleged and therefore, the said order is perfectly in accordance with law and there is no illegality in the said order; that pursuant to the servico of summons, the petitioner herein appeared before the Special Judge and pleaded not guilty for the charges levelled against him including the charge for the offence punishable under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act and has participated in the trial which went on for several years, therefore at this stage, it is not open to the petitioner to question the order passed regarding taking cognizance contending that there is no application of judicious mind; that assuming for the purpose of argument that there is some irregularity in the order dated 5.6.1997, in the light of the provisions of Section 465 of the Code, this Court in exercise of inherent powers u/s 482 of the Code, cannot quash the proceedings as, the alleged irregularity has not vitiated the trial of the case nor it has occasioned in the failure of justice, as such there are no grounds to quash the proceedings therefore he sought for dismissal of the petition. The learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance on several decisions.

11.

In the light of the above, the point that arise for consideration is,

Whether the prosecution pending against the petitioner in Special C.C. No. 208/2004 is liable to be quashed in exercise of the power of this Court u/s 482 of the Code?

12.

Now by catena, of decisions of the Supreme Court, the principles relating exercise of jurisdiction u/s 482 Code to quash the complaint or criminal proceedings are well settled. According to these principles a criminal proceedings can be quashed if the materials placed before the Court along with the final report submitted u/s 173 of the Code, even accepting as true and correct at its face value, does not constitute any offence alleged or make out the case alleged against the accused. Proceedings may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, or when the criminal proceeding is les and to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

13.

In the case on hand, the petitioner has sought for quashing the proceedings on the ground that the order dated 5.6.1997 passed by the Special Judge at Chennai ordering, issue of summons to her is a nullity in the eye of law as the said order has been passed without application of judicious mind and therefore in law there is no order taking cognizance of the offences alleged as such the entire proceedings is liable to be quashed. As could be seen from the copy of the charge sheet produced, the following offences are said to have been committed by the accused persons:

(1) "Act: Indian Penal Code, Section 120B r/w Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

(2) "Act: Prevention of Corruption Act-1988* Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) Prevention of Corruption ACt, 1988.

(3) "Act: Indian Penal Code. Section 109 r/w Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988".

14.

The order dated 56.1997 passed by the Special Court at Chennai reads as under:

Taken on file u/s 120(B) of IPC r/w Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act and u/s 109 of LPG r/w 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act. Issue summons to the accused to appear on 11.6.1997. Prepare copies.

The petitioner alleging that the above order passed is illegal and not in accordance with law as such it is a nullity, has sought for quashing of the proceedings.

15.

Though several provisions contained in Chapter XIV of the Code uses the word `cognizance'', the said word has not been defined in the Code. The expression ''taking cognizance'' has been the subject matter of judicial interpretation in many decisions of the Apex Court and this Court.

16.

In R.R. Chari Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, it was observed that.

...''taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate as such applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence''.

17.

In Darshan Singh Ram Kishan Vs. The State of Maharashtra, , while considering the purport of Section 190 of the Code, it has been observed thus,

Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance, therefore, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. This is the position whether the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint, or on a police report, or upon information of a person other than a police officer.

18.

In Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas Vs. The State of West Bengal, , the Apex Court while considering the case in which the Magistrate had taken cognizance of offences as per Section 190(1)(a) of the code has observed that,

before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence u/s 190(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of the Chapter- proceedings u/s 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report u/s 202.

It was further observed that,

there is no special charm or any magical formula in the expression "taking cognizance" which merely means judicial application of the mind of the Magistrate to the fact, mentioned in the complaint with a view to taking further action.

It was also observed that

what Section 190 contemplates is that the Magistrate takes cognizance once he makes himself fully conscious and aware of the allegations made in the complaint and decides to examine or test the validity of the said allegations.

19.

In Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar (1993) 2 SCC 161, it has been held that,

when the Magistrate takes notice of the accusations and applies his mind to the allegations made in the complaint or police report or information and on being satisfied that the allegations, if proved., would constitute an offence; decides to initiate judicial proceedings against the alleged offender, he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence.

20.

in State of West Bengal and another Vs. Mohammed Khalid and others, the Apex Court after taking note of the fact that the expression "taking cognizance" has not. been defined in the Code has held thus in para 43.

In its broad and literal sense, it means taking, notice of an offence This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word ''cognizance'' indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and. ''net. of persons.

21.

After referring to all the above decisions, the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka and Another Vs. Pastor P. Raju, has observed thus in Para -13,

13.

It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the farts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process is at a subsequent stage when after considering the material placed before it the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out.

22.

As held in Tula Ram and Others Vs. Kishore Singh, ; in State of Bihar and Another Vs. P.P. Sharma, IAS and Another, ; and in Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, , it is only upon consideration of the materials submitted along with the final report u/s 173 of the Code, and satisfying himself that the prima facie case is made out, the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance as per Section 190(1)(b) of the Code takes cognizance of the offences alleged and proceeds to take further steps for issue of process to the accused persons, then only proceedings in a criminal case stand commenced. Therefore, taking cognizance of the offences alleged on application of judicious mind is a condition precedent for proceeding with the criminal prosecution against any person, and as a corollary if cognizance of the offence is not taken in accordance with law, certainly criminal prosecution cannot be proceeded with.

23.

In Devendra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Another, it has been held that it is obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to apply his mind to the contents of the charge sheet, and such application of mind on his part should be reflected in the order.

24.

In the background of these well settled principles of haw let me consider the contention urged in support of this petition.

25.

No doubt, perusal of the order dated 5.6.1997 passed by the Special Judge at Chennai indicates that the learned Special Judge has not in so many words stated that he has taken the cognizance of the offences. However, the learned Judge after referring to the offences, has directed issue of summons to the accused persons to appear before the Court. This, as rightly contended by the learned Senior Special Public Prosecutor, is indicative of the fact that the learned Special Judge has taken the cognizance of the offences, alleged on application of his judicious mind. As fairly submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the Special ''Judge was not required to pass a detailed order while taking cognizance to indicate his application of mind. What is required at that stage is only to indicate that the Special Judge has apprised himself of the facts of the case and the offences alleged and satisfied that there is .a case for taking cognizance of such offences. No doubt, the offence punishable under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of PC Act has been independently mentioned in the charge sheet and the same has not been independently indicated in the order dated 5.6.1997. Nevertheless there is reference in the order dated 5.6.1997 to the offence punishable under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of PC Act, of course, in the context of the offence punishable u/s 120-B of IPC and 109 of IPC.

26.

It is highly difficult to accept the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the fact that the offence punishable under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of PC Act are not independently mentioned in the order dated 5.6.1997 as alleged in the charge sheet, is indicative of non application of judicious mind of the learned Special Judge. At this stage, it is necessary to note that though the petitioner appeared before the learned Special Judge pursuant to the service of summons in . the year 1997 itself, and she was represented by eminent lawyers and though she had challenged several orders passed by the Special Judge on several occasions, in none-of those petitions it was contended that the order dated 5.6.1997 is a nullity. In fact, as noticed earlier, after the appearance, the learned Special Judge framed charges against the petitioner and others wherein the petitioner is charged for the offences punishable u/s Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of PC Act independently and of course the petitioner has pleaded not guilty for the same. The petitioner has participated in the trial of the case during which period as many as 200 and odd witnesses were examined and cross examined, During this entire period, she did not contend that there, is no proper order taking cognizance of the offence alleged. It appears only when the deck was cleared for further trial of the case before the Special Court at Bangalore and when the prosecution filed application before the Special Court for recalling some of the witnesses for the purpose of cross examination by treating them hostile as observed by the Supreme Court, the petitioner appears to have come up with this petition. No doubt there is no limitation prescribed for filing a petition u/s 482 Code and the power u/s 482 Code could be invoked at any stage of the proceedings. However, in the case on hand, having regard to fact that the petitioner has consciously participated in the proceedings for nearly 13 years, ably represented by eminent Lawyers, it is not open to her now to seek quashing of the proceedings on the premise that the order of taking cognizance of the offence passed on 5.6.1997 is a nullity and it is not in accordance with law.

27.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court in the judgment passed in transfer petitions, after noticing the events that have gone on in the case subsequent to the petitioner becoming the Chief Minister of the State, observed that free and fair trial is not going on and the process of justice is being subverted. It is for that reason, the cases were ordered to be transferred to a Special Court at Bangalore. After the transfer of the case to the Special Court at Bangalore, the stay granted by the Supreme Court on 5.8.2005 in SLP. No. 3829- 3830/2005 was in force till 24.4.2009 and subsequently, the prosecution in Special C.C. No. 209/2004 came to be withdrawn and thus the Special Court was required to proceed with the further trial of Special C.C. No. 208/2004. it is not in dispute that thereafter the prosecution filed application before the Special Court seeking to recall some of the witnesses and the said application was opposed by the petitioner and the Special Court has reserved its order on the said application It is at that stage, the petitioner has approached this Court, The power u/s 482 of the Code is meant to prevent the abuse of process of the Court and invocation of the power u/s 482 of Code by a party should not amount to abuse of the process of law. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the conduct on the part of the petitioner in keeping quite for 13 long years and having participated in the proceedings, it is not open to her at this stage of the proceedings to seek quashing of the proceedings on the premise that there is no proper order regarding the taking of cognizance. In the facts and circumstances of the case, if the power u/s 482 of the Code is exercised, it would amount to abuse of the process of law.

28.

As per the provisions of Section 465 of the Code, unless in the opinion of the court failure of justice has in fact, been occasioned, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be revised or altered by a Court of appeal on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, judgments or other proceedings before or during the trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under the Code. According to Sub-section (2), in determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceedings under the Code has occasioned a failure of justice, the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could or should have been raised at an earlier stage of proceedings.

29.

In the case on hand, the petitioner had ample opportunity to have raised this contention earlier as she had challenged several orders of the Special Court at different times before the higher courts and in none of those petitions she had urged this point as a ground. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, this defect in the order is inherent defeat and not a technical defect and therefore provision of Section 465 of the Code has no application.

30.

I see no substance in this contention. In the first place, I find no error in the order dated 5.6.1997. It cannot be said that the learned Special Judge at Chennai had not applied its mind to the materials placed before him and that he has not taken cognizance of the offence after making himself aware of the case. The order dated 5.6.1997 is sufficient to indicate that the learned Special Judge had applied his mind to the material on record and was fully satisfied about the existence of prima facie case to take notice of the offences alleged and the fact that he directed issue of summons to the accused persons is indicative of the fact that he has taken cognizance. The order dated 5.6.1997 do not suffer from any illegality or irregularity. At the second place, assuming that there ''are some irregularities in the order dated 5.6.1997, it is a technical defect and on that ground, the proceedings cannot be quashed, in exercise of the power u/s 462 of the Code. At this stage, it is necessary to notice the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Santosh De and Anr.'' v. Archna Guha and Ors. (1934) 2 Scc 420 at para 15 as under:

15.

The facts of this case impel us to say how easy it has become today to delay the trial of criminal cases. An accused so minded can stall the proceedings for decades together, if he has the means to do so. Any and every single interlocutory is challenged in the superior courts and the superior courts, we are pained to say, are falling prey to their stratagems. We expect the superior courts to resist all such attempts. Unless a grave illegality is committed, the superior courts should not interfere. They should allow the court which is seized of the matter to go on with it. There is always an appellate court to correct the errors. One should keep in mind the principle behind Section 465 Cr.P.C. Any and every irregular qty or infraction of a procedure provision cannot constitute a ground for interference by a superior court unless such irregularity or infraction has caused irreparable prejudice to the party and requires to be corrected at that stage itself. Such frequent interference by superior court at the interlocutory stages tends to defeat the ends of justice instead of serving those ends. It should not be that a man with enough means is able to keep the law at bay. That would mean the failure of the very system,

''The above extracted observation of the Supreme Court squarely applies to the case on hand.

31.

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and the fact that the petitioner had participated in the proceedings for nearly 15 years, and since the case is almost at the fag end of the trial, assuming that there is some irregularity in the order dated 5.6.1997, it cannot be said that prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. As no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner,. it is not fair or proper for this Court at this stage to entertain this petition and quash the proceedings. Therefore, looking from any angle, I find no ground to quash the proceedings. Therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed.

32.

Accordingly, the petition as well as Misc. Crl.731/2010 are dismissed.