SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT OF POST OFFICES vs C. SEKHARAN

THE preliminary objection raised by the Registry is that there is a delay of 250 days in filing the instant revision petition. The petitioner has moved an application for condonation of said delay. The petitioner has explained the cause of delay in Para 2 of the application for condonation of delay, which runs as follows:- "2. That the revisionist has sought legal opinion on the scope of filing a revision petition before National Commission from Department of Legal affairs and it took 5 months to get the expert opinion and also some administrative reasons resulted in delay in filing the petition before National Commission ".

WE have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners. She submitted that the petitioners belong to a Government Department and, therefore, the delay should be condoned. To our mind, this is a lame excuse for condonation of delay. Day-to-day delay for 250 days, which amounts to 8 or more than 8 months '', was not explained, in the said application. It is difficult to fathom as to why did the petitioners procrastinate in pursing this matter. The law does not make special provision for the State or Government. The following authorities go to dovetail this case. A) In State of West Bengal v. Brojesh Chandra Singha Barman, 2005 (3) CHN 19, 24, it was held that a bare perusal of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, makes it plain that the material part of the language of proviso appended to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act is in pari materia therewith. Therefore, it would seem settled beyond caisil that it is incumbent on the petitioner to explain each day of default, beyond the terminus line of the prescribed period of limitation. B) In Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras ". C) In Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361, it has been observed that "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved, nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown, then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion, it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts, and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. " D) In Sow Kamalabai, W/o. Narasaiyya Shrimal and Narsaiyya, S/o Sayanna Shrimal v. Ganpat Vithalroa Gavare, 2007 (1) Mh.LJ 807, it was held that the expression ''sufficient cause '' cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a ''sufficient one '' for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such ''sufficient cause '' stated in the application and no such interference in the impugned order is called for. E) In Delhi Development Authority v. Ramesh Kumar, 1996 (2) CCC 150 (Del.), it was observed that when appellant found grossly negligent and administrative delays have not been properly explained, application for condonation is liable to be dismissed. [Emphasis Supplied].

SEE the observations made by the Apex Court in State Bank of India v. B.S. Agricultural Industries (I), II (2009) CPJ 29 (SC)=II (2009) SLT 793=2009 CTJ 481 (SC) (CP), Vikram Das v. Financial Commissioner and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1221 and Government of UT, Electricity Department and Ors. v. Ram Lubhai, II (2006) CPJ 104.

DUE to the said inordinate delay, the case is barred by time, hence, the revision petition is dismissed. Revision Petition dismissed.